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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines rivalry linkages—ties such as alliances or shared
disputes which connect different international rivalries to one another. Drawing on stepsto-war theory, I argue that many rivalry linkages form as a result of the coercive, “power
politics” strategies that rivals often employ in their dealings with one another. These
strategies encourage states to attempt to gain advantages over their rivals by pursuing
alliance partners or by inviting third parties to intervene in their disputes. Consequently,
when rivalries employ these strategies, they tend to establish linkages between their
rivalry and others. I also argue that the accumulation of rivalry linkages has several
important effects on rivalry dynamics. First, linkages provide an avenue for diffusion of
conflicts across rivalries, making it more likely that rivalries will “catch” others’ disputes
and that their disputes will be joined by third parties. Second, the presence of rivalry
linkages also complicates diplomatic negotiations and makes it more difficult for rivals to
resolve their disputes peacefully.
I test some of the implications of my theory in three empirical chapters. The first
chapter examines the causes of rivalry linkage. Consistent with the argument, I find that
states involved in rivalry were significantly more likely to form alliances and join in
disputes with other states that were also involved in rivalries. These kinds of linkages are
especially likely to form between rivalries that shared common enemies. In the second
chapter, I explore the effects of rivalry linkages on the risk of militarized disputes and
war between rivals. Using bivariate probit models, I find that rivalries with larger
numbers of linkages are more likely to experience militarized disputes and that these
disputes are more likely to be joined by other states and to escalate to war. The third
chapter assesses the impact on de-linking on rivalry duration. Here, I find that t rivalries
which accumulate larger numbers of linkages tend to last longer and the severing of
rivalry linkages (or de-linking) significantly shortens rivalry. Together these findings
suggest that linkages have important effects on rivalry dynamics, and that they deserve
greater attention from scholars and policymakers.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
On its surface, the visit by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev to the small,
sparsely populated island of Kunashir on September 10th, 2010, would seem to be to be
an unlikely candidate to be the trigger for a major international incident. Medvedev spent
just four hours on the island. For most of his visit, he played tourist. He visited a visited a
geothermal power station and a fish packing plant, sampled the local caviar and spoke
with shopkeepers. Before leaving, he made a short speech pushing the government’s
plans for promoting regional economic development. “Life will be better here”, he said,
“like it is in central Russia” (Anishchuk 2010, 1).That evening, he even posted a picture
of the island’s coast on his official Twitter account with the caption: “There are so many
picturesque places in Russia… Kunashir”(Zakaria 2010).
However, despite his short stay, Medvedev’s visit to Kunashir did not go
unnoticed by the international community. This is because Kunashir is one of the four
disputed Southern Kuril Islands, which were seized by Soviet forces from the Japanese
Empire in the closing days of World War II. Although Russia has occupied and governed
the islands since 1948, Japan still considers them to be part of its territory, and their
occupation remains an emotional issue for many Japanese. The day after Medvedev’s
visit, the Japanese Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, described it as an act of “impermissible
rudeness” and recalled his ambassador from Moscow (Oki and Yamaguchi 2010). The
Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, then responded coldly, declaring that the
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Japanese response was “unacceptable” and proudly proclaiming that “the Russian
president was visiting Russian land” and “Russian territories” in “a Russian region”
(Anishchuk 2010, 2). Five months later, Medvedev announced that in order to better
defend Kunashir against potential Japanese aggression, Russia had deployed an advanced
anti-aircraft missile system to the island and had begun plans to substantially increase in
the size of its pacific fleet (Reuters 2011). Perhaps most alarmingly for the Japanese, this
increase in Russian military deployments also coincided with the release of a joint
statement by both China and Russia which asserted the legitimacy of both countries’
territorial claims1 against Japan and their desire to work together in order to address them
(Oki and Yamaguchi 2010). The sudden involvement of China (which is now Japan’s
biggest trading partner) in the dispute raised fears in Japan that the Chinese and Russians
might attempt to use economic pressure in order to force Japan into giving up its claims.
Although the immediate danger of an international crisis has now passed, tensions in the
region remain high.
Diplomatic rows, like the dispute over Medvedev’s visit to Kunashir, can
sometimes be quite puzzling for observers of international politics. We generally like to
assume that most states, especially those that are large, powerful, and economically
advanced, will behave rationally, and that their governments will place objective national
interests and their citizens’ well-being ahead of petty disputes or nationalist saber-rattling.
However, in this case, three of the world’s largest and most powerful states seem to have
been willing to risk economic disruptions, and perhaps even military conflict, in order to

1

China’s primary territorial claims against Japan concern the uninhabited Senkaku islands, which are
claimed by China but have been controlled by Japan since 1895.
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secure their claims to a few small pacific islands. For political scientists, the apparent
willingness of three major powers to risk so much over such seemingly small stakes
raises several important questions.
First, how did the dispute over the Southern Kurils become so salient? The islands
are arguably peripheral territories for both Russia and Japan. They are relatively poor in
natural resources and have few inhabitants, and they have never been a part of either
country’s historical homelands. Why, then, is control over the islands such an important
issue in both countries?
Second, why has this dispute continued to remain so contentious for so long? In
the more than fifty years since the islands were first seized, both of the governments
which were originally party to the dispute have collapsed, and Japan and Russia have
made fundamental changes to their foreign policy. In Japan, the constitution now asserts
that the Japanese people have forever renounced war as a legitimate means for settling
international disputes, and Japan has formally given up its territorial claims to former
colonies in places like Korea and Taiwan. Likewise, during the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Moscow relinquished its control over vast stretches of territory in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia. Given the scope of these territorial concessions, why should these
governments continue to covet four small islands in the North Pacific?
Third, why has China now decided to become involved in the dispute? By issuing
a joint statement with Russia, it has made the dispute over the Southern Kuril Islands an
important part of its own bilateral relationship with Japan, endangering an increasingly
important trading relationship and jeopardizing continued cooperation from Japan in
regards to other issues, such as Japan's willingness to withhold diplomatic recognition
3

from Taiwan. Why would China risk its relatively good relationship with Japan in order
to help the Russians?
These are difficult questions, and it is perhaps tempting to ignore them, and to
dismiss the Kunashir incident as being simply the product of Russian or Japanese
nationalism, or a lack of proper caution by the leadership in both countries. However,
doing so would abandon an opportunity for inquiry, and also overlook an important fact
about the Kuril Islands dispute; a fact which suggests that the dispute may still produce
new confrontations in the future. For what makes this dispute so dangerous is not just that
it evokes nationalist sentiment or creates opportunities for leaders to inflate external
threats. What makes this dispute particularly dangerous is that it is also situated within
the context of an enduring rivalry relationship. For more than 150 years, Russia and
Japan have been in a state of enduring rivalry, and have experienced an unbroken series
of more than fifty militarized disputes, including two wars. Although the issues, leaders
and governments associated with these disputes have changed dramatically over the
years, the rivalry has endured and deepened, to the point to which it has become well
established in both countries’ foreign policy institutions and national cultures.
Consequently, when disputes occur between Russia and Japan, they take place within the
context of a longer history of recurrent military confrontation and national grievances.
This history magnifies the importance of seemingly minor issues, like the dispute over
ownership of the Kuril Islands, and it encourages leaders and citizens on both sides of the
rivalry to see each other’s intentions as hostile. In this environment, even relatively small
actions, like an official visit or even a provocative tweet, can be interpreted as threats.
Thus, rivalry goes a long way towards explaining why the Kuril Islands dispute is so
4

salient, and why it does not appear to be going away any time soon.
Yet, in itself, the concept of rivalry does not tell us much about the third question
associated with the Kunashir incident, concerning China’s motivations for becoming
involved in the dispute. If anything, the existence of a Russo-Japanese rivalry suggests
that China should wish to avoid becoming entangled in a long-running international feud.
Furthermore, if one focused only on the Russo-Japanese rivalry and ignored China’s
involvement, then one would also miss an important dimension of the Kunashir incident
and underestimate the risks which a confrontation with Russia over the issue poses for
Japan.
In order to fully understand Kuril Islands dispute, as well many other
confrontations between rivals, it is sometimes necessary to go beyond the notion of
international rivalry as being simply a relationship between a pair of states (or dyad) with
a history of conflict. Often, rivalries also entail recurrent interactions with third parties. In
some cases, these third parties intervene in ways which constrain rivals and lessen the
risk of military confrontations, but in others, such as in the case of China's involvement in
the dispute over the Kurils, they intervene in ways which raise the stakes and increase
international tensions. These interventions are likely to be especially dangerous when
third parties are also involved in rivalries themselves. In these situations, they bring with
them their own diplomatic baggage and conflict histories, which can serve to promote the
escalation of the dispute or even encourage additional states to become involved.
In this regard, China’s potential motivation for becoming involved in the Kuril
Islands dispute becomes much clearer when one considers its rivalry relationships and the
linkages between them and the Russo-Japanese rivalry. Since the 1870s, China has had
5

ongoing rivalries with both Russia and Japan. Consequently, China has a potential
interest in how the Russo-Japanese rivalry plays out, as it pits two of its enemies against
one another. While the Chinese ultimately may not want either side to emerge victorious,
they do have an interest in making sure the rivalry remains costly for both Russia and
Japan, so that it consumes resources which might otherwise be directed towards both
countries’ disputes with China. In this regard, the Chinese have intervened in RussoJapanese disputes in the past and have often sought to play one side off of the other in
order to further their foreign policy goals. For example, during the latter decades of the
Cold War, the People’s Republic of China occasionally worked with Japan to thwart
Soviet ambitions in East Asia. In fact, as recently as 1989, China had publicly supported
Japan in the Kuril Islands dispute, and had asked the Soviet Union to consider returning
the islands (Oki and Yamaguchi 2010). However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
China has tended to work with Russia in an attempt to limit the expansion of Japanese
and American influence in the region. Thus, in this light, Kunashir is not just a potential
point of confrontation between Russia and Japan. It is also an important part of a broader
complex of regional security relationships that involve several competing major powers. .
In this dissertation, I attempt to shed light on some of these complex rivalry
relationships by examining the linkages which connect different dyadic rivalries to one
another. In doing so, I build on the work of a small, but significant, group of studies
within the rivalry literature which suggest that extra-dyadic relationships (or in other
words, relationships with third parties) have an important effect on rivalry dynamics. My
dissertation contributes to this research by developing and testing a theory which explains
how most rivalry linkages form and which generates a number of expectations about how
6

the accumulation of linkages is likely to affect rivals’ behavior. The results of my
empirical analyses, which are presented later in this manuscript, lend support to the
theory and indicate that rivalries which become linked tend to last longer and entail
higher levels of conflict.
In the next section of this chapter, I discuss the significance of rivalries in
international politics and the role that the rivalry concept plays in the scholarly study of
international conflict. I then describe more precisely what rivalry linkages are, and
provide a brief review of the literature that addresses them. In the last section, I present a
plan for the rest of the dissertation.

Rivalries in International Politics
Rivalries are long-term, competitive relationships between pairs of states that are
characterized by recurrent militarized disputes and mutual perceptions of threat, hostility
and mistrust (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Thompson 2001). Today, there are 37 ongoing
rivalries in the international system involving 39 states2. Each of the world's major
powers is currently involved in at least one international rivalry, as are all nuclear states,
with the exception of France. Afghanistan holds what is perhaps the dubious distinction
of being the current world leader in rivalry, with five active contests. Some of these
rivalries are fairly old, like its rivalries with Russia and Pakistan (which began in 1980
and 1949, respectively), but others, like its rivalries with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are
relatively new and emerged after the end of the Cold War (both rivalries began in 1993).

2

This figure is calculated using the Diehl and Goertz (2000) list of international rivalries and includes both
“enduring” and “proto” rivalries.

7

The same is also true of rivalries in the international system more broadly. While the
average rivalry has been around for more than 30 years, 13 new rivalries have formed
since 1990.
Rivalries are important for students of international conflict because rivals are
much more likely to fight one another than are other pairs of states. Although rivalries
account for only a tiny fraction of all dyads, they are responsible for about 75% of wars
and about 80% of militarized disputes (Goertz and Diehl in Midlarsky 2000, 225). Thus,
most international conflict is conflict between rivals. Rivals also tend to fight one another
repeatedly over time. Since 1945, almost half of all inter-state wars occurred as part of a
series of confrontations between rivals, such as Israel and Egypt (five wars) or India and
Pakistan (four wars). Furthermore, even when rivals are not fighting, they often engage in
behaviors that have serious consequences for international security, such as arms races or
the issuing of coercive threats.
The extraordinary conflict-proneness of rivalries is made all the more striking
when one considers that outside of rivalry relationships, the world appears to be growing
more peaceful. The frequency of inter-state wars, especially between major powers,
seems to have been declining since the end of World War II (Mueller 2009), and for large
portions of the planet, including most of the states in Europe and the Western
Hemisphere, large-scale military conflict has become nearly unthinkable. Although many
states continue to have disputes, sometimes quite serious ones, there seems to be very
little support among elites or the mass public in much of the world for resolving these
disputes in ways that might entail the use of military force. This is a profound change
from centuries of common practice in statecraft, and it has led John Mueller (2009) to
8

suggest that war, like dueling, may be fading out of existence as a socially acceptable
institution for resolving conflicts. Other scholars are less optimistic about the end of war,
but it is widely accepted that much of the world now lies within a “zone of peace”
(Singer and Wildavsky 1993, 4) maintained by factors such as joint democracy (Doyle
1986, Maoz and Russett 1993), high levels of economic interdependence (Oneal and
Russett 1997) or nuclear deterrence (Zagare 1990).
Thus, rivalries are something of an oddity in international politics; they are small
islands of enduring conflict in a much larger sea of more peaceful dyads. For this reason,
researchers frequently use rivalry as a means of selecting cases in which to test
theoretical arguments about the causes of war or other conflict phenomena, such as arms
races (Diehl 1985) or deterrent threats (Huth and Russett 1993). In addition, there is also
a significant literature which examines rivalry as a subject of inquiry in its own right.
These studies have made a significant contribution to conflict research by revealing that
many militarized disputes are related to one another over time and by helping scholars to
better understand the ways in which individual conflicts fit within the broader context of
enduring international relationships.
Yet while rivalries have become an increasingly important part of the study of
international relations, there is still a great deal that we do not know about them. For one
thing, it is still not entirely clear what causes rivalry in the first place. Some studies have
shown that states are more likely to develop rivalries when they have disputes over highly
salient issues (Hensel 1998) or have disputes that end in stalemates (Goertz, Jones and
Diehl 2005), but we are still a long way from being able to predict when and where new
rivalries are likely to emerge. Likewise, we still do not fully understand the processes by
9

which rivalries develop and change over time. Here, there is ongoing debate about the
nature of rivalry dynamics, with some studies arguing that rivalries tend to be relatively
stable relationships (Diehl and Goertz 2000) and others arguing that they tend to escalate
as they wear on (Hensel 1998).
One of the least understood aspects of rivalry is the way in which different
rivalries may be connected to one another. This area has received very little attention
from rivalry researchers because they have generally been more interested in examining
the connections between rivals’ interactions over time rather than at looking at the ways
in which these interactions might be linked to events in other rivalries. However, as a
practical matter, it is clear that rivalries are often strongly affected by events in other
ongoing international conflicts. The rivalries that existed between many US and Soviet
client states, for example, were frequently influenced by changes in relations between
their superpower patrons, and it is perhaps not surprising that few of these contests have
survived the end of the Cold War. Similarly, many contemporary rivalries, such as those
between Israel and its Arab neighbors, appear to be closely connected, as they revolve
around common sets of issues and share many of the same militarized disputes. Scholars
have long been aware that these kinds of extra-dyadic relationships exist (Kinsella 1994,
1997; Schroeder in Thompson 1999; Colaresi 2005), but so far, these relationships have
largely been ignored by the rivalry literature. Only a handful of studies devote much
attention to the issue of rivalry linkage, and even for these works, linkages were generally
not their primary concern.
For students of international rivalry, the failure to address rivalry linkages is
potentially problematic for several reasons. First, if these extra-dyadic linkages do have a
10

significant effect on rivals' behavior, then it raises the possibility that existing models of
rivalry dynamics or rivalry conflict may be vulnerable to omitted variable bias (Vasquez
and Leskiw 2001). That is, we may be ignoring an important set of influences on rivalry
which may account for unexplained aspects of rivals' behavior or which may interact with
other known explanatory variables and causal relationships. If this is true, then existing
models of rivalry may be underspecified. Second, the neglect of rivalry linkages also
leaves us blind to important research questions. For example, rather than simply asking
what causes conflicts between rivals, we might also ask what causes conflicts between
rivals to spread to other dyads, or what causes states in one rivalry to become involved in
the affairs of another. These questions can help to push the rivalry research program
forward into new areas and help to provide a new source of insights into the sources of
conflict between rivals.
For policymakers, there are also a number of reasons why the issue of rivalry
linkage should not be ignored. If linkages exacerbate rivalry conflict, then this suggests
that conflict mediation efforts may need to be multilateral in nature or that they may need
to be focused on particular rivalries which lie at the center of broader structures of
interconnected conflicts. In addition, the possibility that conflicts may spread across
rivalries suggests that rivalry linkages may also pose serious implications for national
security. If conflicts can diffuse across rivalry linkages, then states may need to worry not
only about relations with their own rivals, but also about events in other rivalries to which
they may be connected. Furthermore, while many rivalry linkages have been highly
visible, others are not, and there is a risk that linkages and extra-dyadic relationships
might go unnoticed by policymakers until it is too late. For example, when Austria11

Hungary invaded Serbia in 1914, most observers in Austria-Hungary and elsewhere
appear to have been largely unaware of the dense web of interconnections that lay
between the 21 international rivalries that were ongoing in Europe at the time (Thompson
2003). Thus, while many in Austria-Hungary expected that Russia would become
involved in the war, few suspected that this relatively minor conflict in the Balkans would
spread further, or that it would ultimately become a war so large and so destructive that it
would result in the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
In sum, rivalry relationships have become an integral part of research on
international conflict because they help to identify the relatively small number of states
that have a significant chance of using force against one another. Thus, rivalries can be
said to provide a good approximation of what Singer and Wildavsky (1993, 5) describe as
a “zone of turmoil”—the zone where coercive, power politics are regularly practiced, and
where the threat of inter-state war remains real—that is of crucial interest to many
international relations scholars. Yet while researchers have succeeded in isolating these
islands of conflict from the larger pool of dyads, they have largely neglected the
connections that exist between rivalries. Or in other words, they have ignored the many
bridges and tunnels which link these islands together. These connections are important
because they establish pathways by which events, such as arms races or wars, can
potentially spread from one rivalry to another, or in some cases, perhaps even into the
“zone of peace” beyond.

12

Rivalry Linkages
Research on rivalry linkages is in its infancy. While students of rivalry have long
been aware of the fact that many rivalries appear to be connected, and that these
connections seem to have important effects on rivals’ behavior, few scholars gave the
possibility of rivalry linkage much explicit empirical or theoretical attention. However,
this has begun to change in recent years, as a handful of studies have begun to investigate
the consequences of rivalry linkage, and to incorporate linkage into existing models of
rivalry dynamics. This work is built largely on the efforts of Diehl and Goertz (2000),
who provide what is arguably the first attempt to systematically identify the connections
between rivalries, and to develop and test hypotheses about their effects. Their work has
been very influential, and has made at least three important contributions to scholarly
understanding of rivalry linkage.
First, unlike many previous studies, Diehl and Goertz attempt to specify
concretely what it is that rivalry linkages are. Although they do not go so far as to provide
a single, formal definition of rivalry linkage, Diehl and Goertz do argue that linkages are
generally spatial or political relationships which connect individual dyadic rivalries to the
larger “enduring rivalry system” (2000, 245). Thus, Diehl and Goertz (2000, 247) suggest
that, at any given time, many of the world's rivalries are likely to be connected to one
another, in what Buzan (1983) describes as “security complexes”, comprised of
overlapping conflicts that involve several different pairs of states. In addition, they also
suggest that rivalries between major powers, such as the US and the Soviet Union, are
likely to produce systemic effects which trickle down to influence rivalries throughout
the international system. Consequently, for Diehl and Goertz, rivalry linkages are an
13

important feature of the external environment in which rivalries develop, and their
presence or absence is likely to have a significant impact on rivalry dynamics.
Second, Diehl and Goertz build on this notion of rivalry linkage by identifying
four distinct forms of linkage—alliance ties, joint disputes, common foes and shared
borders. Rivalries become linked by alliance ties when one state in a rivalry establishes a
formal alliance with a second state in another rivalry. For Diehl and Goertz, formal
alliances are the most obvious and direct form of rivalry linkage, as they demonstrate the
existence of interdependent security interests between the two pairs of rivals, and to
reflect an “explicit choice” by states “to connect their mutual security fates” (2000; 246),
In addition, Diehl and Goertz also suggest that rivals can become tightly linked, even in
the absence of a formal alliance, when they share common militarized disputes. When
states from different rivalries participate in the same militarized disputes, this is believed
to provide a good indication that the rivalries are directly linked by common issues or
shared security interests. For example, Egypt and Syria's rivalries with Israel are linked to
one another because these states fought together against Israel during the Six Day and
Yom Kippur wars. As with the existence of formal alliances, shared disputes are assumed
to provide evidence that rivalries are tightly connected.
The other two forms of rivalry linkage—common foes and shared borders—are
treated by Diehl and Goertz as being evidence of much looser connections between
rivalries, which they describe as “indirect”. Rivalries can be said to be linked through
common foes when two states are involved in rivalries with the same enemy. Thus, the
rivalries between India and China and between Vietnam and China are linked by a
common foe. Rivalries are linked by a shared border when they are contiguous by land.
14

Both of these types of linkages are considered to provide an indication that states in these
rivalries are likely to have overlapping security concerns, since states presumably have
interest in their rival's other conflicts with third parties, and in third-party conflicts that
involve neighboring countries. Yet since neither of these forms of linkage requires direct
action by states in order to be established, they are considered to be less direct forms of
linkage than alliances or shared disputes.
Yet while this four-part typology of rivalry linkages has been very useful for
researchers, it is important to remember that it is not exhaustive. It is certainly possible
that rivalries may be linked in other ways3, such as through trade relationships or through
joint membership in intergovernmental organizations. These kinds of ties are also likely
to have a significant impact on rivalry dynamics, and future research would do well to
broaden the notion of rivalry linkage and explore the impact of other types of third party
relationships. However, since work on rivalry linkages remains underdeveloped this
project leaves this task for other scholars and focuses on the four types of linkage
identified by Diehl and Goertz. In doing so, it hopes to make it easier to compare the
empirical results produced by this dissertation with those of previous studies.
Third, in addition to identifying the different forms of rivalry linkage, Diehl and
Goertz also offer some initial arguments about the ways in which linkages are likely to
affect rivals' behavior. In general, they argue that linked rivalries should tend to exhibit
higher levels of conflict and last longer than rivalries which are not linked to other
conflicts. This argument is based the finding that complex MIDs and wars, which involve
three or more participants, tend to last longer and escalate faster than other disputes
3

I am grateful to Carl Pierce for this point.
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(Gochman and Maoz 1984). Since rivalry linkages presumably make it more likely that
new MIDs between a pair of rivals will become complex, then it stands to reason that
MIDs that occur within linked rivalries should generally be more severe than conflicts
that occur in other rivalries.
Diehl and Goertz therefore make an important contribution and have provided a
framework for subsequent studies seeking to explore the connections between different
dyadic rivalries. Yet, while their work has been path-breaking, efforts to test their
arguments empirically have faced several significant challenges. One problem is the high
number of linkages that exist between rivalries. By their count, only one rivalry
(involving Honduras and Nicaragua) has developed without becoming linked to other
rivalries at some point in its duration, and the average rivalry develops 18 such
connections. In addition, most rivalry linkages are created in the early phases of the
rivalry life cycle, when rival states begin to “lock-in” to patterns of conflictual and
competitive behavior. This makes it very difficult to compare the behavior of linked
rivalries to those that exist in isolation. Another problem concerns the tendency for
several different types of linkages to occur together. For example, states that share a
common enemy are likely to be contiguous with either each other or their enemy, and
they may be especially prone to form alliances. This introduces significant potential for
multicollinearity into analyses, making it difficult to parse out the effects of different
kinds of rivalry linkage.
Both of these issues are made more difficult to address by the fact that Diehl and
Goertz examine the effects of rivalry linkages from the perspective of a particular
approach to rivalry dynamics—the punctuated equilibrium model—which assumes that
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rivalries typically change very little over time. In their own analyses, Diehl and Goertz
therefore do not examine how the accumulation of linkages affects rivalries over time.
Instead, they focus their attention on comparing the effects of rivalry linkages across
rivalries. That is, they investigate whether rivalries which accumulated greater total
numbers of rivalry linkages also experienced higher average levels of conflict over the
course of the rivalry. This approach makes sense from the perspective of punctuated
equilibrium models, but it ignores a great deal of valuable information about the changes
that occur in the number of linkages and in patterns of rivalry conflict over time.
Although other studies have employed different approaches that are more sensitive to
changes in the number of linkages and in rivals' behavior, this work has produced mixed
findings, some of which conflict with those produced by Diehl and Goertz (Stinnett and
Diehl 2001, Valeriano 2008).
In regards to theory, Diehl and Goertz's work also has some limitations. They treat
rivalry linkages largely as exogenous characteristics of the external environment in which
rivalries develop. Consequently, they provide no theoretical explanation for how or why
rivalry linkages form, nor do they offer an explanation for rivalry de-linking. This, again,
is problematic because rivalries seem to form new linkages and terminate old ones
frequently throughout the course of the rivalry, which is generally not what punctuated
equilibrium models of rivalry would expect. In addition, Goertz and Diehl's arguments
about the effects of linkages on rivals' behavior rest on the assumption that the formation
of linkages will make it more likely that new MIDs between a pair of rivals will become
complex. This assumption has never been tested empirically, and the mechanisms by
which linkages might encourage dispute expansion remain unclear.
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As a result, while Diehl and Goertz have laid an important foundation for research
into rivalry linkages, there is still much to learn. This dissertation employs their
framework for identifying rivalry linkages, but develops a new and expanded theory of
the causes and consequences of linkage formation. Drawing on steps-to-war theory
(Vasquez 1996), I argue that linkage formation is an important part of the process by
which rivals compete with one another, and that many linkages form as a result of the
coercive “power politics” strategies that rivals often employ in their dealings with one
another. This argument has important implications for the effects of rivalry linkage as it
helps to explain why linkage formation encourages the expansion and escalation of rivals'
militarized disputes. As a result, these arguments help to fill in some of the gaps in the
existing literature on the effects of rivalry linkage and yield novel hypotheses.

Plan of the Dissertation
In the following five chapters, I investigate the causes and consequences of rivalry
linkage. I begin in Chapter II by reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature
generated by the rivalry research program, with an eye towards showing how further
work on the subject of rivalry linkages can contribute to rivalry research. I argue that
while students of rivalry have made important contribution to conflict studies, by
showing that many conflicts are related to one another over time (as part of enduring
rivalries between the same pairs of states), they have neglected to address the other ways
in which disputes may be related to one another—such as through shared issues or spatial
relationships. These other kinds of relationships hold the key to revealing much about the
sources of rivalry dynamics.
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Chapters III, IV and V each present a part of my theory of the causes of and
consequences of rivalry linkage. They can each be read as stand-alone pieces which
develop and test hypotheses about causes of rivalry linkage, the effects of linkages on
rivals' conflict behavior, and the effects de-linking on rivalry duration, respectively.
Consequently, each of these chapters contains its own theoretical section and empirical
analyses, as well as a review of the relevant literature
In Chapter III, I explore the causes of rivalry linkage. I begin by discussing how
the existing literature has largely ignored the question of how linkages form. This is
because most studies treat rivalry linkages as external environment conditions which are
assumed to be largely exogenous to rivals' interactions. I argue that approach is
problematic because most linkages tend to form after rivalries are underway, and in most
cases, reflect conscious decisions by policymakers to engage in behaviors (such as
dispute-joining) which will connect their rivalries to other conflicts. To address this
problem, I introduce a new explanation for linkage formation. Drawing on steps-to-war
theory, I argue that many linkages emerge as a byproduct of the coercive, “power
politics” practices that rivals often employ in their efforts to compete against one another.
In some cases, these linkages are created deliberately, while in others, they emerge
inadvertently as a result of prolonged periods of security competition. These arguments
yield four hypotheses, which are then tested in two sets of empirical analyses. In the first
set of analyses, I examine alliance formation as the dependent variable, while the second
set of analyses examines the expansion of militarized disputes. The results lend support to
the argument, as I find that states involved in rivalry are more likely to form alliances and
that militarized disputes are more likely to become complex when they involve rival
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states.
Chapter IV takes up the question of how linkages affect rivals' conflict once they
are in place. While many studies suggest that linkages should tend to exacerbate rivalry
conflict, these arguments have not been adequately tested, and the mechanisms linking
linkages to higher rates of conflict remain unclear. In this chapter, I provide a more fullydeveloped explanation of the effects of rivalry linkages which stresses the tendency for
rivalry linkages to produce complex militarized disputes, that other studies have shown to
be more likely to escalate to war. However, I also argue that linkages may contribute to
the risk of dispute escalation in the absence of dispute expansion. I test these claims using
two sets of bivariate probit models. The results provide support for my argument, as they
show that the accumulation of linkages increases both the risk of dispute onset (in first
stage of the models), and the risk that disputes will become complex or escalate to war
(in the second stage of the models).
In Chapter V, I examine the effects of de-linking on rivalry duration. Here, I draw
on the arguments developed in the previous two chapters to hypothesize that the severing
of linkages should shorten rivalry. The results again provide support for arguments about
the causes and consequences of rivalry linkage. The results of survival hazard models
reveal that the accumulation of larger numbers of rivalry linkages significantly lengthens
rivalry duration, while de-linking substantially increases the risk of rivalry termination.
When considered together, these chapters provide an account of the process by
which rivalry linkages form, and of the effects that these linkages have on rivals’
behavior once they are in place. It therefore sheds light on a crucial, but neglected, aspect
of rivalry—that it affects not only the two states involved the rivalry relationship, but also
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third parties as well. In Chapter VI, I conclude with a review of the contributions made
by this dissertation to our understanding of rivalry, and to international conflict more
broadly. I also discuss the ways in which the findings of this study could further
developed in future research, and consider the implications of this research for
policymakers seeking ways to better manage and mitigate rivalry conflict.
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CHAPTER II
THE RIVALRY RESEARCH PROGRAM
Introduction
It is only within the past 20 years or so that rivalries have become the subject of
much explicit theoretical or empirical attention. Prior to this period, rivalry was just one
of many terms used casually by scholars and diplomatic historians to describe relations of
enmity between states. There was no common understanding of precisely what rivalries
were, nor was there any body of theory that endeavored to explain why they formed or
how long they endured. Most early empirical work on rivalries was interested in
identifying them primarily because of their potential value as a case-selection device for
testing other theories about international conflict. For example, Wayman (1982, 1983)
who provides what is arguably the first attempt to identify international rivalries, is
interested in isolating pairs of states that perceive each other as threats in order to test
some of the implications of power transition theory. Beyond specifying some conditions
under which states might be considered rivals, he offers little discussion of what rivalries
are or how involvement in a rivalry might influence states' behavior. In a similar fashion,
other studies have employed various operational definitions rivalry to test hypotheses
related to arms races (Diehl 1985), deterrence (Huth and Russett 1993) and conflict
mediation (Grieg 2001). Thus, as Goertz and Diehl (in Midlarsky 2000, 225) observe, the
concept of rivalry is somewhat unusual in that a number of operational definitions of
rivalry were established before it become a topic of much theoretical interest.
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However, this early research produced important findings that helped to spark
interest in international rivalries as a subject of study in their own right. Perhaps the most
significant of these is the observation that, despite representing a tiny fraction of all
possible dyads, rivalries account for very large proportion4 of militarized disputes and
wars. The desire to explain this finding has motivated much of the work in the rivalry
research program. In this effort, the rivalry literature has largely focused on two main
tasks. First, researchers have endeavored to identify ongoing international rivalries and
elucidate the conditions that make these dyads different from others in which conflict is
less frequent. Second, the tendency for longstanding rivalries to experience recurrent
conflicts has led many researchers to postulate that these disputes may be related to one
another over time. Or in other words, that the high levels of hostility and conflict
observed between rivals in the present is a product of their history of confrontations in
the past. A large body of research has sought to test this proposition and model the
dynamics by which patterns of conflict develop and change within rivalries over time. In
doing so, this work has provided a new methodological and theoretical perspective on the
causes of war, which is sometimes described as a distinct “rivalry approach to war and
peace” (Goertz and Diehl in Midlarsky 2000).
In this chapter, I review the progress that has been made by the rivalry research
program in regards to both of these projects. I argue that while rivalry researchers have
made significant advances in regards to how they conceptualize rivalries and model their
dynamics, scholarly understanding of rivalry is limited by the tendency of most studies to
4

Just how much conflict is associated with rivalry depends on how rivalries are operationalized. For
example, according Diehl and Goertz's (2000) list of enduring rivalries, rivals have accounted for roughly
half all wars since 1816. If one uses Thompson's (2001) list of strategic rivalries, this figure increases to
77%.
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ignore the impact of factors and events which occur outside of the rivalry dyad. This
approach obscures many of the external influences on rivals' behavior and places an
unnecessary constraint on the scope of rivalry research.

Identifying and Conceptualizing Rivalry
Identifying Rivalry
The term rivalry has typically been employed by international relations scholars
to describe some sort of long-term relationship of enmity between states. Early work
often used the term rivalry loosely, alongside other terms like “international enemies”
(Finlay, Holsti and Fagan 1967), and rarely specified precise conditions that could be
used to distinguish rivalries from other dyads. Instead, these studies relied on historical
convention and scholarly norms to identify rivalries. Most of this work took the form of
case studies of individual rivalries, which were usually conducted with the goal of testing
some other theory within the context of the rivalry relationship. These studies were
generally limited to the analysis of great power rivalries (especially the US-Soviet
rivalry) and other dyads whose relationships were covered extensively by historians.
However, the opportunities available to rivalry researchers expanded dramatically
with the introduction of the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set by Gochman and Maoz
(1984). They examined the behavior of all states between 1816 and 1976 (subsequently
updated to 2001) in order to identify every instance in which one government threatened,
displayed or used military force in its dealings with another. Whenever one of these
instances occurred, the relevant dyad was said to have experienced a militarized interstate
dispute, or MID. The MID data were quickly seen as valuable by rivalry researchers
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because they provided a source of information about dyads’ conflict history. Rather than
relying on historical convention, researchers could now use the repeated occurrence of
MIDs to identify which dyads had developed protracted, hostile relationships. In addition,
since the MID data included all dyads, scholars could also hope to identify the complete
population of rivalries. This opened up the possibility of investigating whether there were
certain characteristics which were common to all rivalries and that distinguished them
from non-rivalries. These possibilities inspired the first efforts to develop operational
definitions of rivalry.
Most of these initial definitions used the MID data to identify dyads as rivalries if
they experienced a certain number of MIDs within a given period of time. This method,
which is often described as the dispute density or dispute threshold approach, is based on
the assumption that militarized disputes have a long-term effect on dyadic relations that
gradually dissipates over time (Goertz and Diehl 1993). When states experience a MID, it
is expected that their relations will generally become more hostile, but that eventually, the
salience of the dispute will fade and relations will return to normal. However, if states
experience a series of disputes then relations are likely to stay hostile for an extended
period of time. Thus, recurrent MIDs can be seen as evidence of an enduring, hostile
relationship. For the purposes of operationalization, this relationship is usually treated as
beginning during the first dispute in the series and as ending when the effects of the last
dispute have dissipated. For example, Wayman (1982) assumes that disputes have a 10
year effect on relations, and identifies rivalries as those dyads which experience two or
more disputes within this 10 year period. He then assumes that rivalries end once 10
years pass without a new dispute. Subsequent studies have generally followed Wayman's
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approach, but have raised the number of disputes necessary (in most cases, to between 5
and 7) for a series to considered evidence of a rivalry (Goertz and Diehl in Midlarsky
2000). Others have also added new criteria, such as the requirement that disputes be
related to the same general issues (Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006), or that rivalries persist
for some minimum period of time, usually 20 to 25 years, (Diehl and Goertz 2000). Some
studies have also used dispute counts in slightly different ways, such as Gochman and
Maoz (1984), who identify dyads as rivalries if they engage in a disproportionate share of
the total number of MIDs that occur in the international system.
Perhaps the single most widely used dispute density measure is the one developed
by Diehl and Goertz (2000). They consider dyads to be in a state of enduring rivalry if
they have experienced six or more MIDs over a period lasting at least 20 years, while
dyads which have less than three disputes are said to have experienced isolated conflicts.
Their measure is unique in that it also includes an intermediate category—proto-rivalry—
which records dyads which have more than three disputes but lack the number of
requisite disputes or duration to be considered enduring rivalries. This approach reflects
Diehl and Goertz's contention that rivalry is best seen as a continuous concept, with
rivalries exhibiting considerable variation in terms of their intensity or duration (2000,
22). Proto-rivalries have been used by empirical studies as a control group (Cioff-Revilla
in Diehl 1998), or to examine questions related to rivalry development (Goertz, Jones and
Diehl 2006). The proto-rivalry category also helps to address an important problem that
arises from the use of dispute density measures. Since these measures can only identify
rivalries ex post (after they have experienced the requisite number of disputes), ongoing
rivalries cannot be identified by researchers when they are still in the early phases of the
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relationship. This is troubling because many of the most important policy implications of
rivalry research relate to conflict management, and to the possibility of identifying those
dyads that are at significant risk of experiencing wars and crises. If one cannot accurately
identify rivalries while they are still “young” then the possibilities for successful conflict
management are likely to be significantly diminished. By classifying some dyads as
proto-rivals, Goertz and Diehl make it possible to identify these young rivalries while still
maintaining a clear distinction between isolated conflicts and enduring rivalries.
However, it should be noted that the most recent version of the data set has moved
away from this tripartite framework, and has reclassified proto rivalries as enduring
rivalries (Klein, Goertz and Deihl 2006). This approach still permits researchers to
include shorter or younger rivalries in analyses, but attempts to make a clearer distinction
between rivalry relationships and isolated conflict. Although Goertz and Diehl still argue
rivalry is best seen as a continuous concept, their current position is that shorter or
younger rivalries should not be treated as being conceptually different from enduring
rivalries. Instead, they suggest that rivalry should be seen as a single concept with
individual rivalries exhibiting varying degrees of duration and intensity.

Conceptualizing Rivalry
While studies employing the dispute density approach produced a large number of
competing operational definitions and lists of rivalries (see Diehl and Goertz 2000 for a
review), they have nonetheless produced quite similar findings in regards to the proclivity
of rivals to engage in militarized conflict. Regardless of the measure employed, these
findings reveal a striking pattern in which the small number of dyads identified by
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scholars as rivalries account for a large proportion of the conflict that occurs in the
international system. For example, Gochman and Maoz (1984) find that 70% of MIDs
were initiated by just 30 highly disputatious states, and that almost all of these states were
involved in enduring rivalries5. Similarly, Diehl and Goertz (2000) find that
approximately 75% of MIDs and 80% of wars have occurred between states involved in
either proto or enduring rivalry. They calculate that, on average, the probability that a
rivalry will experience a war over the course of its lifetime is 0.59 for enduring rivalries
and 0.32 for proto rivalries.
Coinciding with Bremer’s (1992) well-known work on “dangerous dyads” and the
shift towards dyadic analysis more generally, these findings have inspired scholars to
identify the conditions that make rivalries distinct from other dyads. This literature has
produced a set of criteria that are frequently used in conceptual definitions of rivalry.
Although not all studies emphasize the same conditions, three types of characteristics—
related to the duration of the relationship, the presence of militarized competition, and
expectations of future conflict—feature in nearly all formal definitions of rivalry. In
addition to these three criteria, many studies also suggest that definitions of rivalry need
to consider the nature of issues under contention and the perceptions of decision-makers.
Each of these conditions will now be discussed in turn.
Virtually all attempts to conceptualize rivalry emphasize their duration in some
way or another. Rivalries are often conceptualized as long-term contests between states
over some particular set of issues (Bennett 1998). While there is some debate over just
5

It should be noted that while Gochman and Maoz use the term “enduring rivalry” they identify rivalries in
different way than Goertz and Diehl (2000). They base their measure on the share of total disputes
associated with the dyad, rather than on the number of disputes which occurred within a given period of
time.
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how long these kinds of hostile relationships need to last in order to be considered
rivalries, most studies agree that rivalries need to endure long enough for states to
significantly adjust their behavior and implement long-term competitive strategies—such
as the pursuit of alliances or arms buildups (Diehl and Goertz 2000). Thus one of the
things that makes rivalry distinct from other conflictual international relationships, such
as those associated with isolated disputes or wars, is that they endure for an extended
period of time and entail significant, non-transitory changes in policy. Rivals orient
themselves towards protracted conflict with one another and “lock-in” new policies and
institutions devoted to security competition (Goertz Jones and Diehl 2006). For example,
after the First Kashmir War, both India and Pakistan established a network of permanent
military bases and garrisons along their borders (Ganguly 2001). India also created new
army divisions with the equipment and training necessary to fight in the cold,
mountainous regions around Kashmir. These policies took several years to implement,
but once in place, they helped to facilitate a strategy of ongoing security and lock-in an
enduring rivalry.
Rivalries are also generally distinguished from other types of competitive
international relationships, such as economic competition over markets, by the fact that
the relationship is militarized (Diehl and Goertz 2000). This means that competition
regularly involves the threat or use of military force. States involved in rivalry are
expected to engage in coercive diplomacy that entails some real risk of military
confrontations and war (Vasquez 1996). Consequently, rivals are likely to perceive each
other as the source of significant military threats, and perceive events that arise within the
rivalry relationship in terms of their implications for national security. Thus, rivalries can
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be distinguished by the fact that their participants tend to see military force as a valuable
tool for managing the relationship and frequently use it in an attempt to secure their
objectives.
Finally, most studies assume that participation in rivalries entails some sort of
expectation on the part of decision makers that future conflict is likely (Goertz and Diehl
in Midlarsky 2000). When rivals face off against one another, these interactions take
place within the context of a broader history of protracted, militarized competition. Rivals
are likely to have used force against one another in the past, and to have experienced
recurrent threats and crises. Over time, these experiences are believed to create
expectations in the minds of decision makers that this pattern of conflict will continue in
future interactions. As a consequence, decision makers are expected to be less willing to
trust or cooperate with their rivals than other states (Hensel 1998). They are also expected
to take steps to prepare militarily for future MIDs and wars. Since conflict with rivals is
always on the horizon, decision makers are likely to feel pressured to engage in arms
buildups and pursue alliances with third parties. They may also be tempted to launch
preemptive attacks if they feel that their rival is gaining the upper hand. Tragically, since
these efforts are frequently reciprocated by the rival, they often serve to sustain the
rivalry and can result in escalatory “conflict spirals” that lead to war (Senese and Vasquez
2008).
Together these three elements—duration, militarization and expectations of future
conflict—comprise what might be considered as a minimal, behavioralist conception of
rivalry. According to this view, “all that matters” when conceptualizing rivalry “is that
states use the military tools of foreign policy in the conduct of the rivalry and expect to
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do so again in the future” (Goertz and Diehl in Midlarsky 2000, 226). Rivalries are
therefore defined primarily in terms of the ways in which pairs of states attempt to deal
with contentious issues, rather than in terms of the characteristics of disputants or of the
issues themselves. States are considered to be rivals as long as they behave as such, by
engaging in security competition and experiencing recurrent militarized confrontations.
Dispute density measures are well suited to identifying this conception of rivalry. They
provide a means of capturing the series of disputes that comprise the life of the rivalry,
and of separating them from the “white noise” of more isolated conflicts. However,
despite their popularity, the dispute density approach and the broader behavioralist
conception of rivalry have been strongly criticized in recent years. Most of this criticism
has been focused on two main points.
First, many scholars object to the decision by proponents of the behavioralist
approach to ignore the issues which underlie rivalries. They argue that this decision
obscures an important dimension of the rivalry concept and results in less valid measures
of rivalry. In regards to the former problem, a number of scholars have suggested that
issues play a pivotal role in determining the ways which rivals behave towards one
another, and are thus an important source of influence on rivalry dynamics and the
process by which rivalries escalate to war. For example, Vasquez (1996) argues wars are
most likely to occur in rivalries which are dominated by disputes over territorial issues.
He suggests that the use of force is likely to be especially attractive as a means of dealing
with territorial issues, because states can use their militaries to physically occupy
disputed territories (armies are, after all, in the business of taking and holding territory).
Territorial issues also tend to be highly salient with domestic audiences, making
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concessions more politically costly. Consequently, states involved in rivalries over
territorial issues are expected to be more likely to rely on coercive strategies and engage
in behavior that increases the risk of war. Territorial disputes have also been shown to
increase the risk of rivalry onset (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001) and to produce rivalries that
entail higher levels of conflict (Vasquez 1998). Most recently, Colaresi, Rasler and
Thompson (2007) have expanded this framework to incorporate positional issues—
disputes between states over their relative status or position in international hierarchies.
They find that rivalries over positional and territorial issues exhibit different patterns of
behavior, with the former being less likely to start their own dyadic wars, but more likely
to join ongoing wars that began in other dyads. These findings suggest that operational
and conceptual definitions that ignore the nature of underlying contentious issues may be
missing an important element of the rivalry relationship and a valuable source of
information about the causes of recurrent conflict.
As for concerns about measurement validity, Goertz and Diehl (in Midlarsky
2000, 227) point out that many extant operational definitions of rivalry draw connections
between disputes that might be better seen as being unrelated. For example, most dispute
density measures treat the series of six disputes which occurred between Britain and
Brazil in the middle of the 19th century as indicative of a single ongoing rivalry. Yet these
disputes were over very different issues, with some being related to the slave trade and
others to competing territorial claims. One might therefore argue that these disputes are
better seen as part of several distinct conflicts rather than a single enduring rivalry. For
this reason, Diehl and Goertz's (2000) own dispute-density measure includes only those
disputes that are linked by a common issue. Bennett (1998) makes a similar point in
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regards to measures of rivalry termination. While most operationalizations consider
rivalries to have ended when a certain period of time passes without a new dispute, this
approach ignores the question of when decision-makers themselves believe that the
rivalry is over. This is problematic because some rivalries may experience extended
periods of time without the occurrence of MIDs, even though both sides still consider
themselves to be actively engaged in security competition. For instance, although no
MIDs occurred in the Anglo-German rivalry between 1899 and 1911, this was a period of
considerable diplomatic tensions and an ongoing naval arms race that would ultimately
contribute to the onset of World War I (Valeriano 2008). Some measures, such as
Wayman’s (1982) would have considered the rivalry to have ended in 1909.
Consequently, Bennett (1998) provides an alternative measure of rivalry termination
which requires both the absence of new MIDs and evidence, in the form of public
statements or formal agreements, which shows that the underlying contentious issues
have been resolved. Rivalries are then considered to have ended at the moment in which
the contentious issues associated with the rivalry were actually settled.
Skepticism concerning the connections between recurrent disputes has also helped
to motivate Gartzke and Simon's (1999) so called “hot hand” critique of the rivalry
research program. They challenge the assumption made by rivalry researchers that
recurrent disputes are related to one another over time, and posit instead that these
patterns might simply result from chance. Using a poisson model, they estimate the
probability of observing a certain number of disputes within a single dyad, given the
assumption that disputes occur independently from one another. They find that it is not
unlikely that a dyad could experience enough disputes through chance to be classified as
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a rivalry even if these disputes were not related. Thus, it is possible that the strings of
recurrent disputes identified researchers as rivalries may be little more than “hot hands”,
series of unrelated random events which are fallaciously treated by human observers as
evidence of patterns or relationships. While Gartzke and Simon do not go as far as say
that these findings indicate that rivalries do not really exist, they do suggest that
researchers need to do more to demonstrate the temporal processes associated with the
rivalry concept, and pay greater attention to other plausible explanations for dispute
recurrence.
Both of these tasks are taken up by Colaresi and Thompson (2002), who directly
test the claim that past conflicts have an effect on future interactions. They find that
dyads which experienced a diplomatic crisis were much more likely to experience
additional crises in the future, and that these crises were more likely to result in the use of
force. Furthermore, all the dyads which experienced more than two crises had been
correctly identified by other studies as rivalries. These findings suggest that the recurrent
conflicts which occur in some dyads are in fact related to one another, and that extant
measures of rivalry do a fairly good job of capturing these relationships. Of course, as
Colaresi and Thompson (2002, 1195) observe, the actual process by which past disputes
influence future disputes is not yet fully understood.
A second major challenge to the behavioralist approach concerns its emphasis on
militarization. While most scholars consider militarization to be an important
characteristic of rivalry, many are wary of relying on MIDs as the sole indicator of when
a rivalry relationship is present. This approach ignores other behavior associated with
militarized competition, such as arms races and alliance seeking, as well as the
34

psychological or perceptual aspects of rivalry, such as expectations of future conflict or
the perception of threat. It also creates several potential problems for empirical analyses.
One issue is that the behavioralist approach classifies some disputatious dyads as rivals
even though one state may be much more powerful than the other. In these cases,
recurrent MIDs may reflect efforts by the stronger state to coerce the weaker state by
threatening to use force, rather than an ongoing rivalry in which both states see each other
as peer competitors (Goertz and Diehl in Midlarsky 2000). These kinds of dyads may be
disputatious enough to be identified as a rivalries by most dispute density measures, but
they seem to have relationships that are conceptually different from those associated with
rivalries (Thompson 1995).
Another problem is that the emphasis placed on MIDs may result in an arbitrary
and inaccurate measure of when rivalries begin and end. While most studies treat the
onset of the first MID as the moment in which a rivalry begins, it is often unclear exactly
when the rivalry relationship became established. In some cases, rivalries appear to have
developed gradually after several disputes occurred. In others, states seemed to have
believed themselves to be rivals before they experienced their first militarized
confrontation. For this reason, Thompson (2001) suggests that that the timing and extent
of militarization should be left open as an empirical question. He argues that the mutual
perceptions of threat and the desire to engage in competition are the best indicators of
rivalry, and that while most rivalries probably experience MIDs early in the life the
rivalry, others may not. By understanding what causes rivalries to become militarized, he
suggests that it may be possible to gain new insights into how conflict within rivalries can
be prevented or managed.
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These issues have also led to the development of a competing approach to
conceptualizing and identifying rivalries. Using historical sources, Thompson (2001, 560)
identifies “strategic rivalries” as those dyads that see each other “as (a) competitors, (b)
the source of actual or latent threats that have some potential for becoming militarized,
and (c) as enemies”. Thus, Thompson's notion of strategic rivalry relies on policymakers'
perceptions as described in foreign policy documents and secondary sources rather than
the occurrence of MIDs. In this regard, Thompson’s procedure offers a means of directly
capturing the perceptual aspects of the rivalry concept.
However, Thompson's method has generally not supplanted dispute-density
approach as the preferred measure of rivalry among empirical studies. This is partly
because Thompson has not released the exact procedures for how his list of rivalries was
coded, making it difficult to replicate his data or examine questionable cases.
Furthermore, there are important differences6 between the list of strategic rivalries
identified by Thompson and those generated by dispute-density approaches (for a detailed
discussion of these differences see Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007, 36-71).
Thompson's list includes more rivalries between minor powers and fewer rivalries
between mixed dyads involving both major and powers. This may reflect some of the
differences between Thompson's historical sources and those used for the MID data, but
it is also indicative of deeper disagreements about the nature of rivalry. Behavioralist
conceptions of rivalry tend to emphasize protracted, militarized competition as the
hallmark of rivalry, but for Thompson, the salience of the issues and disputes for
6

Thompson's (2001) list correlates poorly (level of agreement = 0.203) with that produced by Diehl and
Goertz (2000). However, levels of agreement are also very low for different rivalry lists producing by
competing dispute density measures (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007). This is surprising given that
one of the supposed benefits of the dispute-density approach is its objectivity.
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policymakers is generally more important (Diehl and Goertz 2000, 147). Thus,
Thompson is willing to exclude some longstanding, militarized rivalries if they are not
considered sufficiently important by policymakers, and to include relatively short or
unmilitarized competitions that were highly salient. Thompson's view reflects his
position, developed in earlier work on “principal rivalries” (1995), that the concept of
rivalry ought to apply only to the relationship between states and their primary
competitors. Some scholars do not share this view, and prefer to treat rivalry as
relationship that can form between any pair of states so long as they are able to sustain
militarized competition.
There is also disagreement concerning the starting and ending points of many
rivalries. Thompson identifies the beginning of rivalry as the moment when both states
perceive each other threats, enemies and competitors, and considers rivalries to end
whenever any of these conditions is no longer met for either side. This approach is
advantageous in that, at least in principle, it captures the precise moment when decision
makers themselves believe that a rivalry has begun or ended. However, it does tend to
identify the onset of rivalries very early, making it difficult to employ in empirical
analyses of the causes of rivalry. For example, approximately, 8% of strategic rivalries
begin during or before the year 1816, which is the earliest point for which data is
available for many variables related to international conflict. Many others begin during
the first year that one participant is a member of the international system, creating a
similar problem. In addition, Rasler and Thompson (2006) find that among states with
territorial disputes, most strategic rivalries begin well before MIDs occur. This finding
appears to challenge many theoretical arguments within the rivalry research program,
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which generally tend to argue either that rivalries evolve gradually out of recurrent
disputes (Hensel 1998) or that the onset of disputes and rivalry should begin at roughly
the same time (Diehl and Goertz 2000). Consequently, there remains considerable debate
over which approach best records the development of international rivalries.
However, as a practical matter, it has become increasingly common for studies in
the rivalry literature to include both measures of rivalry in empirical analyses. The use of
both measures reflects a growing agreement among rivalry researchers that protracted
militarized competition, contentious issues, and mutual perceptions of threat are all
important elements of the rivalry concept. While no existing measure may capture all of
these dimensions perfectly, the prevailing operational pluralism can be seen as a source of
strength for rivalry research, as it offers opportunities to test the robustness of observed
relationships and explore how findings may change when different measures of rivalry
are employed.

Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Findings
The Contributions of Rivalry Research
The study of international rivalries marks a significant shift in the way that
scholars examine interstate conflict (Diehl and Goertz 2000). Whereas most studies in the
conflict literature have been focused on explaining the onset of war, rivalry research takes
a broader perspective and examines the entire rivalry relationship. Wars may occur within
the context of this relationship, but rivalry researchers are also interested in other forms
of conflict, in disputes which fall short of war, and in explaining the onset and
termination of the rivalry relationship itself. Thus, the study of rivalry directs scholarly
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attention towards a broader range of dependent variables, and towards a more long-term
view of conflict processes. In addition, the rivalry approach also requires researchers to
pay greater attention to conflict management. Since rivalry researchers consider peace to
be the absence of hostile relations, rather than simply any period of “not war”, they often
take an interest in the interactions which occur between rivals after wars have come to an
end (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001).
In terms of methodology, rivalry research is distinguished from much of the other
work on international conflict by the fact that it typically begins with the assumption that
disputes between rivals are related to one another across time. Instead of treating disputes
or wars as independent observations, rivalry research explicitly incorporates longitudinal
relationships into theory and research design. For instance, Hensel's (1998) work treats
the disputes that occur between rivals as part of an evolving rivalry relationship, and
relies on factors related to conflict history as an important explanation for dispute
behavior. In contrast, other studies in the conflict literature typically employ a crosssectional research design which seeks to explain the occurrence of conflict in terms of
contemporaneous conditions. Even when theories do specify longer term processes, they
are often tested in a fashion which ignores the impact of conflict history and which treats
temporal relationships largely as a form of bias that must be controlled for statistically
(Diehl and Goertz 2000). However, as Vasquez and Leskiw (2001, 298) point out, the
decision to ignore the impact of conflict history is tantamount to making the assumption
that the underlying relationships between states do not significantly influence conflict
behavior. Instead of relying on this assumption, rivalry research seeks to uncover and
model the processes by which past conflicts influence future interactions.
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Furthermore, while most studies of conflict have tended to use the concept of
rivalry merely as a means of selecting cases, the rivalry literature suggests that it deserves
a place within the theoretical framework itself. Rather than simply being a static
background condition, the rivalry literature argues that rivalry should be seen as an
evolving relationship which may change over time or interact with other conflict
processes. It suggests that students of international conflict should incorporate rivalry
relationships into their analyses as independent variables, and be cognizant of where the
conflict processes fit into broader relationships. Recent work in steps-to-war theory
provides an excellent example of this kind of research (Senese and Vasquez 2008). Here,
scholars have identified the development of rivalry as an important step to war, and as a
variable which interacts with other factors, like territorial disputes or arms races, to make
war more likely. Valeriano (2008) has also applied the steps-to-war approach to the study
of the causes of rivalry, suggesting that these same processes may also play an important
role in explaining how rivalries develop.
As a result, rivalry research can be seen as offering a distinct approach to the
study of war and peace. Rather than simply asking “what causes war?”, students of
rivalry investigate the broader historical relationships in which most wars occur. This
approach points to new independent and dependent variables, and provides a new spin on
many old hypotheses about the causes of international conflict. It has opened up entirely
new areas of inquiry and provided researchers with the opportunity to examine old
theories in novel ways. However, despite these contributions, it is only relatively recently
that empirical studies have begun to examine rivalries as their primary focus. This work
has largely been directed towards uncovering the factors which influence the onset,
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dynamics and duration of international rivalries.

Modeling Rivalry Development
While there is no general theory of rivalry, most research has been guided by one
of two models of rivalry development. The first, known as the evolutionary model,
suggests that rivalries tend to develop gradually out of repeated confrontations between
the same pair of states. Studies employing this approach typically begin with the
assumption that states tend to respond in kind to coercive or cooperative behavior. For
example, Hensel (1998) suggests that the use or threat of force tends to produce a
“feedback effect” on perceptions of threat and hostility in future interactions. When states
use force or employ other coercive tactics against one another during disputes, it is
expected that this will increase likelihood that more disputes will occur and that these
disputes will be more severe. Over time, these behaviors can become mutually
reinforcing, leading to a pattern of recurrent disputes that eventually develops into an
enduring rivalry. In regards to rivalry dynamics, evolutionary models generally posit that
conflict between rivals should exhibit an escalatory pattern in which disputes grow more
intense as the rivalry matures (Hensel 1996). Wars are expected to be more likely to occur
later in the life in the rivalry as a result of the gradual buildup of hostility. However, some
studies do suggest that rivals can halt or reverse this process of escalation by adopting
more peaceful approaches to dispute resolution, or as a consequence of mediation by
third parties (Hensel 1999, Grieg 2001). As for rivalry duration, the evolutionary model
posits that disputes are likely to recur when they end in stalemates or entail higher levels
of force (Stinnett and Diehl 2001, 720). Thus dispute severity and the absence of decisive
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outcomes can be seen as factors which contribute to the duration of rivalry. Some studies
also suggest that rivalries should become difficult to terminate as they grow older, and
that mature rivalries are only likely to come to an end once one side becomes exhausted
and is no longer able to continue the competition (Hensel 1996). Thus the greatest
opportunities for conflict management are expected to occur early in the life of the
rivalry.
Why are conflictual behaviors self-reinforcing? Many studies emphasize the
tendency for the use of force to create new grievances by causing casualties or changing
the distribution of territory between adversaries (Hensel 1999). Likewise, verbal threats
and displays of force are believed to increase perceptions of threat and reduce domestic
resistance to militarized responses. Thus, in Vasquez's (1993, 199) words, militarized
disputes can serve to “create a constituency for hardliners” and thereby increase the
likelihood that states will resort to the use of force in their future dealings with each
other. Other scholars also suggest that patterns of recurrent conflict may also reflect an
addiction process, in which states which lose territory or prestige in past confrontations
initiate new conflicts in order to recoup their losses (Stinnett and Diehl 2001). Regardless
of the precise process believed to be at work, studies utilizing the evolutionary model
share a common emphasis on the idea that “disputes beget disputes”, and that the
behavior of disputants plays a crucial role in determining whether or not a rivalry will
develop.
In contrast, the punctuated equilibrium model of rivalry suggests that patterns of
conflict within rivalries are relatively stable, and that most rivalries are caused by
exogenous factors that are largely outside of the control of disputant states (Diehl and
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Goertz 2000). According to this perspective, levels of conflict and cooperation between
states tend to fluctuate randomly around some sort of equilibrium level. For some dyads,
this equilibrium might be peaceful and cooperative. For others, it might entail high levels
of conflict and significant risk of war. Where this equilibrium lies is believed to be
largely determined by structural factors, such as those related to the contentious issues
shared by the dyad, the characteristics of the individual states involved, or the structure
the international system. Changes in this equillibrium are expected to be most likely to
occur when exogenous shocks, like world wars or regime changes, disrupt the stability of
the existing relationship. These shocks create brief windows of opportunity when major
changes in international relations are possible. Thus, shocks are seen as providing a set of
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for significant international change (Goertz and
Diehl 1995)
In this light, rivalries represent one particularly disputatious type of relationship,
in which the equilibrium level of conflict and cooperation, known as the “basic rivalry
level” (BRL), is characterized by frequent militarized confrontations (Diehl and Goertz
2000, 165). Most rivalries are believed to be caused, at least indirectly, by some sort of
exogenous shock which initially transformed the relationship between the adversaries and
locked them into rivalry. Although relations between rivals are likely to experience many
short-term changes, the punctuated-equilibrium approach suggests that, over the longterm, rivalry dynamics should exhibit a stable or “flat” pattern with no secular trend in
levels of hostility. Thus, the age of the rivalry is expected to have little bearing on the risk
of war. Instead, scholars employing the punctuated-equilibrium approach focus on
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identifying the BRL and the degree of volatility7 of the relations between rivals. Rivalries
are more likely to experience war when the BRL is more hostile or when the volatility of
rivals’ relations is greater. However, despite the general stability of rivalry relationships,
the punctuated equilibrium model suggests that changes in the relations between rivals
are likely to be rapid during the beginning and ending phases of the rivalry. During these
periods, the relationship between rivals is likely to have been disrupted by some sort of
shock or change in the underlying structural conditions, opening up opportunities for
decision makers to make dramatic changes in policy. Exogenous shocks are therefore
seen as a primary cause of both rivalry onset and termination.
What accounts for the stability of rivalry relationships? In early work, Goertz and
Diehl (1993) relied on the assumption that rivalries where maintained by psychological
processes, in which recurrent disputes served to lock-in mutual perceptions of enmity,
and resulted in the creation of stable long-term identities for both adversaries. Thus,
rivalries were believed to endure in part because rivals carried the psychological baggage
of past conflicts with them into new disputes (Colaresi 2004, 556). More recently, Diehl
and Goertz (2000, 134) have suggested that the stability of rivalries also reflects the
internal nature of the foreign policy decision-making processes. Here, they make a clear
connection between the application of punctuated equilibrium models in rivalry research
to work which uses this approach in the study of domestic policy-making and public
administration. In these fields, scholars like Kingdon (1984) and Tucker (1982) have
argued that because of bureaucratic inertia, major policy changes are very difficult to
7

In this sense, the term volatility refers to the extent to which random variation in rivals’ relations diverges
from the BRL. Volatility is high when relations frequently stray far from the BRL and low when relations
stay close to the BRL.
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achieve and are only likely to occur during fleeting moments when the interests of
various actors align in favor of change. During other periods, policy changes are likely to
be incremental if they occur at all. Thus, in the context of rivalry, major changes in either
states’ foreign policy are unlikely except during the windows-of-opportunity created by
external shocks. If a new rivalry happens to form during one of these windows, then the
punctuated-equilibrium model suggests that there is relatively little that decision makers
can do to bring it to an end until another window of opportunity forms.
Empirical studies have produced some support for both models. Consistent with
the evolutionary model’s account of the causes of rivalry, a number of studies have found
that disputes are more likely to recur when they entail higher levels of force or end in
stalemates (Stinnett and Diehl 2001; Goertz, Jones and Diehl 2005; Hensel in Diehl
1998). Similarly, Valeriano (2008) observes that dyads are more likely to develop
enduring rivalries when they attempt to settle their initial disputes the use of “power
politics” strategies, such as coercive diplomacy, arms buildups and the pursuit of
alliances. In addition, a number of studies have produced evidence to support the notion
that interactions between pairs of states evolve over time as a result of learning processes.
For example, Maoz and Mor (2002; 1996, 156), find that learning processes account for
many of the changes that occur in patterns of interactions between rivals, but that they
observe “exogenous changes”, like major shifts in the distribution of power, also play an
important role.
Variables associated with the punctuated equilibrium model also fare well in
analyses. Many of the structural conditions associated with the outbreak of war—such as
contiguity, power parity, or the absence of joint democracy—have been found to increase
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the risk that dyads will develop rivalries, and to be associated with rivalries that have a
higher BRL (Maoz and Mor 1996, Vasquez 1993, Hensel et al 2000, Goertz and Diehl
2000). Likewise, disputes over territorial issues have been found to be more likely to
develop into rivalries, and to produce rivalries that last longer and entail higher levels of
conflict (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001; Vasquez 1998; Stinnett and Diehl 2001). Perhaps the
strongest source of support for the structural approach comes from evidence concerning
the role of external shocks. Goertz and Diehl (1995) find that almost 90% of enduring
rivalries began within 10 years of at least one exogenous shock. These findings lend
considerable weight to the punctuated equilibrium model’s explanation for rivalry onset.
In regards to rivalry dynamics, a prominent early study by Leng (1983) found that
recurrent crises tended to produce an escalatory pattern that almost always resulted in war
by the time of the third crisis. Likewise, several studies by Hensel (1996, 1998) find that
militarized disputes tend to become more severe and more frequent as adversaries
develop a longer history of conflict. However, Goertz and Diehl (2000) have also
produced strong support for the punctuated equilibrium model. After examining changes
in the severity levels of MIDs over the course of 63 enduring rivalries8, they observed
that 74.6% of rivalries exhibited a flat or stable BRL, while only 3.2% exhibit a pattern of
increasing dispute severity. The remainder of cases were divided among rivalries with
decreasing (7.9%), convex (4.8%), concave (7.9%) or wavy (1.6%) patterns. These
conflicting findings have been reconciled to some extent by Colaresi (2002), who finds

8

This was done in three different ways. First, a regression line was estimated for each rivalry by regressing
the severity level of the disputes on number of the dispute in the rivalry sequence (first, second, third, etc.)
Second, rivalries were also classified graphically using scatterplots of dispute intensity over time. Finally,
Goertz and Diehl also compared the severity levels of the first and last three disputes were with each other
and with the mean level for the rivalry as a whole.
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that while most rivalries exhibit a sharp escalation in hostilities early in their life cycle,
hostility levels typically fall after these initial increases, and then exhibit relative stability.
Attempts to test the evolutionary and punctuated-equilibrium models have largely
produced mixed findings. Goertz, Jones and Diehl (2005) observe that rivalries are more
likely to continue when the most recent dispute involved the use of force or ended in a
stalemate, but these findings are only significant during the early phases of the rivalry
relationship. Along with Colaresi's (2002) findings, these results seem to suggest that
dispute behavior has little effect on rivalry duration once the rivalry become wellestablished. Likewise, the finding that the hazard rate for rivalries increases as they grow
older casts doubt on the claim that older rivalries are more difficult to terminate (Bennett
1998, Cioff-Revilla in Diehl 1998). As for the punctuated equilibrium model, Goertz and
Diehl (1995) observe that most rivalry terminations do follow shortly after some sort of
political shock. However, efforts to test this relationship statistically have generally
produced mixed results, with some types of shocks having a significant impact, but not
others (Bennett 1998, Goertz and Diehl 2000).
Thus, while empirical studies suggest that the evolutionary and punctuated
equilibrium models each capture an important aspect of rivals’ behavior, neither approach
has become dominant. Most analyses find that the onset, dynamics and duration of
international rivalries are best explained by models which combine variables from both
approaches (Stinnett and Diehl 2001, Bennett 1998). Unfortunately however, there is
currently no theoretical framework for integrating the evolutionary and punctuated
equilibrium models.
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Both models have also faced significant criticism on theoretical grounds. The
primary challenge for the evolutionary model concerns the initial decision by states to
threaten or use force against one another, thereby initiating the first MID in the rivalry.
Most studies employing evolutionary models simply take the occurrence of the first
dispute as given9, and then focus one explaining how past uses of force influence
subsequent interactions. Yet since the use of force rarely produces a decisive resolution to
contentious issues (roughly 60% of MIDs end in stalemates) and may result in costly
rivalries or wars, one might reasonably ask why it is that states see the use of force as a
desirable means of resolving disagreements (Gochman and Maoz 1984). The answer to
this question would seem likely to hold important insights into the processes behind the
development of rivalry and be important for identifying potential rivals. It also raises the
potential for omitted variable bias in empirical studies since factors which cause initial
disputes to become militarized may be important determinants of behavior in future
interactions (Colaresi and Thompson 2002).
For the punctuated equilibrium model, the principal charges have been that it is
underspecified and that its expectations are difficult to falsify. While it identifies
exogenous shocks as necessary condition for rivalry onset and termination, it does not
make any precise claims about the intensity, duration or even the direction of the effects
that particular kinds of shocks are expected to produce. This is particularly problematic
because the same shocks can produce effects that vary dramatically across different
dyads. For example, World War II was a systemic shock that created some new rivalries,
9

Most studies justify this decision by asserting that other theories from the conflict literature can be called
upon to explain initial disputes. From the perspective of the evolutionary model, rivals do not begin to
behave differently from other dyads until the rivalry is underway.
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terminated some old rivalries, raised the BRL in some cases, lowered it in others, and in
some dyads had no significant effect on relations. All of these outcomes are consistent
with the punctuated equilibrium model. Furthermore, since shocks of some form or
another occur fairly frequently, most major changes in dyadic relationships occur within a
few years of several different shocks, making it difficult to determine which, if any, were
most responsible.
In response to these issues, recent studies have increasingly begun to look to other
sources for insights into the processes that influence rivalry dynamics. In this regard,
perhaps the single most common area of inquiry has been the role that domestic political
processes play in sustaining rivalries. While studies employing evolutionary or
punctuated models often incorporate domestic political variables into their analyses, these
factors have rarely been their primary concern. Here, researchers have had to look for
guidance from other theories in the conflict literature. For example, Colaresi's (2004,
2005) work draws on steps-to-war theory in order to argue that the recurrent conflict
associated with rivalries strengthens the domestic political position of hawkish leaders.
Consequently, the duration of rivalries can be explained in part by domestic incentives
that leaders have to take hardline positions when dealing with rivals or to engage in threat
inflation. Consistent with this argument, Colaresi has found that leaders which make unreciprocated offers to cooperate with rivals are much more likely to lose office (2004),
and that leaders are less likely to attempt to deescalate rivalries when public suspicion of
rivals is high (2005). In addition, Colaresi has also suggested that the domestic process of
“rivalry outbidding”, in which elites compete for popular support by taking more hardline
positions in response to external rivals, may be responsible for many cases in which
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rivalries escalate to war. Thus, he points to domestic political incentives as an important
source of influence on rivalry dynamics.
Others have also explored the impact of domestic politics from the perspective of
the literature on international bargaining. According to this view, rivalries are a product of
bargaining problems which prevent both state from arriving at a mutually acceptable
resolution to their contentious issues (Bennett 1998, Maoz and Mor 2002). Changes in
domestic political institutions are expected to create opportunities for states to bring
rivalries to an end because they can change the preferences of leaders or increase the
capacity of states to commit to agreements. For example, Bennett (1998) finds that
regime changes significantly shortened rivalry duration. Likewise, Prins and Daxecker
(2009) find that by establishing liberal institutions, both domestically and internationally,
rivals could mitigate some bargaining problems and increase the likelihood of rivalry
termination.
In sum, the rivalry research program has developed a fairly sophisticated
understanding of the processes by which rivalries develop and change over time. There is
a large body of consistent findings that suggest rivalry dynamics are influenced by a
variety of factors, such as disputants' behavior, structural conditions, political shocks and
domestic political processes. These findings have provided important insights into
processes which lead to international conflict and have offered a new perspective on the
causes of war and peace. However, there remains considerable disagreement about how
rivalries should be identified and about which models best capture rivalry dynamics.
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The Future of the Rivalry Research Program:
Beyond the Rivalry Dyad
Rivalry research has made a significant contribution to the study of international
conflict. It has been able to do so, in large part, because it abandoned the assumption that
disputes and wars were independent of one another and acknowledged the potential
temporal relationships between them. Yet despite making this advance, the rivalry
literature has been slow to address the possibility that disputes might be connected in
other ways. For example, it is plausible that some disputes might also be linked through
spatial relationships, such as those that form when conflicts that begin in one dyad
expand geographically to involve dyads that include neighboring countries. In these
cases, the militarized disputes in several different dyads would be connected both
temporally and spatially. If researchers ignored the possibility of a spatial linkage
between disputes then they would be likely to miss both relationships. Likewise, disputes
may also be connected through other kinds of ties, such as those created by alliances or
common enemies. States may join a dispute in another dyad to help defend an ally, or
they may attack a rival that is temporarily distracted by a conflict with another enemy.
These kinds of processes, described elsewhere as “conflict diffusion” (Siverson and Starr
1991), are largely ignored by existing studies of rivalry. Most research begins with the
assumption that rivalries are purely dyadic relationships, and then examines the effects of
independent variables related to conditions within the dyad or its participant states. While
studies employing the punctuated equilibrium approach do examine the impact of events
that occur outside of the rivalry, these analyses have generally been focused on the
impact of broad systemic shocks like world wars or shifts in the global distribution of
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power. Thus, students of rivalry still know very little about how rivalries are affected by
their connections to other dyads.
However, it is not hard to find evidence that these kinds of ties have often had a
significant impact on rivals’ behavior. For example, studies of minor power rivalries
during the Cold War often refer to the role that military aid and other forms of support
from the US and Soviet Union played in maintaining the rivalry (Colaresi 2005,
Thompson 1998, Kinsella 1995). Conversely, no discussion of the US-Soviet rivalry
would be complete without acknowledging the ways that the behavior of client regimes
in places like Vietnam, Korea, Cuba and Afghanistan influenced relations between the
two superpowers. Unfortunately, existing work in the rivalry research program largely
ignores these kinds of connections. This might be understandable if the Cold War era
were unique in regards to the tendency for different dyadic rivalries to form ties to one
another, but the evidence suggest that these kinds of rivalry linkages are far from rare. In
one of the few efforts to document linkages between rivalries, Diehl and Goertz (2000)
observe that these ties are nearly universal. Since 1816, only one rivalry, between
Nicaragua and Honduras, has developed without forming ties another ongoing rivalry at
some point in its duration. Furthermore, some small groups of rivalries appear to be so
tightly interconnected that they might be better thought of as singular rivalry “clusters” or
“complexes” than as sets of distinct dyadic relationships. In these cases, shared borders,
as well as overlapping networks of alliances and shared disputes make it difficult for
states in any one dyad to manage their relations without also considering the others. For
instance, few analysts would think of discussing ways to manage conflict in Israel’s
rivalry with Egypt without also addressing its rivalries with its other Arab neighbors or
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the underlying Palestinian issue.
Perhaps the most prominent evidence of the significance of rivalry linkages is
provided by work on causes of multilateral wars. Several recent studies have identified
the connections between rivals as crucial to explaining the process by which World War I
spread from a seemingly minor conflict between Serbia and Austria to a great power war
involving most of the states in Europe (Thompson 2003; Vasquez et al 2011). Similar
arguments about the role of rivalry linkages have also been made in regards to the spread
of participation in World War II (Vasquez in Diehl 1998) and the diffusion of conflict in
the Middle East (Kinsella 1995). Consequently, an understanding of rivalry linkages
would appear to be essential for scholars and policymakers seeking to manage patterns of
conflict within rivalries.
Research into the causes and consequences of rivalry linkage has the potential to
make at least three significant contributions to the literature on rivalry, and to the research
on international conflict more broadly. First, it introduces a new set of independent
variables which are likely to have important effects on rivals’ behavior. Thus, the study of
rivalry linkages opens up a new area of inquiry and has the potential to improve the
explanatory power of existing models. In addition, rivalry linkages may also condition
the effects of other well-known influences on rivalry dynamics. For example, it seems
plausible that rivalry linkages may serve to transmit some of the effects of domestic
political shocks, like regime changes or civil wars, to other dyads, or that the presence of
rivalry linkages might impair the effectiveness of states’ efforts to pursue conflict
management.
Second, the study of linkage also points towards useful new ways of
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conceptualizing or classifying rivalries. In this respect, Valeriano and Powers (2011)
identify “complex rivalries” as groups of three states whose relationships are connected
by common issues or shared disputes, and in which there is active threat of militarized
conflict between all parties. One might go even farther, and identify entire clusters or
systems of interconnected rivalries, and classify them in terms of their degree of
interconnectedness or they number of dyads involved. This may open new avenues of
research into whether the density of linkages or size of clusters affects conflict
management. It holds the potential to help policymakers by offering a clearer picture of
where individual rivalries fit into broader networks of relationships. Eventually, one may
even be able to identify pivotal rivalries or contentious issues that can become the focus
of conflict management efforts at the system level.
Finally, linkage research draws attention to possibility of studying rivalries at an
entirely new level of analysis. Rather than treating rivalries as a collection of
independent, disputatious dyads, one might use the linkage approach to analyze changes
in the larger networks of interconnected rivalries. By tracking the ways that patterns of
connections evolve over time, it may be possible to gain insights into broader processes
which influence dynamics of multiple rivalries simultaneously. In addition, this approach
permits the use of new methodological tools, like social network analysis, which have the
potential to address novel research questions, or provide additional leverage when testing
existing theories. In short, the study of rivalry linkages offers the potential to explore a
new realm of international interactions that lies in between individual dyads and the
broader international system.
However, before these efforts can begin, one needs a working theory of how
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rivalry linkages form and shape rivalry dynamics at the dyadic level. To test such a
theory, it is also necessary to have a system for identifying and classifying different types
of rivalry linkages, so they can be measured. Both of these tasks are taken up in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER III
THE CAUSES OF RIVALRY LINKAGE
Introduction
In 1974, Somali diplomats signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the
Soviet Union. In return for granting the Soviets basing rights at the port of Berbera,
Somalia became the target of a generous military and economic aid program. Over the
course of the next three years, Somali military spending more than doubled, and the
Somali military became one of the most well-equipped in the region, fielding 250 Soviet
T-34 and T-50 tanks as well as 50 MiG fighters, and supported by more than 1,500 Soviet
advisers and trainers (Colaresi 2005, 64). Somalia's ruler, Siad Barre, wasted no time in
using these resources to facilitate a more assertive foreign policy. In the name of creating
a “Greater Somaliland”, the Barre regime demanded territorial concessions from
Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. These claims ultimately resulted in war in 1977, when
Barre decided to invade Ethiopia and seize the disputed Ogaden region by force.
The invasion of the Ogaden was not well-received by the Soviet Union. Ethiopia
had recently experienced a Marxist revolution, and was considered by many in the Soviet
leadership to be an increasingly important ally in the region. After the Somalis refused to
accept Soviet demands to withdraw, the Soviets decided to back Ethiopia in the conflict.
They quickly terminated the flow of aid to Somalia and redirected many of these
resources to Ethiopia. Bolstered by the sudden inflow of Soviet military equipment and
the support of roughly 15,000 Cuban ground troops, Ethiopian forces succeeded in
retaking the Ogaden the following year, and inflicted devastating losses on the Somali
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military in the process. By one count, the Somali military lost as much as one third of its
35,000 combat troops and nearly half of its aircraft during the Ethiopian counteroffensive (Watson 1986). Yet, although Ethiopian forces succeeded in forcing the Somali
army to retreat they were restrained from advancing into Somalia by pressure from the
Soviets, who feared that an occupation of Somalia would increase tensions with the
Americans, who had recently stepped in as Somalia's new patron. The Americans then
began to supply Somalia with large amounts of military equipment, including advanced
anti-aircraft missiles designed specially to counter the types of Soviet fighters employed
by the Ethiopians. In return for helping Barre to rebuild the Somali military, the
Americans received access to the same naval facilities that Soviets had built in Berbera
four years earlier. Thus, although the Ogaden War ended in a decisive Somali defeat, the
Somalis were able to maintain their rivalry with the Ethiopians for another 11 years, until
US and Soviet aid to both sides finally dried up after the end of the Cold War.
The connections that formed between Somalia and Ethiopia and their respective
superpower patrons provide a striking example of the process of rivalry linkage, whereby
two distinct dyad rivalries become linked to one another through ties such alliances,
common borders or shared disputes. Although these two conflicts began over very
different sets of issues, they nevertheless became quite closely linked, with the Somalis
and Ethiopians coming to rely heavily on superpower support to maintain their rivalry,
and the Americans and Soviets each devoting substantial resources to their clients, and at
times risking the possibility that the contest might escalate into a direct confrontation
between them. These ties also probably helped to encourage the Cubans to join the
Ogaden War in 1978, thereby linking the Somali-Ethiopian conflict to the US-Cuban
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rivalry, and placing it in the middle of an extensive network of rivalry linkages that
developed during the Cold War.
Yet while students of rivalry have long been aware that these kinds of linkages
exist, and that they are quite common10, we still know very little about them. There are
only a handful of studies that have examined how the presence of linkages might
influence rivalry dynamics, and these have generally produced inconsistent findings. For
example, while Diehl and Goertz (2000) find that higher numbers of rivalry linkages are
associated with greater volatility and higher levels of conflict, others find that linkages
have no significant impact on rivalry development or on the frequency of militarized
disputes (Stinnett and Diehl 2001). In addition, findings concerning the effects linkages
often vary depending on which types of linkages are examined, making it difficult to
determine exactly how the linkage process affects rivalry dynamics.
Moving forward, one of the biggest challenges for research on rivalry linkages is
that scholars have yet to develop a theoretical understanding of the processes by which
rivalry linkages form. Instead, most studies have tended to approach rivalry linkages from
the perspective of punctuated equilibrium models, which treat linkages primarily as an
attribute of the external environment in which rivalries develop, rather than as
relationships which rival states may choose to form for themselves. Thus, studies
typically assume that most linkages are in place before rivalries begin and they tend to
treat linkage formation as something which is largely exogenous to the interactions
between rival states.
10

Diehl and Goertz (2000) observe that only one rivalry (between Nicaragua and Honduras) has developed
without becoming linked to another rivalry at some point in its duration, and the average rivalry develops
18 such connections.
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This approach is problematic because, empirically, we know that most rivalry
linkages form between six and seven years after rivalry onset11, and that, in most cases,
rivalry linkages continue to form throughout the life of the rivalry (Diehl and Goertz
2000, 255). Rather than being born into linkages, most rivalries appear to develop them
gradually, after security competition has already been underway for some time.
Furthermore, the tendency by previous studies to treat linkages as exogenous
environmental conditions obscures the fact that the most common and direct forms of
linkage, alliance ties and shared disputes, usually form as the result of conscious choices
by decision-makers in at least one rival state. When linkages form, it is often because
policymakers have decided to create them, and it seems likely that these actors have some
understanding of the implications of their actions for the future of the rivalry relationship.
For example, when Soviet leaders decided to adopt Somalia as a client state, they
probably knew that this decision might lead to their involvement in future conflicts
between Somalia and its rivals, and that their ties to Somalia might also come to have an
impact on their own rivalry with the United States. Likewise, the United States' decision
to begin supporting Somalia during the final stages of the Ogaden War was probably part
of an effort to weaken the Soviet Union by raising the costs of its involvement in the
Horn of Africa. By developing a better understanding of why states choose to establish
rivalry linkages in the first place, we may be able to gain new insights into the ways in
which these external relationships may affect rivalry dynamics, and ultimately, how they
might contribute to the outbreak of war.

11

The onset of rivalry is very difficult to measure, but the most common practice is to mark the beginning
of the rivalry at the time of the first militarized dispute.
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In this chapter, I develop and test a novel explanation for the formation of rivalry
linkages. In doing so, I treat linkages as a dependent variable, and argue that, rather than
being part of the external environment in which rivalries develop, most linkages are
consciously created by rivals as part of the processes by which they compete with one
another. In making these claims, I build on recent work which has sought to integrate
Vasquez’s steps-to-war theory into the rivalry literature (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson
2007, Valeriano 2008). My argument rests on the idea that the same “power politics”
foreign policy practices which rivals often employ in their dealings with another also
make it more likely that these conflicts will become connected to rivalries in other dyads.
Thus, it is no surprise that rivalry linkages are widespread, as linkage formation is
integral to the process by which rivals compete.
In the next section, I briefly review existing work on steps-to-war theory and
international rivalry. The third section then introduces my arguments linking power
politics practices to the formation of rivalry linkages. Here, I develop four hypotheses
about the ways that involvement in enduring rivalries is likely to affect the formation of
alliances and the expansion of disputes. In the fourth section, I describe the data and
methods that I use to test these hypotheses, while the fifth section presents the results.
Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my findings for research on
rivalry, as well for policymakers seeking to manage conflict between rivals.

Steps-to-War Theory
The empirical literature on the causes of war is vast. Researchers have compiled
large bodies of evidence linking the outbreak of war to a host of different factors, such as
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the distribution of power (Bremer 1992), the presence of territorial disputes (Hensel
1996, 2001) or the occurrence of arms races (Richardson 1960). Yet, while much has
been learned, the insights provided by this work have been limited by the fact that
individual studies have tended to focus on the relationship between particular causal
factors and the outbreak of war (usually subject to some set of control variables) without
asking how these factors interact, or how their effects may change at different points in
the processes that lead states into military conflict. Thus, while we know that a large
number of purported causes are individually related to the risk of war, we still know
relatively little about the complex processes by which these conflicts develop over time.
Vasquez’s (1993) steps-to-war theory offers an attempt to address this problem and
interpret how these various “pieces of the war puzzle” fit together. His work has become
influential because it succeeds in integrating many of hypothesized causes of war into a
single multivariate theory about how wars begin.
At the core of Vasquez’s argument is the idea that the factors associated with the
onset of war can be divided into underlying and proximate causes (1996). Underlying
causes are the fundamental factors that set off a sequence of events (the proximate
causes) that leads to war. For Vasquez, the most common underlying cause of war is a
dispute over territory. Territorial issues tend to be highly salient and are amenable to
being settled through the use of force, because soldiers can be used to physically occupy
disputed territory. Yet whether or not territorial disputes ultimately result in war depends
on how they are handled by states. Vasquez suggests that when states lack effective
means for settling their disagreements peacefully (through arbitration, for example), they
are likely to resort to the use of more coercive, “power politics” tactics (which entail the
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pursuit of military power and the threat or use of military force) in an attempt to resolve
their disputes unilaterally (Senese and Vasquez 2008: 20). The use of these tactics
increases the probability of war in future interactions because they tend to produce a
security dilemma which heightens mutual perceptions of threat and hostility. Thus, for
Vasquez, the foreign policy practices that states employ in their attempts to settle their
territorial disputes serve as the most important proximate causes of war.
In addition, Vasquez suggests that the use of power politics practices also tends to
strengthen the domestic political position of hawkish elites, making it more difficult for
leaders to deescalate crises or negotiate with perceived national enemies once they have
begun to employ these tactics. When leaders use force successfully, this often enhances
the domestic political clout of hardliners who believe that force is the best foreign policy
tool for dealing with the rival. Likewise, when adversaries respond in kind, it tends to
reinforce perceptions of threat and encourages the formation of “cognitive rigidities”, or
preconceived notions about how rivals are likely to behave (Colaresi, Rasler and
Thompson 2007, 226). In the context of an enduring rivalry, these domestic political
processes can create conditions which encourage elites to compete with one another to
take more and more hawkish positions when dealing with rivals (Colaresi 2005), and in
which elites who attempt to cooperate with rivals are more likely to lose office (Colaresi
2004). As a result, steps-to-war theory, and much of the recent research on rivalry
suggests that the use of power politics practices tends to produce a syndrome of domestic
and international interactions that work together to escalate tensions between rivals.
Why do states choose to employ power politics practices then, given that they
increase hostility and the risk of war? One answer concerns the availability of
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alternatives. When international norms and institutions fail to provide a context in which
states can resolve their disputes peacefully, and when the disputed issues are highly
salient, then states may feel that they have no choice but to resort to the use of force. In
addition, steps-to-war theory also suggests that states’ foreign policy decisions are
strongly influenced by diplomatic cultures or “folklores” (Senese and Vasquez 2008: 13).
These folklores provide a body of shared wisdom which informs policymakers about
when it is appropriate or necessary to use force, and which influences the way that they
perceive the intentions of others. At least in the West, diplomatic culture has historically
been dominated by realist thinking which portrays the acquisition of power as the
primary means by which states can hope to increase their security, press their claims, or
defend their positions in disputes over security issues. Realist folklore suggests to leaders
that other states are unlikely to cooperate with them in matters of national security, and
that the best response in these situations is for leaders to employ power politics tactics. In
the short term, this means the use of coercive threats or military faits acomplis to compel
an adversary into backing down. In the long term, it is also likely to entail the pursuit of
alliances and military buildups in order to increase the state's military power.
In sum, Vasquez's steps-to-war theory suggests that most wars result from the
repeated use of power politics foreign policy practices. When states use these practices
they tend to produce a security dilemma which, over time, is likely to escalate to war.
This process is exacerbated by the rise of hawkish elites in domestic politics and
motivated by a realist diplomatic culture which portrays military power as a diplomatic
asset and coercion as a necessary foreign policy tool. Empirically, steps-to-war theory has
received substantial support. A number of studies have found that when states with
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contentious issues attempt to increase their power through arms build-ups or the pursuit
of external alliances, this substantially increases the risk of future disputes and wars
(Vasquez 1993, Vasquez 2009, Senese and Vasquez 2008). In addition, these factors also
appear interact to interact with rivalry, so that their effects are greater when they occur in
the context of a rivalry relationship (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007).

Steps-to-War Theory and Rivalry Research
Work on steps-to-war theory has made two important contributions to scholarly
understanding of international rivalries. First, it has helped to shed light on the processes
by which rivalries form and develop over time. For example, Valeriano (2008) has recast
Vasquez’s original argument as a steps-to-rivalry theory, in which the use of power
politics tactics serves as an important cause for the onset of rivalry. He finds that when
disputants engage in power politics practices their disputes are more likely to recur and
develop into rivalries. In a similar vein, Vasquez and Leskiw (2001) have shown that
rivalries are more likely to develop over territorial disputes than over disagreements
about other kinds of issues. Likewise, Colaresi (2005) has also demonstrated that the
kinds of domestic and international interactions envisioned by steps-to-war play an
important role in influencing levels of hostility between rivals. He finds that hostility
levels tend to increase when domestic conditions (such as high levels of public suspicion
of rivals and the presence of information asymmetries between the public and foreign
policy elites) encourage domestic challengers to attempt to “outbid” the leader by taking
hardline stance on rivalry-related issues.
Second, steps-to-war theory has also helped to provide new insights into the
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processes by which rivalries escalate to war. For example, Vasquez (1996) has used stepsto-war theory to provide a parsimonious explanation for the occurrence of war among
rivals. He argues that most wars between contiguous rivals occur as a result of the
escalation of disputes over territory through the processes identified by steps-to-war
theory. However, wars can also occur between non-contiguous rivals when these states
join the wars that begin between contiguous rivals. Thus, he intriguingly suggests that the
wars which non-contiguous rivals experience are primarily the result of the diffusion of
conflicts across different dyadic rivalries. Rasler and Thompson (2000, 508) develop this
idea further, and suggest that wars are especially likely to spread when they begin
between rivals fighting over “positional” issues, which entail questions about states’
relative positions in the international hierarchy. The kinds of conflicts often present
important implications for third parties because states which assume a higher position in
the international hierarchy tend to become more active in international affairs and are
more likely to intervene in other countries’ disputes. Unfortunately, since most rivalries
are related to multiple issues, and these issues are often intertwined, it is possible for
conflicts that begin over territory (or in Rasler and Thompson's terminology, spatial
issues) to grow to have positional implications and then spread to other rivalries. As a
result, these studies suggest that conflict diffusion is likely to play an important role in
the processes by which rivalries escalate to war.
My explanation for the causes of rivalry linkage builds on this work. Following
Valeriano (2008), I begin with the assumption that power politics practices are an integral
part of the process by which rivalries form, and that all rivalries entail the use of power
politics practices to some degree. However, I depart from previous research by focusing
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on the ways in which these practices affect relations with states other than the primary
adversary12. Here, my argument builds on those studies which emphasize the diffusion of
conflicts across rivalries. I argue that the use of power politics practices increases the
likelihood that other states will be drawn into, or affected by, the militarized disputes that
occur between rivals. When these other states are also involved in rivalries of their own,
it can result in the formation of rivalry linkages. In the next section, I present a set of
arguments linking power politics practices to the formation of two types of rivalry
linkage—alliance ties and shared disputes.

Power Politics and the Formation of Rivalry Linkages
Power politics practices play an integral role in the security competition that takes
place between international rivals. Each time that rivals engage in a militarized dispute,
they are essentially choosing to employ power politics in an attempt to settle their
grievances, and by doing so repeatedly, rivals show that they remain committed to a
conflict management strategy rooted in the dictates of realpolitik. Of course, rivals do
sometimes cooperate with one another and can experience periods of relative détente.
However, rivalries can be distinguished from other international relationships by the fact
that their participants continue to see military force as a valuable and necessary tool for
managing the relationship, even when relations are relatively peaceful (Goertz and Diehl
1993). In rivalry, the threat of conflict is always on the horizon, and decision makers act
accordingly by maintaining military arsenals and defensive postures oriented towards
12

Although it is not a part of the literature on the steps to war, one interesting study which does take this
approach is Prins (2005). He finds that states involved in rivalry tend to have a more militarized foreign
policy and are more likely to use force, even in their dealings with states that are not their rivals.
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potential conflicts with their rival. Thus, the cooperation that occurs between rivals is
likely to be seen as the means for rivals to achieve better outcomes for themselves in
regards to their disputes, or perhaps to reduce the costs of rivalry maintenance.
Throughout the rivalry, rivals are likely to remain committed to a long-term strategy of
militarized competition with their adversaries.
In these efforts, rivals are usually guided by some sort of “grand strategy” which
is designed to weaken their adversary and produce victory in the long-term (Valeriano
2008, 72). Grand strategies encompass a set of military, economic and political goals
whose fulfillment is believed to be necessary for the survival of the state. In most cases,
grand strategies suggest that states should find ways to increase their own military power
while weakening that of their rivals, usually through some combination of internal and
external balancing (Waltz 1979). Internally, the logic of realpolitik suggests that states
should find ways to increase the military resources that could be brought to bear against
their rivals in a fight. In this regard, states may engage in efforts to enlarge and
modernize their militaries, increase their state’s capacity to mobilize resources from
society (Thies 2004), or adopt new policies or institutions designed to facilitate security
competition (Goertz, Jones and Diehl 2006). Externally, realpolitik suggests that states
should try to find ways to shift the international balance of power against their rivals.
This typically entails two basic tactics. First, states can pursue external alliances which
commit other states to fight with them against their rivals. Second, when disputes occur,
states can attempt to broaden these conflicts by encouraging others who share a grievance
against their rival to intervene. By getting others to join in the fray, states can hope to
weaken the relative position of their adversaries.
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In this section, I focus on these two tactics for external balancing against rivals. I
suggest that while the formation of alliances and the expansion of disputes may help
states to gain an upper hand over their rivals, these efforts can also result in the formation
of linkages to other ongoing rivalries. Thus, I argue that linkages form as a result of
practices encouraged by the same realist logic which guides security competition between
rivals more generally. In the subsections below, I explain in greater detail how realist
thinking and the use of power politics practices encourages the formation of each type of
linkage.

Forming Alliances
Realist thought suggests that states are more likely to be successful in coercive
bargaining when they are militarily more powerful than their adversaries. For classical
realists, military power translates directly into foreign policy influence and provides a
source of leverage in international bargaining. Realists typically argue that states should
try to increase their military power when possible because power is fungible, and because
it provides the primary means by which states achieve their goals and ensure their
survival in international relations (Waltz 1979). Thus, when engaged in a dispute, states
are believed to have strong incentives to find ways to increase their own military power
and reduce the power of their adversaries.
Steps-to-war theory suggests that one of the primary means by which states do
this is through the formation of external alliances (Vasquez 1996). Alliances can provide
states with many potential advantages in security competition. First, they establish formal
commitments by third parties to intervene (or in some cases, to abstain from intervening)
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in a potential conflict. Consequently, alliances can alter the balance of military
capabilities, and when these agreements are made public, they can also provide a means
for states to gain greater leverage in diplomatic bargaining, since states with allies can
threaten to impose greater costs on their adversaries should war occur. In addition,
alliances can also serve as a framework to facilitate cooperation between states in matters
of security. Historically, allies have often shared intelligence and have permitted each
other’s troops to move through their territory. In the modern era, allies have also
frequently provided each other with access to military technology, training and other
forms of support. Consequently, for states involved in protracted security competition, the
support of external allies is likely to offer significant competitive advantages.
However, the benefits of alliances do come with certain costs. When states form
public alliances they reveal information about their foreign policy preferences which can
harm relations with other states and even lead to war (Bueno de Mesquita 1983). They
also commit themselves to fight alongside their allies. This can draw them into costly
conflicts, or if they renege on their alliances, potentially damage their international
reputation. For these reasons, realist folklore has typically suggests that states should be
wary of becoming entangled in alliances unless they are necessary for survival, and that
these partnerships should be abandoned once they are no longer needed (Mearsheimer
2003).
Consequently, realist folklore suggests that states should be most likely to form
alliances when they face significant, enduring threats to their national survival. In the
international system, few states face threats as severe or as enduring as those involved in
rivalries. Furthermore, since rivals are engaged in ongoing security competition, they are
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likely to be under considerable pressure to find ways to compete more effectively against
their adversaries. External allies offer significant advantages in this regard, which for
rivals, are likely to be worth the costs and risks that alliances entail. Conversely, states
without rivals should have much less incentive to form alliances, since they are unlikely
to be engaged in security competition or face significant security threats that endure for
long periods of time.

H1: States involved in rivalries should be more likely to form alliances
than other states.

Yet while states involved in rivalries have strong incentives to acquire
alliances, not all third parties are equally desirable as alliance partners. Some states are
simply too weak military or too far away geographically to help states compete against
their rivals. Conversely, other potential alliance partners may be capable of offering
assistance but are either unwilling to do so, or demand too great a price for their support.
Furthermore, even when prospective allies are both willing and capable of helping, states
must still worry about whether others will believe them to be so, and perceive the alliance
to be credible. If a state's rivals doubt the credibility of its alliances, then they may be
more reluctant to make concessions in bargaining and more willing to use force (Maoz et
al. 2007). Furthermore, a state’s allies may renege on their agreement and abandon them
at the moment when alliance commitments are tested. Thus, states involved in rivalries
face a dilemma. They must pursue alliances in order to compete militarily and deter
potential attacks, but they must also be wary of the possibility that their enemies will
doubt the credibility of these agreements, or that they will be exploited by potential
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alliance partners who could abandon them in their moments of need.
Realist theory suggests that one of the ways that states deal with this problem is
by forming alliances with other states with which they already share objective strategic
interests. If alliances appear to reinforce states' common interests then these agreements
should more likely to be seen as credible. States can also be expected to be more
confident that their partners will not defect when their alliances appear to provide clear
benefits to both parties. In this regard, realist theory suggests that the presence of
common enemies provides one of the best indicators of whether states have mutual
security interests. States have a strong incentive to work together in the face of common
threats because, despite their differences, all states place great value on their security
(Walt 1987). This basis for cooperation should be especially strong in regards to states
who share common rivals. Rivals pose consistent, enduring threats to states’ security and
provide a stable basis for cooperation. Furthermore, since rivalry relationships are usually
highly visible, others are likely to recognize the salience of these common security
interests. Thus, one should expect that states who are involved in rivalries with a common
enemy should be especially likely to form alliances.

H2: States involved in rivalries should be more likely to form alliances
with states with which they share a common enemy than with other states.

Expanding Disputes
Shared dispute linkages are formed when a militarized dispute that begins in one
dyadic rivalry is joined by one or more states that are involved in another dyadic rivalry
(Diehl and Goertz 2000, 241). There are two general ways in which the use of power
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politics practices can result in the formation of shared dispute linkages. First, much of the
realist literature on foreign policy suggests that states can benefit by encouraging others
to fight with them against their rivals, or by intervening themselves in other disputes
between their rival and third parties. This behavior is based on the assumption that the
bargaining position of an adversary is likely to be diminished when they face larger
number numbers of opponents. For example, Mearsheimer suggests that states can
benefit by engaging in a strategy of “bloodletting”, whereby they encourage their rivals to
fight one another (2003, 144). As a result, the logic of realpolitik provides states with an
incentive to expand their disputes and to join others that involve their rivals.
However, as with the pursuit of alliances, dispute expansion can be a costly
strategy for states to employ. Intervention by third parties tends to increase the hostility
level of disputes and makes them more difficult to resolve (Vasquez, Petersen and Wang,
2004). In addition, third parties who offer to join ongoing conflicts may ask for
something in return, or demand their share of the spoils when the conflict is over.
Furthermore, there is nothing to prevent one’s adversary from using the same tactic, and
enticing additional states to join the conflict on its behalf. Consequently, it is unlikely that
deliberate dispute expansion will be the first step that most states will take in their efforts
to resolve contentious issues. Most states should be expected to try first to settle things
unilaterally, or through more peaceful multilateral efforts, like diplomatic summits or
conferences (Hensel 2001). Yet in the context of enduring rivalries, in which disputes
recur and tend to end in stalemates, states are likely to become more willing to employ
riskier tactics in an attempt to gain the upper hand over their adversaries. As the costs of
rivalry maintenance increase, states should be more likely to try to encourage others to
72

fight alongside them in hopes that this will force their rivals to concede.
A second potential source of dispute linkage arises from the inadvertent effects
that the use of power politics practices often have on other nearby states. When rivals
engage in recurrent crises or wars, these activities often produce spillover effects, such as
economic dislocations or the creation of refugee populations, which may reduce the
security of neighboring countries. These problems can put pressure on other countries to
enter into these disputes in order to put an end to the conflict or protect their own
interests. In addition, as rivalries drag on and competition intensifies, rivals may feel
compelled to employ more extreme or riskier tactics that may antagonize others. For
instance, they may raid enemy safe havens in neutral countries, implement naval
blockades, or utilize of weapons of mass destruction. The use of these kinds of tactics can
result in what Lebow (1984, 41) describes as “spillover crises”, in which third parties
decide to intervene in a dispute because it has affected their interests. For example,
during WWI, German leaders had initially been reluctant to permit unrestricted U-boat
warfare in the seas around the British Isles because they feared antagonizing neutral
powers, especially the United States. However, as the costs of the war increased, it was
decided that the potential gains from unrestricted U-boat warfare were worth the risk. On
February 15th, 1915, Germany declared the waters around Britain to be a war zone, and
just three months later, German U-boats sank the RMS Lusitania, an ocean liner carrying
a large number of civilian passengers. This event helped to turn American public opinion
against Germany and served to catalyze the United States’ entry into the war.
Thus, even when rivals do not intend to expand their disputes, their involvement
in protracted security competition tends to increase the risk that this will happen
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inadvertently, and that others will become involved in disputes on their own accord.
Consequently, one should expect that states involved in rivalries will be more likely to
experience complex MIDs, and that the probability of dispute expansion should increase
as the rivalry wears on.
H3: Disputes that occur within the context of an ongoing rivalry should be
more likely to become complex than other disputes.
H4: Disputes should be more likely to become complex when they occur in
more advanced phases of the rivalry relationship.

Data and Methods
The theoretical arguments presented above suggest that states involved in rivalries
are more likely than other states to form alliances and experience complex militarized
disputes. I test these claims with two sets of empirical analyses. First, I test hypotheses
H1 and H2 by examining the ways in which participation in rivalries affects rates of
alliance formation between pairs of states. For this purpose, I employ a dataset containing
information about all politically relevant dyads for the years 1816-2000, with the dyadyear serving as the unit of analysis. The dependent variable in these analyses is alliance
formation, which is coded as 1 in dyad-years in which a new alliance is formed and 0
otherwise. Following Kimball (2006), an alliance is considered to be new when there was
no alliance of any kind during the previous year or when the alliance that was in place
was of a different type (for example, when a non-aggression pact is replaced by a defense
pact). When new alliances are of the same type as the alliance that was in place the
previous year, the old alliances is considered to have been renewed rather than replaced
74

with a new alliance. Data on alliance formation are taken from the Correlates of War
(COW) Alliance dataset (Gibler and Sarkees 2004)
In the second set of analyses, I test hypotheses H3 and H4 by examining whether
disputes are more likely to become complex when they occur between rivals, and when
they occur in more advanced phases of the rivalry relationship. Here, individual
militarized disputes serve as the unit of analysis. I examine all 2,332 militarized disputes
included in COW Project’s MID dataset (Ghosn et al. 2004). The dependent variable in
this second set of analyses is complex mid, which is a binary variable that is coded as 1
whenever a dispute becomes complex and 0 otherwise. Disputes usually become complex
because other states join the dispute after it has begun, but in some cases, disputes begin
with multiple participants. Both kinds of kinds of disputes are considered to be complex
MIDs.13

Modeling Alliance Formation
Since alliance formation is a dichotomous variable, I employ logit models to
assess the effects of the explanatory variables on the predicted probabilities of alliance
formation. Diagnostics14 reveal that the data are subject to both temporal dependence and
unit effects. Consequently, I estimate a random effects model15 and use Beck, Katz and
Tucker's (1998) method for dealing with autocorrelation. I test hypotheses H1 and H2 by
13

As a robustness check, I also estimated a set of models in which only disputes with joiners were
considered to be complex. The results in regards to the primary explanatory variables were largely
unchanged.
14
Wooldridge (2002) provides a hypothesis test for assessing whether temporal autocorrelation is present in
panel data, the results of which indicated that temporal effects were present in this case.
15
Hausman (Green 2008) provides a test for determining whether a fixed or random effects model would
be best for dealing with the problem of panel effects (it examines whether the unique errors are correlated
with the regressors). The results indicated that a random effects model would be best in this case.
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examining the relationship between alliance formation and two primary explanatory
variables. Rivalry involvement is a binary variable which is coded as 1 if at least one state
in the dyad is involved in a rivalry with any other state during a given year. Dyad-years in
which neither state is involved in any rivalries are coded as 0. Common enemy is also a
binary variable, and it is coded as 1 if both states in the dyad are involved in a rivalry
with a common enemy during a given year. In other words, it codes whether states A and
B in the dyad both have a rivalry with a third state, C, which is outside of the dyad. It is
expected that pairs of states will be more likely to form alliances with one another if
either state is involved in at least one rivalry, and if both states are involved in rivalries
with a common enemy.
I also control for a number of other variables which have been linked to alliance
formation by previous studies. First, following Kimball (2006), I control for the relative
capabilities of the two states in each dyad by taking the ratio of the military capabilities
(as measured by COW CINC scores) of the stronger state to the combined capabilities of
both. The values of this variable range from 0.5 (parity) to 1 (preponderance). I also
control for the distance between states in using two variables. The log of distance is
calculated by taking the natural log of the distance (in miles) between the capitals of the
two states in the dyad. Contiguity is dummy variable which indicates whether the states
in the dyad shared a land border according to the COW Direct Contiguity data. In order to
address the possibility that regime similarity may affect the propensity of states to form
alliances, I also control for joint democracy and joint autocracy. Both of these variables
are dummy variables which are coded 1 when both states in the dyad are democracies (a
polity score of 14 or greater on a 0 to 20 scale) or autocracies (a polity score of 7 or less
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on a 0 to 20 scale). Data for these variables are taken form the POLITY IV dataset.
However, since Lai and Reiter (2000) find that this relationship changes across different
historical periods, with democracies being more likely to “flock together” after 1945, I
also include a dummy for the period 1945-2001 and interact it with both regime
variables. I expect that jointly democratic dyads should be more likely to form alliances
after 1945, although they may not be more likely to so before then. Jointly autocratic
dyads are expected to be more likely to form alliances in both periods. Finally, I also
control for whether there is an ongoing militarized dispute in the dyad using the COW
MID data. This variable is coded as 1 for all years in which a dispute is ongoing and 0
otherwise.

Modeling Dispute Expansion
In the second set of analyses I employ logit models to estimate the effects of three
primary explanatory variables on the probability that dispute will expand and become
complex. The first explanatory variable is rivalry MID, which is a dummy variable that
indicates whether or not the MID occurred as part of a rivalry. This variable is as coded
as 1 if the two of the original participants in the MID were rivals and were one opposite
sides of the dispute. Disputes in which the original participants were non-rivals were
coded as 0. Rivals were identified using Diehl and Goertz's (2000) list of interstate
rivalries.
I test hypothesis H4 by disaggregating rivalry MID into two dummy variables that
indicate whether the disputes occurred during proto-rivalry or enduring rivalry phases of
the rivalry relationship. Following Diehl and Goertz, I consider disputants to be enduring
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rivals if they have had six or more MIDs over a period lasting at least 20 years, with no
more than 10 years separating each individual dispute. Disputants are considered to be
proto-rivals when they have had three or more disputes, but lack the requisite number of
MIDs or the duration to be considered enduring rivals. Disputes that occurred between
states that have had less than three disputes are considered to be part of isolated conflicts
serve and as the reference category in these analyses. It is expected that disputes which
occur in more advanced phases of the rivalry relationship will be more likely to be
complex.
I also control for several dispute characteristics which are likely to be related to
dispute expansion. First, I examine the possible that the propensity for dispute expansion
may vary across disputes related to different kinds of issues. Following the approach
employed by Senese and Vasquez (2008, 90), I create three dummy variables—territory
MID, policy MID, and regime MID—that indicate whether or not the disputes involved
these types of issues. Data for this variable are taken from the COW MID dataset, and
disputes related to issues coded as “other” serve as the reference category. Second, I
control for the involvement of states that are major powers using two binary variables.
Major-major dispute is coded as 1 if the dispute’s original participants included two
major powers on opposite sides; while mixed dispute is coded as 1 if the original
participants included a major power on one side but not on the other. Here, disputes
between minor powers serve as the reference category. It is expected that disputes will be
more likely to expand when they involve major powers because these states are more
likely to have the capability of fighting multiple states at once, and more likely to become
involved in conflicts over broader, multilateral issues.
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Empirical Results
Alliance Formation
I begin my analyses by examining the relationship between states' participation in
rivalry and their propensity to form alliances. Table 3.1 presents logit estimates of the
likelihood of alliance formation produced by three random effects logit models. In the
first model, I test hypotheses H1 and H2 by examining whether dyads which contained
states involved in rivalries or states involved in rivals with the same common enemy were
more likely to form alliances. The results in Model 1 provide support for both
hypotheses. On average, dyads in which at least one state was involved in an enduring
rivalry were about 25% more likely (see Table 3.2) to form alliances than dyads in which
neither state was involved in a rivalry. When both states in a dyad were involved in
rivalries against a common enemy, the predicted probability of alliance formation
increased by about 150%. Substantively, this means that while the average dyad has only
about a 0.04 probability of forming an alliance in a given year, this probability increase to
about a 0.05 probability if either state becomes involved in a rivalry. If both states in a
rivalry with the same enemy, then the probability of alliance formation increases to 0.10.
Both of these effects were statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level,
suggesting that it is highly unlikely that these patterns are due to chance. Consequently,
states involved in rivalry do appear to be more likely to form alliances than other states,
and it seems that they are especially likely to form alliances with their adversary’s other
rivals. When this occurs, these alliances establish rivalry linkages.
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Table 3.1: Logit Estimates of Alliance Formation
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Rivalry involvement

0.284***
(0.072)
0.990***
(0.099)
-1.402***
(0.310)
-0.195***
(0.020)
0.688***
(0.160)
-0.026
(0.162)
0.531***
(0.106)
-0.951***
(0.076)
0.503**
(0.189)
-1.021***
(0.174)
-1.001***
(0.180)
-0.655**
(0.301)

___

0.321***
(0.072)
___

Common enemy
Relative capabilities
Log of distance
Contiguity
Joint democracy
Joint autocracy
Post 1944
Joint democracy*Post 1944
Joint autocracy*Post 1944
Ongoing MID
Constant

1.006***
(0.099)
-1.326***
(0.309)
-0.187***
(0.020)
0.692***
(0.160)
-0.017
(0.161)
0.477***
(0.105)
-0.970***
(0.076)
0.480**
(0.189)
-0.945***
(0.173)
-0.978***
(0.180)
-0.572*
(0.300)

-1.46***
(0.309)
-0.199***
(0.020)
0.691***
(0.161)
0.022
(0.161)
0.488**
(0.105)
-1.02***
(0.076)
0.422**
(0.188)
-0.983***
(0.174)
-0.843***
(0.178)
-0.577*
(0.301)

92,079
92,079
92,079
2,067
2,067
2,067
-7273.335
-7281.167
-7321.900
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All models are
estimated with Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) controls for temporal dependence. Coefficients for
splines are not reported.

N
Units
Log Likelihood
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Table 3.2: Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Alliance Formation
Variable

Model 1
(% change)

Baseline

0.04

Dyad involved in rivalries

+0.010 (+25%)

∆No→ Yes

Dyad shares common enemies

+0.060 (+150%)

∆No → Yes

Relative Capabilities

- 0.009 (-22%)

∆Mean → Max

Log of Distance

-0.021 (-52%)

∆Mean → Max

Contiguity

+0.032 (+80%)

∆No→ Yes

Joint autocracy before 1945

+0.025 (+62%)

∆No→ Yes

Joint autocracy after 1944

-0.027 (-67%)

∆No→ Yes

Joint democracy after 1944

+0.024 (+60%)

∆No→ Yes

Ongoing militarized dispute

-0.025 (-62%)

∆No→ Yes
Note: Predicted probabilities for the onset of strategic rivalry are calculated using the coefficients from
Models 1 and 2. Baseline probabilities are calculated using the means or modes for each variable.
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In Models 2 and 3, I also estimate the effects of rivalry involvement and common
enemy separately from one another in order to account for the possibility that collinearity
between these variables may have influenced the coefficient estimates in Model 1.
Rivalry involvement and common enemies are weakly correlated (correlation = 0.031),
but since all dyads that share common enemies are also dyads that contain states involved
in rivalry, collinearity is a potential concern. The results of these models are generally
similar to those produced by Model 1. Both rivalry participation and the possession of
common enemies continue to have a significant, positive effect on the likelihood of
alliance formation.
In all three models, the control variables behaved mostly as expected. Dyads with
ongoing militarized disputes, with a with a greater distance between their capitals, and
with a more equal distribution of military capabilities were significantly less likely to
form alliances with one another, while dyads which shared a land border were more
likely to form alliances. In regards to the regime variables, the results were consistent
with the findings of Lai and Reiter (2000) and Kimball (2005). Jointly democratic dyads
were significantly more likely to form alliances, but only after 1944. During the period
between 1816 and 1943, joint democracy had no significant impact on the likelihood of
alliance formation. Conversely, jointly autocratic dyads were significantly less likely to
form alliances in the period after 1994, and significantly more likely to form alliances in
the period between 1816 and 1943.
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Dispute Expansion
Before proceeding to the second set of analyses, I first examine the distribution of
complex and dyadic militarized disputes in light of the expectations of hypotheses H3
and H4, which posit that disputes should be more likely to become complex when they
occur between rivals, and in more advanced phases of rivalry relationship. Table 3.3
presents the observed frequency of dyadic and complex MIDs across different phases of
the rivalry relationship, as well the frequency of complex MIDs that would be expected
to occur in each phase by chance.
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Table 3.3: Observed and Expected Frequencies of Complex MIDs by Rivalry Phase
Rivalry Phase

Dyadic MIDs

Exp. Dyadic

Complex MIDs

Exp. Complex

Isolated dispute

866

831.1

125

159.9

Proto-rivalry

416

416

80

80

Enduring rivalry

673

707.9

171

136.1

Total

1,955

Note: Exp. = Expected, Pearson Chi2 =19.7028, Pr = 0.000.
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Table 3.3 provides some suggestive evidence in favor of both hypotheses. While
only 131 militarized disputes between enduring rivals would have been expected to
become complex by chance, the observed number of complex MIDs was 171. Thus,
almost half of all complex MIDs began as disputes between enduring rivals, despite the
fact that disputes between enduring rivalries accounted for only about a third of the entire
pool of disputes. In contrast, isolated disputes, which occurred outside of the context of
rivalry, experienced only 125 complex MIDs, 35 fewer than would have been expected
by chance. This suggests that disputes are more likely to expand when they occur in more
advanced stages of rivalry.
I provide a more rigorous test of hypotheses H3 and H4 in Table 3.4 which
presents the estimates of the likelihood of dispute expansion presented by two logit
models. In the first model, I examine whether the presence of rivalry relationship
between disputants influences the risk of conflict expansion. Here, the results indicate
that, on average, disputes between rivals are about 35% more likely (see Table 3.5) to
become complex than disputes between non-rivals. In the second model, I disaggregate
enduring rivalry to examine how the propensity for expansion varies across disputes at
different stages in the rivalry relationship. These results indicate that disputes between
rivals at the proto stage were about =28% more likely to be complex, while those at the
enduring stage were about 42% more likely. This suggests that, consistent with
hypothesis H4, disputes which begin between states in more advanced forms of rivalry
are more likely to be joined by third parties.
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Table 3.4: Logit Estimates of Dispute Expansion
Variable

Model 4

Model 5

Rivalry MID

0.436***
(0.125)
___

___

Proto-rivalry phase

0.943***
(0.134)
0.913***
(0.169)
0.174
(0.171)
0.035
(0.153)
1.483***
(0.225)
-2.625***
(0.170)

0.302*
(0.159)
0.517***
(0.138)
0.944***
(0.134)
0.876***
(0.171)
0.162
(0.171)
0.033
(0.153)
1.474***
(0.225)
-2.619***
(0.170)

2,331
-969.696

2,331
-968.732

Enduring rivalry
Major power on one side
Major power on both sides
Territory MID
Policy MID
Regime MID
Constant

___

N
Log likelihood
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
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Table 3.5: Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Dispute Expansion
Variable

Model 4

Baseline
Dispute part of a rivalry
∆No→ Yes
Dispute occurred during protorivalry phase
∆No → Yes
Dispute occurred during enduring
rivalry phase
∆No → Yes
Major power on one side only
∆No → Yes
Major powers on both sides
∆No → Yes
Dispute over regime issues
∆No → Yes

0.14

Model 5
0.14

+ 0.05 (+35%)

___

___

+ 0.04 (+28%)

___

+ 0.06 (+42%)

+ 0.13 (+92%)

+ 0.13 (+92%)

+ 0.14 (+100%)

+ 0.13 (+92%)

+ 0.27 (+192%)

+ 0.27 (+192%)

Note: Baseline probabilities are calculated using the means or modes for each variable in the model.
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In regards to the control variables, the results indicate that disputes were about
twice as likely to become complex when they included a major power on one or both
sides. This suggests that. While disputes over regime issues were highly prone to
expansion, disputes over territory or policy were not significantly more likely to expand,
at least relative to the reference category (disputes over “other” issues).
In sum, the findings from both sets of analyses provide substantial support for all
four hypotheses. Dyads which contain states involved in rivalry relationships were more
likely to form alliances, especially when both states are involved in a rivalry with the
same enemy. Likewise, disputes that occur between rivals were more likely to be joined
by other states, and this propensity for expansion increases as rivalries mature and their
conflict history lengthens. Consequently, these findings suggest that states involved in
rivalries are prone to engage in behavior which leads to the creation of rivalry linkages
through the formation of alliances and expansion of disputes.
However, before making too much of these findings, it is important to point out
that these analyses simply assess the probability that states involved in rivalry will form
alliance or shared dispute linkages with other states. These analyses do not distinguish
between linkages that are formed with third parties that are involved in rivalries and
linkages that are formed with third parties that are not involved in rivalries16.
Consequently, in themselves, these analyses do not provide estimates of the probability
that linkages will form between rivalry dyads. They simply show that states involved in
rivalry tend to pursue linkages with third parties, and it is assumed that process helps to
explain the accumulation of linkages between rivalry dyads (presumably, linkages also
16

I am grateful to Wonjae Hwang for this point.
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accumulate between rivalry dyads and non-rivalry dyads as well). While this appears to
be a reasonable assumption, it is still possible that although rivals are prone to form
external linkages, they may be averse to forming linkages with other states involved in
rivalry for some unknown reason. If this were the case, then the results presented here
would not provide an explanation for the formation of rivalry linkages.
In order to investigate this possibility, I estimated three additional models which
examined the likelihood of the formation of linkages between pairs of states that were
both involved in at least one rivalry. These models provide a means of assessing the
robustness of the results produced by the analyses above and provide an additional source
of leverage for my arguments about the origins of rivalry linkages. In Model 6 (which is
presented in Table 3.6), I disaggregated the rivalry involvement variable included in
Models 1, 2 and 3 into two separate dummy variables in order to distinguish between
dyads in which only one state was involved in a rivalry and dyads in which both states
were involved in rivalries. These results indicate that dyads in which both states were
involved in rivalry were significantly more likely to form alliances with one another. In
addition, the size of the coefficient is greater for this variable is greater than for the
variable which captures the effect when only one state in the dyad is involved in rivalry,
indicating that states involved in rivalries are more likely to form alliances with other
states involved in rivalry. This suggests that rivalry dyads are most likely to form linkages
with other rivalry dyads.
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Table 3.6: Logit Estimates of Alliance Formation Between States Involved in Rivalry
Variable

Model 6

Rivalry involvement (one state in dyad)

0.219***
(0.073)
Rivalry involvement (both states in dyad)
0.539***
(0.095)
Common enemy
0.949***
(0.100)
Relative capabilities
-1.245***
(0.312)
Log of distance
-0.202***
(0.020)
Contiguity
0.697***
(0.159)
Joint democracy
-0.059
(0.163)
Joint autocracy
0.564***
(0.106)
Post 1944
-0.948***
(0.076)
Joint democracy*Post 1944
0.578***
(0.191)
Joint autocracy*Post 1944
-1.076***
(0.174)
Ongoing MID
-0.993***
(0.180)
Constant
0.782**
(0.303)
92079
N
2067
Units
-7257.67
Log Likelihood
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All models are
estimated with Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) controls for temporal dependence. Coefficients for
splines are not reported.
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In regards to shared dispute linkages, Table 3.7 presents the results of two models
which are identical to Models 4 and 5 except that the dependent variable has been
modified so that incidents of dispute expansion are only coded as such when the dispute
joiners are involved in rivalry. Consequently, these models directly estimate the
probability that disputes between rivals will be joined by third parties that are also
involved in rivalries of their own. The results of these models indicate that disputes
between rivals and disputes which occur in later phases of rivalry are significantly more
likely to be joined by third parties involved in rivalry. As a result, it seems that disputes
which occur within the context of a rivalry relationship tend to attract the attention of
others who are also involved in third party conflicts.
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Table 3.7: Logit Estimates of Dispute Joining by Rivals
Variable

Model 7

Model 8

Rivalry MID

1.219***
(0.194)
___

___

Proto-rivalry phase
Enduring rivalry
Major power on one side
Major power on both sides
Territory MID
Policy MID
Regime MID
Constant
N
Log likelihood
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.

___
0.917***
(0.183)
1.254***
(0.204)
0.837***
(0.242)
0.664***
(0.227)
1.884***
(0.295)
-4.522***
(0.282)
2331
-625.98
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0.715**
(0.244)
1.462***
(0.202)
0.922**
(0.185)
1.139***
(0.208)
0.797***
(0.243)
0.657**
(0.227)
1.852***
(0.297)
-4.496***
(0.281)
2331
-618.45

Conclusion
This chapter makes two important contributions to scholarly understanding of
rivalry linkages. First, it offers an explanation for why rivals form linkages. Whereas
previous studies have tended to treat rivalry linkages as neutral characteristics of the
external environment in which rivalries develop, this chapter suggests that they are often
consciously established by rivals in attempt to gain advantages in security competition.
Thus, this chapter helps to explain why rivalry linkages are so common, something which
had been seen as an anomalous finding by previous research (Diehl and Goertz 2000).
Second, this chapter examines rivalry linkage as a dependent variable. This is something
which has not yet been done by studies in the rivalry research program. The findings
presented here therefore make a novel contribution to scholarly understanding of the
process by which involvement in rivalry influences the way that states behave in their
dealings with third parties. This is an important implication of rivalry for conflict
behavior which has not yet received adequate attention from rivalry researchers.
Future research could build on this work in several ways. One possibility would
be to examine how the availability of linkage opportunities influences rivalry
development and escalation. While the analyses conducted in this chapter have shown
that states involved in rivalries’ are more likely than non-rivals to form alliance ties and
to experience complex disputes, it remains to be seen how rivalries are affected by the
opportunities for linkage. It is possible that rivalries tend to form more easily or last
longer in regions where there are more ongoing rivalries that can be linked to, or in times
when there are more great-power rivalries in the international system. The existence of
these kinds of dangerous linkage environments has been alluded to by work on conflict
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diffusion (Maoz et al 2007, Thompson 2003), and it may be possible to expand the
approach employed here in order to elucidate how these environmental conditions
influence rivalry development.
Another area for inquiry concerns the potential interactions between the two kinds
of linkages examined here, and the presence of contiguity or common enemy linkages.
This possibility has been examined to some extent by the analyses of alliance formation,
which include measures of contiguity and common enemy linkages in the model.
However, it remains to be seen whether these kinds of connections interact to encourage
the formation of additional linkages. That is, it is unclear whether dyads which form one
type of rivalry linkage are then at greater risk of forming others. If this is the case, then it
may help to explain the tendency for linkages to overlap and to occur in clusters,
something which Chapters 5 and 6 reveal to have important implications for rivalries’
intensity and duration.
The results of the analyses conducted here also suggest several policy
implications for those seeking ways to manage and mitigate hostility between rival states.
First and foremost, it suggests that policymakers should pay greater attention to the way
that rivalries are embedded in other, secondary relationships. If there are third parties that
routinely become involved in rivals’ disputes then they may be a good first target for
mediation efforts and other forms of diplomatic intervention. By persuading these states
to disconnect themselves from enduring rivalries, it may facilitate subsequent efforts to
meditate directly between the rivals. Along these lines, policymakers should also work to
prevent linkage formation in the first place. One of the most practical ways of doing this
would be to address the inadvertent sources of dispute expansion. While a great deal of
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international attention is already devoted to addressing problems like famine or
population displacement in conflict areas, this chapter suggests that it may worthwhile to
work towards enhancing the security of other nearby states who may not yet be directly
affected. This may prevent subsequent interventions by these states which could
complicate militarized disputes and contribute to the development of new interstate
rivalries.
Finally, this chapter suggests that great powers, such as the United States, should
work to ensure that their own efforts to compete against their rivals do not exacerbate
other unrelated conflicts. While great powers may hope to gain in the short term by
forming alliances or joining in disputes with other disputants who could benefit from
their assistance, these activities may pose serious long-term consequences for
international order and stability. For example, while the decision by US policymakers to
extend support to the Barre regime may have temporarily increased the costs of Soviet
activities in Ethiopia, it resulted in a protracted conflict that consumed considerable
resources and ultimately resulted in state failure in Somalia. Today, Somalia continues to
be source of transnational security problems and the US remains active in the region,
despite the end of the US-Soviet rivalry more than 20 years ago.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONSEQUENCES OF RIVALRY LINKAGE
Introduction
Most of the research on rivalry linkages has been focused on their effects on
rivals' conflict behavior. This is partly because much of the scholarly interest in rivalry
stems from concerns about the sources of international conflict, but it also reflects the
fact that there are many instances where rivalry linkages appear to have increased
tensions between rivals and contributed to the spread of conflicts from one rivalry to
another. For example, Thompson (2003, 457) suggests that the emergence of a “ripe
rivalry structure” in Europe in the years prior to 1914 was crucial to the outbreak and
spread of World War I. By his count, 15 of the 21 international rivalries in Europe were
connected to one another at the start of the war. These ties served to raise the strategic
stakes of confrontations within individual rivalries, and in turn, this helped to escalate
dyadic tensions across Europe. Thus, for Thompson, it is no surprise that hostilities
between Austria and Serbia escalated so quickly after the assassination of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand in Sarejevo, or that the resulting war spread to involve so many states. In
his view, the proliferation of rivalry linkages had turned Europe into a geopolitical
powder keg that was ripe for the outbreak of a major multilateral war.
The case of World War I illustrates well the concerns that many scholars have
about rivalry linkages. If ties like alliances or common borders can help to transform a
relatively minor confrontation between Serbia and Austria into “the global war that no
one really wanted” (Thompson 2003, 459), then it seems that plausible that they might
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have similar effect on other conflicts. In this regard, one might wonder whether the
structure of rivalry linkages today is also ripe for a major international conflict, and
where the next Sarejevo might be located. It is only by developing an understanding of
how linkages connect different rivalries together and how these ties influence rivals’
behavior that scholars can begin to make progress in answering these questions.
Recent studies in the rivalry literature do offer some insights into how rivalry
linkages might affect rivals’ conflict behavior. Diehl and Goertz (2000), in particular,
provide a framework for identifying and classifying rivalry linkages, and suggest that
they increase rivalries’ severity and duration. Yet while their empirical analyses, along
with those of several other scholars (Valeriano 2008), does provide some evidence in
favor of these claims, others produce conflicting findings (Stinnett and Diehl 2001), and
no study has yet to produce a well-developed theory of how or why linkages might
produce these effects. Thus, we still know relatively little about the ways in which
linkages actually affect rivalry dynamics, or the processes by which linkages might
contribute to the outbreak of war.
The goal of this chapter is to address this gap by developing a theory about how
the accumulation of rivalry linkages influences the expansion and escalation of disputes
between rivals. This theory argues linkages have two main effects on rivals' conflict
behavior. First, they increase the risk that rivals will be drawn into disputes that begin in
other linked dyads and that third parties from these dyads will intervene in their disputes.
Thus, as rivalries accumulate larger numbers of linkages it becomes more likely that they
will “catch” others’ disputes, and that their own disputes will become complex. Second, I
also argue that the formation of rivalry linkages increases the risk that disputes will
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escalate to war. Building on previous work by Gochman and Maoz (1984) and Diehl and
Goertz (2001), I suggest that this is because complex disputes are more likely to result in
war than disputes that remain dyadic. However, I also argue that disputes that occur
within the context of rivalry linkages are more likely to escalate to war even when they
do not become complex, because linkages affect rivals decision making processes in
ways which increase the attractiveness of militarized means of dispute resolution. Thus,
rivalry linkages have both a direct effect on the risk of war, and an indirect effect, which
is expressed through their tendency to produce complex MIDs. Together, these two
mechanisms suggest that as linkages accumulate rivalries should tend to experience more
disputes, and that when these disputes occur, they should be more likely to become
complex and to escalate to war.
I test these arguments using a series of bivariate probit models. This approach
allows me to estimate the direct and indirect effects of rivalry linkage, and to control for
the potential problem of selection bias, which may arise because linkages influence the
risk of both dispute onset and dispute escalation to war. The results of these analyses
provide considerable support for my arguments and indicate that linkages have an
important impact on rivals’ conflict behavior. The implications of these findings are
discussed in the conclusion of this chapter.

Extant Work on the Effects of Rivalry Linkage
Work within the rivalry literature have primarily been concerned with uncovering
the connections between conflicts that occur within a single dyad over time rather than
the exploring the possible connections between conflicts that occur in different dyads.
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However, there are a number of empirical studies which point to the significance of thirdparty conflicts for rivalry dynamics. Several scholars have found evidence that during the
Cold War changes in US-Soviet relations had an impact on rivalries between client states
in the Middle East (Kinsella 1994, 1997) and the Horn of Africa (Colaresi 2003) as well
as on the superpowers’ rivalries with China (Goldstein and Freeman 1991). These studies
suggest that changes in the dynamics of great power rivalries can have a trickle-down
effect on the dynamics of minor power clients because they bring about changes in
alliance ties or in the provision of military aid. Conversely, Ingram (in Thompson 1999)
suggests that events in minor power rivalries can also affect relations between their great
power patrons. He finds that one of the reasons why the Anglo-Russian rivalry endured
throughout the 1800s was because it was “enforced” by relatively minor powers like the
Ottoman Empire, Persia, and China, which often attempted to play Britain and Russia off
of one another, and at times deliberately sought to escalate Anglo-Russian tensions in
order to gain an advantage in their own conflicts (Ingram in Thompson 1999, 291-295).
Likewise, Schroeder (in Thompson 1999) argues that the Franco-Austrian rivalry was
sustained in part by its connections to other ongoing conflicts between minor powers in
Europe.
Thus, there is considerable evidence to suggest that rivalries are often strongly
influenced by events that occur in other dyads. These relationships have helped to inspire
several recent efforts by researchers to identify the connections that may exist between
rivalries and uncover their effects on rivalry dynamics. For example, Valeriano and
Powers (2010) have used existing data on rivalries to identify 48 complex rivalries
comprised of at least two dyadic rivalries which share common issues, MIDs or alliances.
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They find that rivalries which were part of these complex rivalry clusters experienced
more wars and were more likely to experience multilateral wars than would be expected
by chance. In a similar vein, Maoz, Terris, Kuperman and Talmud (2009) have used
social network analysis to identify the indirect relationships which connect pairs of states.
Indirect relations are based on the direct relationships, like alliances or rivalries, which
states have with third parties. So for example, a pair of states might be indirectly related
because they are both involved in a rivalry with the same state (they share a common
enemy), or are both allied with the same state (they share a common friend). Maoz,
Terris, Kuperman and Talmud (2009) find that states are more likely fight against their
friends’ enemies and their enemies’ friends, suggesting that relations with third parties
can have an important impact on dyadic conflict behavior.
Within the context of the rivalry literature, Diehl and Goertz (2001) provide what
is probably the most influential investigation of rivalry linkages. They identify four
different kinds of rivalry linkages based on the whether the participants in different
rivalries are connected to one another by contiguity, alliances, shared disputes or common
enemies. Working from the perspective of punctuated equilibrium models of rivalry, they
consider rivalry linkages to be an important feature of the systemic environment in which
rivalries develop. They argue that rivalries which develop in dyads that possess linkages
should tend to be longer and more severe because linkages serve to create a “favorable
international rivalry environment” that makes it easier for states to sustain security
competition (Diehl and Goertz 2001, 241).
Yet while most studies agree with Diehl and Goertz’s expectations regarding the
effects of rivalry linkages, attempts to test these claims have produced surprisingly
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inconsistent findings. In their own analyses, Diehl and Goertz find that only shared
dispute linkages had a statistically significant effect on rivals' hostility levels and the
frequency of war. As a result of these findings, subsequent studies which have examined
the effects of rivalry linkages have generally ignored the effects of contiguity, alliance
ties and common enemy linkages, and have focused solely on the impact of shared
disputes. Some of this work has provided support for Diehl and Goertz's initial
expectations. For example, using a slightly different research design, Valeriano (2008)
finds that as dyads accumulated larger numbers of disputes with third parties, they were
more likely to develop more advanced forms of rivalry and to have higher hostility levels
(Valeriano considers each new dispute to be instance of rivalry linkage, regardless of
whether the third party was involved in an enduring rivalry at the time). However,
Stinnett and Diehl (2001) find that shared dispute linkages have no significant effect on
rivalry development when one controls for other factors like the occurrence of military
stalemates or systemic shocks.
There are several potential reasons why previous empirical analyses may have
produced inconsistent results concerning the link between rivalry linkages and conflict.
First, Diehl and Goertz’s (2000) work, while path-breaking, employed a relatively
unsophisticated method of assessing the impact of rivalry linkages. They used individual
rivalries as the unit of analysis and regressed the basic rivalry level on the number of
linkages that the rivalry accrued over the course of its entire duration. This approach
makes sense from the perspective of the punctuate-equilibrium model of rivalry
employed by Diehl and Goertz, which assumes that rivalry dynamics are relatively stable
over time, and that most rivalry linkages form early in the life of the rivalry and remain in
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place until the rivalry ends. However, Diehl and Goertz's own data reveal that these
assumptions are likely to be inaccurate. The first instances of rivalry linkage typically
occur between 7 and 10 years after rivalry onset, and in most cases, linkages continue to
be created and destroyed throughout the life of rivalry17. Furthermore, almost all rivalries
develop linkages at some point in their duration, with the average rivalry developing
connections to 17 other rivalries.
Consequently, rather than being simply a feature of the external environment in
which some rivals happen to find themselves, linkage formation appears to be an
important part of the process by which most rivalries develop over time. Instead of asking
how linked rivalries differ from un-linked rivalries, it seems that a better approach would
be to examine how the linking and de-linking of rivalries affects their development over
time. Thus, one would be interested not only in the total number of linkages that a rivalry
develops, but also in timing of when these linkages form in relation to the occurrence of
military conflict. One might also expect that the effects of rivalry linkages would
dissipate once these ties were severed. To some extent, this is the kind of approach
employed by Stinnett and Diehl (2001), as they use time-series data and code linkages as
beginning at the moment when the first shared dispute occurs. This approach is more
sophisticated than the one employed by Diehl and Goertz because it permits the
comparison of rivals’ conflict behavior before and after the linkage formed, and enables
them to control for other variables. However, the utility of Stinnett and Diehl's approach
is limited by the fact that they treat rivalry linkage as a dummy variable, and stop
17

Given that the duration of the average enduring rivalry is about 30 years (Diehl and Goertz 2000), this
would place the first instances of linkage at about one third of the way through the life-cycle of the average
rivalry.
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counting new instances of rivalry linkage after the first one is created. Consequently, one
reason that Stinnet and Diehl failed to observe a significant relationship between shared
dispute linkages and conflict is that they may have underestimated the number of rivalry
linkages that some dyads possessed. Ideally, efforts examine the impact of rivalry
linkages should utilize a measure which captures changes in the total number of rivalry
linkages over time.
A second reason why previous studies may have failed to uncover a clear link
between linkages and conflict is that they lack a clear theory about how linkages affect
rivalry dynamics. Most studies follow Diehl and Goertz in assuming that linkages
intensify conflict, but they generally do not specify the processes or mechanisms by
which this effect occurs. Linkages are simply included as one of many variables believed
to influence rivalry dynamics. For their part, Diehl and Goertz do offer an explanation for
the effects of rivalry linkage which is based on the finding by Gochman and Maoz (1984)
that complex militarized disputes (which involve more than two disputants) are more
likely to escalate to war than disputes which are dyadic. Diehl and Goertz assume rivalry
linkages should serve to increase the risk that disputes between rivals will become
complex, and based on this finding, assert that the MIDs which occur in linked rivalries
should generally be more severe MIDs and be at greater risk of escalating to war. This is
an important contribution, but it still leaves several questions unanswered. For one thing,
it is not clear whether linked rivalries are actually more likely to have complex MIDs.
While this would seem to be a plausible assumption, it has not yet been tested
empirically. In addition, studies of rivalry linkage have generally not paid much attention
to the processes by which complex MIDs are believed escalate to war. Here, recent
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research on multiparty disputes provides some important insights into the ways in which
rivalry linkages may affect rivals’ conflict behavior. Many of these are consistent with
Diehl and Goertz's claims, but there are also some which yield novel expectations about
the likely effects of linkage formation on rivalry dynamics.
In sum, while a number of studies have acknowledged the likely importance of
rivalry linkages and some have begun to incorporate them into models of rivals’
interactions, the results of empirical analyses have been inconsistent and no study has yet
produced a fully developed theory of how the formation of rivalry linkages affects rivals’
conflict behavior. I undertake these tasks in the next two sections of this chapter.

A Theory of the Consequences of Rivalry Linkage
In this section, I develop a theory about how rivalry linkages affect rivals' conflict
behavior. This theory suggests that linkages have two primary effects. First, linkages
serve to facilitate the diffusion of conflicts from one rivalry to another. Second, since
linkages increase the likelihood that others will intervene, their presence may also
complicate negotiations and influence leaders’ decision-making processes in ways which
increase the attractiveness of militarized means of dispute settlement. In the subsections
that follow, I discuss each of these effects in greater detail.

Conflict Diffusion
The literature on the diffusion of war provides an important theoretical and
empirical foundation for efforts to understand the connections between rivalries. It posits
that conflicts can sometimes spread from one group of countries to another, and seeks to
104

identify the mechanisms or linkages that facilitate this process. In this regard, most
studies suggest that conflicts can spread in two general ways (Vasquez et al. 2011). First,
conflicts can grow through a process of conflict expansion, whereby the original dyadic
dispute or war is joined by additional states. Second, conflicts can also diffuse through a
process of conflict generation, in which a dispute in one dyad helps to encourage the
onset of a second dispute in another dyad.
Conflicts have been found to be most likely to spread to states that share common
borders (Most and Starr 1980) or alliance ties (Siverson and King 1980) with one or more
of the belligerents. The most influential theoretical framework for analyzing this
diffusion process has been that of opportunity and willingness (Siverson and Starr 1991).
According this perspective, shared borders or geographical proximity to belligerents are
believed to provide states with an opportunity to become involved in conflicts, while
alliance ties serve as an indication of whether states are likely to have an interest in
intervening. Together, these factors are typically considered to be a set of necessary, but
not sufficient, conditions for conflict diffusion to occur.
The empirical literature has built upon this opportunity and willingness
framework in several different ways. One branch of research has sought to examine how
the propensity for conflict diffusion is affected by geographical conditions. For example,
Thomas and Starr (2005) find that conflict is most likely to diffuse across “vital” borders,
which are both economically or politically salient and relatively easy to cross.
Braithewaite (2006) takes this emphasis on geographical factors one step further and
examines the factors which influence the physical scope of militarized disputes (MIDs).
He finds that the combination of vital borders with passable terrain and territorial
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disputes provides a powerful explanation for the size of the area that is likely to be
affected by the MID. Another set of studies has looked for alternative indicators of
willingness. Gledistch (2002), for instance, suggests that the presence of common
domestic institutions or high levels of interdependence can encourage states to intervene
in conflicts even when they are not formally allied with any of the participants.
Conversely, Kadera (1998) argues that some alliances, such as non-aggression or nonintervention agreements, may act as “transmission barriers” that discourage diffusion
between contiguous states. Together these two strands of research have revealed new
insights into the factors that draw nearby countries into ongoing conflicts and has helped
to propel a growing literature on the effects of regional factors on the risk of war.
Most recently, scholars have begun to explore the possibility that conflict might
spread through social networks as well as through geographical space (Maoz 2011,
Vasquez et al. 2011, Maoz 2006, Hammerstrom and Heldt 2002). These studies are
particularly notable in that they introduce international rivalries as an additional channel
through which conflicts might spread. Most studies argue that the presence of rivalry
relationships between states in the dyad and third parties can serve as an indicator that
third parties possess both the opportunity and willingness to intervene in the dyad's
disputes. It is typically assumed that states have a vested interest in the outcomes of
disputes which involve their rivals, and many studies suggested that they may be tempted
to intervene in order to weaken their adversary.
The conflict diffusion literature therefore suggests that conflict should be more
likely to spread across rivalries which are linked to one another by alliance ties, shared
borders or common enemies (Maoz 2011, Vasquez et al. 2011, Maoz 2006, Hammerstrom
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and Birger 2002). While the conflict diffusion literature has not paid much attention to
shared dispute linkages, it seems likely that they should also serve to increase the
likelihood of conflict diffusion. For one thing, shared dispute linkages are formed by
conflict diffusion. They arise when disputes that began in the context of one rivalry
spread to involve third parties that are participants in another rivalry. Thus, the formation
of a shared dispute linkage between two dyads provides evidence that the diffusion of
conflict is possible between them. In addition, Diehl and Goertz (2000) assert that the
occurrence of a shared dispute provides a good indication that the states involved in the
two rivalries have interdependent security interests. They suggest that rivalries by linked
by shared disputes are also likely to share common grievances and contentious issues,
and that it is likely that additional complex disputes involving states form both dyads will
continue to arise. For this reason, they assume that once shared dispute linkages are
established, they remain in place until one of the two rivalries has come to an end.
Following this reasoning, one would expect that disputes should be prone to spread
between rivalries that are linked by shared dispute linkages.
In sum, the conflict diffusion literature proves an important insight into the ways
in which rivalry linkages are likely to affect rivals’ conflict behavior. It suggests that
these ties should serve to facilitate the spread of conflict across rivalries, thereby
increasing the risk that rivalries will “catch” disputes that begin in other dyads, and that
third parties will be drawn into their conflicts. These possibilities are examined
empirically, by testing the following two hypotheses:

H1: Rivalries with larger numbers of rivalry linkages are more likely to
experience militarized disputes.
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H2: Rivalries with larger numbers of rivalry linkages are more likely to
experience complex militarized disputes.

Dispute Escalation
The arguments presented above, as well as those developed in the previous
chapter, suggest that rivalries should become more likely to experience complex
militarized disputes as they accumulate larger numbers of rivalry linkages. This
consequence of rivalry linkage is potentially very important because a number of studies
in the conflict literature have found that multiparty disputes are more difficult to resolve
and more likely to escalate to the use of force (Gochman and Maoz 1984, Vasquez,
Petersen and Wang 2004). This finding serves as the foundation for Diehl and Goertz’s
assertion that linked rivalries should be longer lasting and more severe. Yet beyond citing
these findings, Diehl and Goertz provide little in the way of a theoretical rationale for
why linkages have these effects. Furthermore, in their empirical work, they do not
actually test the assumptions that rivalry linkages lead to more complex disputes, or that
complex disputes escalate to higher levels of hostility. Instead, their focus is simply on
demonstrating that rivalries with larger numbers of linkages experience higher levels of
conflict. This is unfortunate, because the conflict literature does suggest a number of
reasons for why multiparty disputes are especially conflict-prone, and these in turn offer
important insights into how the accumulation of linkages might influences rivals’ conflict
behavior.
First, Gochman and Maoz suggest that one of the reasons why multiparty disputes
tend to be more likely to escalate to the use of force is because they typically involve a
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greater aggregation of military capabilities. War is often averted, especially in minorpower disputes, simply because the states involved lack the military capabilities
necessary to sustain a full-scale war. Potential attackers may lack strong offensive
military forces, or are deterred by obstacles like mountains, deserts, or rivers which limit
their ability to project military against their adversary. However, since dispute joiners
tend to be great powers or states which border one of the disputants, they often bring with
them military resources—such as ships, transport aircraft or military access rights
through nearby territory—that can make large-scale military conflicts easier to sustain.
For this reason, Gochman and Maoz suggest that the more parties involved in a dispute,
the more likely it is that the dispute will result in war. This argument is particularly
relevant for disputes which expand because of rivalry linkages because linkages tend to
connect minor power rivalries to those involving great power patrons.
Second, there are also many studies which suggest that conflict resolution is likely
to become more difficult as the number of parties increases (Wagner 2000, Leeds 2003).
Each new disputant enters a conflict with their own goals and objectives, and may object
to agreements which would have satisfied the original parties. Since the peaceful
settlement of disputes often requires at least the tacit support of all militarized parties,
this means dispute joiners can act as veto players, and delay conflict resolution until their
own goals are obtained. In doing so, they effectively reduce the “issue space” available
for a peaceful settlement. This dynamic is summarized nicely by Vasquez, Petersen and
Wang (2010, 89):
In multiparty disputes, all are held hostage to the actor that is most intransigent or
least able to sign an agreement, so long as all seek to remain within this coalition.
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Therefore, disputes involving more than two states might be less likely to be
resolved prior to the escalation to war (if in fact the addition of third parties
reduces the common ground) and thus more likely to lead to war than disputes
between two parties

Consequently, one would expect that disputes which occur within rivalries that possess
linkages to other ongoing conflicts should generally be more difficult to resolve because
they are more likely to become complex.
Finally, the involvement of third parties also tends to increase decision-makers’
uncertainty about the future (Gochman and Maoz 1984). When states become involved in
militarized disputes, their leaders must make calculations about their adversary’s
capabilities and objectives, and try to anticipate how others will react to different conflict
trajectories. For example, policymakers must try to determine whether their opponents
will back down in the face of coercive threats or whether alliance partners will honor their
commitments and join the dispute should it escalate to war. These tasks are likely become
much more difficult as the number of disputants grows, and this results in greater
uncertainty about where the dispute will lead. Many studies in the literature on multiparty
disputes assert that the increase uncertainty associated with dispute expansion results in
greater risk that the dispute will escalate to war, because it becomes more likely that
disputants will make mistakes and arrive at incorrect assessments of others’ intentions,
capabilities or resolve (Vasquez, Petersen and Wang 2011).
In addition, this uncertainty is likely to be especially dangerous in the context of
international rivalries because rivals tend to respond to uncertainty with hyper-vigilance
(Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007). The history of past conflicts with the rival often
lead policymakers to assume the worst about their adversary’s intentions, and to develop
‘‘enduring enemy images’’ of suspicion and mistrust (Aggestam 1997, 778). Furthermore,
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when states become involved in rivalries, they tend to adopt new institutions and policies
designed to facilitate a more militarized approach to foreign policy. These changes tend
to strengthen the domestic political position of hawkish elites and make it more likely
that force will be used in subsequent confrontations (Colaresi 2005). Consequently,
involvement in rivalry tends to create a policymaking environment in which leaders are
more likely to interpret ambiguous situations in a more threatening manner, and to
respond to anticipated threats with the use of force.
The literature on multiparty disputes therefore provides a number of reasons why
complex disputes should be more likely to escalate to war than disputes which remain
dyadic. Provided that rivalry linkages increase the risk that rivals will experience complex
MIDs, as suggested in the previous section, these arguments support Diehl and Goertz's
(2000) claim that rivalries which accumulate larger number of linkages should tend to
experience higher levels of conflict and hostility. However, given that rivalry linkages are
believed to establish enduring patterns of third party involvement, it also seems plausible
that the formation of linkages may have an effect on rivals’ interactions in the periods
between disputes and in subsequent disputes which do not become complex. In other
words, it seems reasonable to expect that rivals probably do not forget about dispute
joining by third parties once the complex MID has come to an end. As long as the
linkages remain in place, rivals are likely to expect that third parties may become
involved in future disputes and should take this possibility into account in their foreign
policy. Thus, even though some disputes that occur within linked rivalries may remain
dyadic in nature (that is, they are not joined), the presence of rivalry linkages (and the
memory of past dispute joining) may still have important effects on dispute behavior.
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In particular, I argue that the expectation that MIDs may be joined by third parties
should serve to promote dispute escalation, for several reasons. First, if a rival state
believes that third party would be likely to intervene if the dispute were to escalate, and
that this intervention would increase their odds of resolving the dispute in a favorable
way (as would be the case if it had a powerful ally or a patron), then one would expect
that they would be more likely to behave aggressively or escalate the conflict, because
they could be more confident that their adversaries would back down. Thus, rivals may
behave more aggressively in dyadic disputes because they believe that it will be joined by
their allies in the future. Conversely, Valeriano (2008) also suggests that rivalry linkages
may provide rival states with an incentive to escalate disputes in order to discourage third
parties from intervening. When states have several different rivals, and when these
rivalries are linked by alliance ties or shared disputes, they fear that their other enemies
will attempt to join a dispute in order to take advantage of their perceived weakness. In
these situations, Valeriano argues that states may have an incentive behave aggressively
while the dispute is still dyadic in order to demonstrate their military capabilities or
resolve. Thus, states may also escalate a dispute in to order to discourage their enemies
from joining. Finally, the literature on multiparty disputes suggests that, in the context of
rivalry, the uncertainty which linkages create for policymakers may encourage them to
react more quickly and aggressively to ambiguous situations. Consequently, linkages may
promote escalation because both sides fear that the dispute is going to be joined by
others, even if those fears are never ultimately realized.
These processes can be seen at work in the disputes which occurred as part
for the rivalries between Israel and its Arab neighbors. During the 1948 Arab-
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Israeli War, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria, fought together against Israel, thereby
establishing a shared dispute linkage between four different dyadic rivalries.
Within the context of this initial dispute, the involvement of multiple states helped
to increase the level of hostility and promoted the escalation of the conflict.
However, since war also established a set enduring rivalry linkages, the prospect
of third party involvement remained an important concern for Israel in subsequent
disputes with its Arab rivals. For example, when Israel became involved in dyadic
disputes with Egypt in the 1970s or with Iraq in the early 1980s, Israeli
policymakers were deeply concerned about the possibility that the dispute would
be joined by their other Arab rivals. For this reason, they underwent extensive
military mobilizations during both series of disputes in preparation for a
multilateral war, and also issued deterrent threats to other Arab states in order to
discourage them from getting involved (Dror 2011). In the dispute that later
become known as the Six Day War, Israel even attacked potential Arab joiners
preemptively, and chose to begin what they believed was an inevitable multilateral
war on their own terms. Conversely, Arab states, like Syria and Egypt, often
behaved more aggressively towards Israel (which was generally much more
powerful than them militarily), because they believed that support from third
parties would enable to them to win a military conflict.
The experiences of Israel suggest rivalry linkages may be dangerous for at least
two reasons. First, as proposed by Diehl and Goertz (2000), they may encourage the
occurrence of complex MIDs, which tend to be more prone to escalate to war than dyadic
MIDs. However, the formation of linkages also creates expectations about likelihood that
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third party involvement in dyadic disputes. Even when these disputes do not actually
expand, rivalry linkages may still contribute to the risk of escalation because they create
uncertainty about the future and provide incentives for states to behave aggressively. As a
result, linkages can be expected to exert indirect effect on the risk of war, which is
expressed through their tendency to produce multiparty disputes, as well as a direct
effect, which should be observable even when one controls for conflict expansion. These
expectations are investigated empirically by testing the following two hypotheses:

H3: Complex militarized disputes are more likely to escalate to war.
H4: As the number of rivalry linkages increases, the risk that militarized
disputes will escalate to war will increase.

Data and Methods
This chapter contains two sets of empirical analyses. In the first set of analyses, I
test hypotheses H1 and H2 by examining the effects of rivalry linkages on the probability
of MID onset and MID expansion. In the second set of analyses, I test hypotheses H3 and
H4 by examining how dispute expansion and the number rivalry linkages affect the
probability of a MID eventually escalating to war. In both sets of analyses, I employ twostage bivariate probit models in which dispute onset serves as the dependent variable in
the first stage.
I use a two-stage model because of the possibility of selection bias, which arises
when one attempts to estimate a model using a non-random sample. Selection bias is a
potential problem in my analyses because dyads can only experience dispute expansion
or escalation while already in the midst of an ongoing militarized dispute. Consequently,
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the process by which disputes arise can be said to have selected those dyads years which
become at risk of dispute expansion or escalation. If one attempted to estimate a model of
either dispute expansion or escalation without also estimating a model of dispute onset,
one would essentially be subsuming the unobserved effects of any variables which would
be included the dispute onset model into the error term of the dispute expansion or
expansion models (Senese and Vasquez 2007, 84). Furthermore, if the error terms of
these models were significantly correlated with one another (which is likely, given that
rivalry linkages are expected to play an important role in both stages), then the coefficient
estimates of the latter could be biased (Heckman 1979, Greene 2000). For these reasons, I
estimate the effects of rivalry linkages on dispute onset and expansion, as well as on
dispute onset and escalation using bivariate probit models. Bivariate probit models have
been used by a number of studies in the conflict literature (Senese and Vasquez 2007,
Kimball 2006, Reed 2000) to account for selection when both stages of the equation
entail dichotomous dependent variables.
The unit of analysis is the rivalry dyad-year, and the sample includes all rivalry
dyad-years for the period 1816-2001. I focus on rivalry dyads for two reasons. First,
many of the theoretical arguments above are developed with the assumption that states
are engaged in an ongoing rivalry, and treat the presence of rivalry relationship as a
background condition that is always assumed to be present. In this regard, there are good
reasons to expect patterns of dispute expansion and escalation are likely to be different
outside of the rivalry context, and so it would likely be inappropriate to generalize many
of these claims to apply to dyads outside of the population of international rivalries.
Second, I am also constrained by data limitations that result from the way rivalry linkages
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are coded. By definition, a dyad can only possess rivalry linkages while it is in a state of
rivalry and a part of the larger rivalry system. If a rivalry ends, then that dyad exits the
rivalry system and the linkages are severed. Since rivalry linkages are my primary
explanatory variable and present in every model, this limits the study to the consideration
of only rivalry dyads. The data used for these analyses are drawn from a variety of
sources. The dependent variables—dispute onset, dispute expansion and escalation to
war—are all dichotomous. Dispute onset is coded as 1 during all dyad-years in which a
MID is ongoing while escalation to war is coded as 1 during all dyad-years in which
hostility levels for a dispute have reached the level of war. Dispute expansion is coded as
1 when a MID s joined is joined by a third-party and lasts until the dispute ends or all
third party joiners have stopped participating in the MID. All of the dependent variables
are created using the COW MID data (version 3.10) (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004).
Dispute onset is the dependent variable in the first stage of both sets of analyses.
There are seven independent variables in this stage of the model. Rivalry linkages is the
primary variable of interest for my hypotheses. It records the number of active linkages
between the dyad and other ongoing rivalries. It sums the number of four types of
linkages based on the presence of contiguity, alliances, common enemies and shared
disputes between rivalry dyads. The number of rivalry linkages increases whenever two
rivalries form a connection, such as through the creation of an alliance, or when a new
rivalry forms in a dyad that is already linked to an ongoing rivalry, such as through
contiguity. The number of linkages decreases whenever these ties are severed, such as
when an alliance is terminated, or when one of the linked rivalries comes to an end. I also
control for six control variables commonly included in models of international conflict.
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Joint democracy and allies are dichotomous variables which are coded 1 when both states
in the dyad are democracies (a polity score of 14 or greater on a 0 to 20 scale) and when
both states in the alliance have an active military alliance according to the COW formal
alliance data (Small and Singer 1969, Gibler and Sarkees 2004), respectively. I do not
distinguish between different types of alliances. Following Senese and Vasquez (2008,
91), I measure economic development as the natural log of energy production per capita
as recorded by the COW national capabilities data, and use the values from the lessdeveloped state in the dyad. Contiguity is a dummy variable which indicates whether
states in the dyad share a land border according to the COW direct contiguity data.
Major-major is coded as 1 when the dyad-year contains two major powers, while minorminor is coded as 1 when the dyad-year contains two minor powers. Mixed dyads, which
contain one major power and one minor power, serve as the reference category. Finally, I
also control for temporal dependence by using the cubic spline technique developed by
Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), and include the variable peace years in the first stage of
the model. Peace years records the number of years since the end of the most recent
militarized dispute between the two states in the dyad. It was created using Bennett and
Stam’s (2000) EUGene software (version 3.204).
For the first set of analyses, the dependent variable in the second stage of the
model is dispute expansion. Here, I include rivalry linkages as well as all six of the
control variables from the first stage of the model, as well as three dichotomous
variables—territory, policy, and regime—which are coded as 1 if the dispute involved
those particular issues. If a dispute involved multiple issues, or if there were multiple
disputes about different issues during the same year, each of the relevant issue variables
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was coded as 1 for the dyad-year. Data for these variables are taken from the COW MID
data, and disputes over issues labeled as “other” serve as the reference category.
In the second set of analyses, escalation to war serves as the dependent variable
in the second stage. This stage of the model includes the rivalry linkages variable as well
as the six conflict variables from the first stage. However, in order to test hypothesis H4, I
also include dispute expansion as an independent variable, which is included as a control
alongside dispute characteristics. Dispute expansion is dichotomous and is coded 1 for all
dyad-years in which there is an ongoing MID that involves more than two participants
and 0 otherwise. In some cases disputes become complex during the same year that the
dispute began. It is expected that disputes which become complex will be more likely to
escalate to war. Descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in both models are
presented in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics (Rivalry Dyad-Years, 1816-2001)
Variable

Observatio

Mean
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Std.

Min.

Max.

Dispute Ongoing
Dispute Expansion
War Onset
Rivalry Linages
Joint Democracy
Allies
Economic
Development
Contigutiy
Major-Major Status
Minor-Minor Status
Territory MID
Regime MID
Policy MID

ns
3,761
3,761
3,761
3,761
3,761
3,761
3,761
3,761
3,761
3,761
3,761
3,761
3,761

0.15
0.0
0.06
3.30
3.65
10.50
7.87

Deviation
0.27
0.33
2.27
1.39
2.25
7.34
0.98

0
0
0
0.002
0
0
5.04

1
5
12
9.44
8
40.91
10.67

0.03
-0.04
1.45
6.81
0.50
3.48

0.89
6.86
4.20
2.55
0.50
3.70

-0.98
-10
0
0
0
0

0.76
10
19
12
1
10

Empirical Results
I begin by providing a test of hypotheses H1 and H2 in Table 4.2, which reports
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the results of a bivariate probit model. The marginal effects of changes in the number of
rivalry linkages on the probability of dispute onset and dispute expansion are presented in
Table 4. The results of Model 1 provide strong support for both hypotheses, as the
number of rivalry linkages has a significant and positive effect on the probability that
new disputes will occur and that they will be joined by other states. On average, for each
additional linkage that a rivalry forms with another rivalrous dyad, the probability of a
new dispute occurring during that year increases by about 0.01 which translates to about
a 3% increase in the baseline probability of a dispute. This effect may seem small, but
given that linkage formation tends to occur in clusters with rivalries often forming two or
three linkages at the same time, the impact of linkage on conflict propensity can be quite
substantial. For a rivalry with 40 linkages, the highest number of linkages observed in the
sample, the probability of a dispute in a given year is 0.58, which is nearly twice the
baseline probability. Or in other words, while the average rivalry can expect to
experience about 3 militarized disputes every 10 years, the most densely linked rivalries
can expect to experience about 6.

Table 4.2: Bivariate Probit Estimates of Dispute Onset and Expansion
Variables in Model

Bivariate Probit 1
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Y1:MID Onset
Rivalry Linkages

0.026***
(0.007)
0.454**
(0.186)
-0.360**
(0.138)
-0.081***
(0.020)
0.201
(0.124)
0.058
(0.176)
-0.215*
(0.122)
-1.883***
(0.485)

Joint Democracy
Allies
Economic Development
Contiguity
Major-Major Status
Minor-Minor Status
Peace Yearsa
Y2:MID Expansion
Rivalry Linkages

0.043***
(0.007)
Territory MIDb
0.558***
(0.165)
0.319**
Policy MIDb
(0.147)
0.867***
Regime MIDb
(0.187)
Joint Democracy
0.173
(0.255)
Allies
-0.160
(0.190)
Economic Development
-0.088***
(0.027)
Contiguity
-0.358
(0.226)
Major-Major Status
0.382*
(0.230)
Minor-Minor Status
-0.328
(0.254)
ρ
0.999 (0.0003)
Wald χ2
288.26***
N
3,615
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a
The spline coefficients are not reported.
b
As compared to the reference category of MIDs regarding “other” issues.

The results from the second stage of Model 1 indicate that rivalry linkages have
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an even greater effect on dispute expansion. When disputes occur, each additional rivalry
linkages increase probability of dispute expansion by about 1.3% on average. While the
disputes that occur within rivalries that have an average number of linkages have about
0.32 probability of being joined by other states, this increases to about an 0.82 probability
when the number of linkages is increased to its maximum. Thus, it appears that the more
external linkages that rivalries develop, the more likely they are to experience new
militarized disputes, and when these disputes occur, they are much more likely to become
complex.
I provide a test of hypotheses H3 and H4 in Table 4.3, which presents the results
of a second bivariate probit model. In this model, the outbreak of war serves as the
dependent variable, while dispute expansion serves an independent variable, in the
second stage of the model. Once again, dispute onset serves as the dependent variable in
the first stage of the model in order to control for the possibility of selection effects. In
the first stage of the model, the results indicate that the number of linkages has a
significant positive effect on the probability of dispute onset, with each additional linkage
again increasing the probability of a new MID occurring by about 0.01 during a given
year. This is consistent with the results of Model 1 and supportive of hypothesis H1. The
results from the second stage of the model provide support for hypotheses H3 and H4,
finding that both rivalry linkages and complex MID have significant positive impacts on
the probability that disputes will escalate to war. Consistent with the arguments of Diehl
and Goertz (2000), and the findings of Gochman and Maoz (1984), disputes which
become complex appear to be much more likely to escalate to war than disputes which
remain dyadic. On average, when dispute participation expands beyond two disputants,
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the risk of war increases by about 138% relative to the baseline. The results of Model 2
also indicate that rivalry linkages increase the risk of war, even when one controls for the
effects of dispute expansion. On average, each additional rivalry linkage increases the
risk that disputes will escalate to war by about 5.6%. This effect is particularly significant
when one considers that this increase in the risk of war is observed in each new dispute
that occurs in the rivalry for as long as the linkages remain in place.

Table 4.3: Bivariate Probit Estimates of Dispute Onset and Escalation to War
Variables in Model
Y1:MID Onset

Bivariate Probit 2
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Rivalry Linkages

0.032***
(0.006)
0.392**
(0.144)
-0.203
(0.136)
-0.103***
(0.021)
-0.028
(0.149)
0.192
(0.192)
-0.216
(0.142)
-0.600***
(0.105)

Joint Democracy
Allies
Economic Development
Contiguity
Major-Major Status
Minor-Minor Status
Peace Yearsa
Y2:War Onset
Rivalry Linkages

0.038***
(0.010)
Dispute Expansion
1.205***
(0.212)
Territory MIDb
0.835***
(0.158)
0.337*
Policy MIDb
(0.190)
0.095
Regime MIDb
(0.469)
Joint Democracy
0.302
(0.436)
Allies
-0.212
(0.176)
Economic Development
-0.316***
(0.091)
Contiguity
-0.014
(0.159)
Major-Major Status
0.552**
(0.183)
Minor-Minor Status
-0.482**
(0.287)
ρ
0.276 (0.107)
Wald χ2
7623.95***
N
3,615
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a
The spline coefficients are not reported.b As compared to the reference category of MIDs regarding
“other” issues.

The effects of most of the control variables in Models 1 and 2 are consistent with
those observed in other empirical models in the conflict literature. In regards to the
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dispute onset stage, both models indicate that disputes are less likely to occur between
rivals that are allied with one another or less developed economically, and when there has
been longer period of peaceful interactions. These findings fit well with the results of
previous studies of dispute onset. In regards to the dispute expansion stage of Model 1,
the results indicate that disputes are more likely to be joined by others when they dealt
with regime issues, or when they involved major powers or states that possessed a higher
level of economic development. This is consistent with the findings of Gochman and
Maoz (1984) and Mousseau (1997) as well as with the results produced by the analyses
conducted in Chapter 3. In regards to the dispute escalation stage of Model 2, disputes
were found to be more likely to escalate to war when they dealt with territorial issues, or
involved states that were major powers or that were more economically developed.
These findings accord with those produced by research on the steps-to-war (Vasquez
1993; Senese and Vasquez 2008) as well as with many other studies in the conflict
literature which suggest that territory and power play prominent roles in the dispute
escalation process (Bremer 1992).
However, there were two control variables—contiguity and joint democracy—
which did not perform as expected. First, the results of both models indicate that
contiguity did not have a significant effect on the probability of dispute onset, escalation
or expansion. This is surprising because territorial contiguity is generally seen as being
one of the most important factors influencing the risk of militarized conflict between
pairs of states, as it provides a measure whether two states have the opportunity or ability
to fight one another. Second, the results both models also suggest that jointly democratic
dyads were more likely to experience militarized disputes, although there was no
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relationship between joint democracy and the risk of dispute expansion or escalation to
war. This finding runs contrary to the expectations of the democratic peace literature,
which argues the relations between jointly democratic dyads should generally be more
peaceful than the relations between mixed or jointly autocratic dyads (Bremer 1992;
Maoz and Russett 1993; Rousseau et al. 1996).
What accounts for these strange findings? At this point any potential explanations
would necessarily be tentative and post-hoc, but it plausible that these results are driven
largely by the fact that the sample employed by this study is comprised solely of rivalry
dyads. Rivalry dyads are likely to differ from the general population of dyads in a number
of ways. For one thing, most rivalries (approximately 60% of the dyads in the sample)
involve states that are contiguous, a much higher rate of contiguity than found in the
general population. In addition, it seems plausible that most non-contiguous states that
become rivals do so because they already possess the capacity to fight one another. Thus,
contiguity may not be as effective as a means of controlling for states’ opportunity to
fight when using a sample comprised of rivalry dyads. Likewise, the sample contains
relatively few jointly democratic dyads, and most of these arise because of the occurrence
of a democratic transition in a rivalry that began between states that were not jointly
democratic. In most cases, it appears that democratic transitions tend to shorten rivalries
and help to them to an end (Prins and Daxecker 2005). However, in those cases where
rivalries endure after a democratic transition, it is often because the democratic regime
fails to become consolidated and the state eventually reverts back to autocracy. So, for
example, in the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, India has consistently been classified by the Polity
IV data as being democratic throughout the duration of the rivalry. Pakistan began the
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rivalry as an autocratic state, but has experienced two democratic transitions, which led
Polity to classify it as democratic for much of the 1970s and 1990s. During these periods,
the Pakistani military continued to wield considerable political power, and Pakistan
continued to have frequent militarized disputes with India, including one war18. Both
periods of democracy came to an end because of military coups. Thus, it is possible that
the greater dispute propensity for jointly democratic rivalries really reflects the effects of
recent regime changes and domestic political instability, both of which have been linked
to the onset of MIDs.
Ultimately, however, the questions of how changes in domestic political
institutions affect relations between rivals, and how the effects of conflict determinants
may change in the context of rivalry relationships, remain important areas for future
research. I have included them in the models here in order to facilitate comparisons with
the results of other conflict studies, and because I believe the counterintuitive results are
important and worth reporting. In addition, it is also important to point out that other
studies have produced similarly null or weak findings in regards in regards to contiguity
and joint democracy. For example, Diehl and Goertz (2001, 121) find that the
development of joint democracy has no significant effect on rivals’ conflict behavior until
the final stages of the rivalry. Likewise, Rasler and Thompson (2006) find that while
contiguity greatly increased the risk of war among dyads in general, among rivals,
contiguity had a much smaller effect, unless the rivals also shared a territorial dispute.

18

It is sometimes debated whether or not the Kargil War, which occurred in 1994, constitutes an example of
a war between two democracies. Many scholars contend that it is not, either because democratic regime
had not yet been consolidated or because it did not truly control Pakistani combatants (Ganguly 2001).
However, the fact remains that according to the Polity data, the Indo-Pakistani dyad was jointly democratic
during this time.
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Future studies would do well to examine why the effects associated with these two
important determinants of conflict appear to change when one examines them within the
context for rivalry relationships.
In sum, the results of Models 1 and 2 provide support for all four hypotheses,
although they also raise additional questions about how to best model conflict processes
between rivals. The results indicate that as rivalries accumulate greater numbers of rivalry
linkages, they face greater risk of experiencing new militarized disputes, and that when
these disputes occur, they are more likely to be joined by other states and to escalate to
war. Thus, these results suggest that formation of rivalry linkages has a substantial impact
conflict behavior between rivals. The substantive effects of linkage formation are
illustrated in Table 4.4, which presents the changes in the predicted probabilities of
dispute onset, escalation and expansion to war at different values for different values of
the explanatory variables.

Table 4.4: Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Dispute Onset, Expansion and
Escalation to War
Variable

Dispute Onset
Model 1

Dispute
Expansion
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Dispute Onset
Model 2

Dispute
Escalation

Baseline
Rivalry Linkages
∆Mean → Max

Joint Democracy
∆No → Yes

Allies
∆ No → Yes

Economic Development

0.28

0.36

0.34

0.32

+0.30
(+107%)
+0.16
(+60%)
-0.11
(-41%)
NS

+0.46
(+129%)
NS

+0.37
(+111%)
+0.15
(+45%)
NS

+0.54
(+169%)
NS

-0.33
(-92%)
+0.149
(+41%)
NS

NS

__

__

+0.21
(+61%)
+0.12
(+34%)
+0.33
(+92%)

__

-0.32
(-100%)
+0.21
(+66%)
-0.18
(-56%)
+0.44
(+138%)
+0.32
(+100%)
+0.12
(+38%)
NS

NS

∆Mean → Max

Major-Major Status

NS

∆No→ Yes

Minor-Minor Status
∆No→ Yes

Dispute Expansion

-0.07
(-26%)
__

NS
NS

∆No→ Yes

Territory MID

__

∆No→ Yes

Policy MID

__

∆No→ Yes

Regime MID

__

__
__

NS

∆No→ Yes
Note: Predicted probabilities for the onset of strategic rivalry are calculated using the coefficients from
Models 1 and 2. Baseline probabilities are calculated using the means or modes for each variable.

The effects of linkage formation are also further illustrated in Table 4.5, which
displays the distribution of militarized disputes and wars observed across rivalries with
varying numbers of rivalry linkages as well as the number that one would have expected
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to observe by chance. This table shows that rivalries with low numbers of linkages
experienced fewer MIDs, and that fewer of these MIDs became complex or escalated to
war, than would have been expected by chance. Conversely, rivalries with a large number
of active linkages generally experienced more conflict than would have been expected if
linkages had no effect on rivals' behavior. For example, while rivalries with 0 linkages
would have been expected by chance to experience about 30 dyad-years which included
MIDs, they experienced only 18. Likewise, they would have been expected by chance to
have experienced about 16 dyad-years of with complex MIDs and about 14 dyad-years of
war, but experienced only 3 and 6 dyad years of each, respectively. Thus, isolated
rivalries appear to be less dispute-prone, have fewer complex MIDs and experience fewer
wars. Conversely, the most highly linked rivalries experience about twice as many dyadyears of disputes as would be expected by chance and almost four times as many dyadyears of war.

Table 4.5: Observed and Expected Frequencies of Dyad-Years with MIDs, Complex
MIDs and War by the Number of Rivalry Linkages
Number of Rivalry Linkages
(Number of dyad-years)

MID
(Expected)
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Complex MID
(Expected)

War
(Expected)

0 linkages
(N = 201)

18
(30.4)

3
(15.6)

10
(13.5)

1 to 10 linkages
(N = 2,295)

267
(347.2)

141
(178.2)

111
(154.4)

11 to 20 linkages
(N = 786)

172
(118.9)

96
(61)

84
(52.9)

21 to 30 linkages
(N = 396)

89
(59.9)

46
(30.7)

29
(26.9)

31 to 40 linkages
(N =83)

23
(12.6)

6
(6.4)

19
(5.6)

569

292

253

82.597***

49.424***

68.488***

Total
(N=3,761)
Pearson Chi-Squared

Conclusion
In this chapter, I sought to accomplish three major goals. First, I endeavored to
test several common assumptions about the impact of rivalry linkages on rivals' dispute
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behavior. While previous studies proceeded on the basis of the assumption that rivalry
linkages encouraged dispute expansion and that complex MIDs were more likely than
other disputes between rivals to escalate to war, these studies had not tested these claims.
This chapter provides strong evidence that linkages do actually promote dispute
expansion and that dispute expansion does have an effect on the risk of war. It therefore
suggests that, despite inconsistent empirical results, previous studies were on the right
track in regards to the connection between linkages and conflict. Second, I also sought to
construct a more fully developed explanation of the effects of the accumulation of rivalry
linkages on rivals' conflict behavior. This explanation fleshed out the mechanisms linking
third party conflicts to rivalry dynamics, and yielded a novel set of testable propositions
about the impact of linkages on the risk of mid onset, and on the risk that dyadic (or in
other words, non-complex) MIDs would escalate to war. Finally, I also sought to test my
arguments about the effects of rivalry linkages, and those of previous studies, in a more
methodologically sophisticated way. I constructed my measure of rivalry linkages in such
a fashion that it took into account changes in the number of linkages over time, and my
analyses made use of bivariate probit models in order to address the possibility of
selection bias.
The results produced by my analyses lend strong support to my arguments about
the effects of rivalry linkages. As rivalries accumulate larger numbers of ties to other
conflicts, they face a greater probability of MID onset, expansion and escalation to war.
The consistency of the effects associated with rivalry linkages suggests that they deserve
an important place in models of rivalry development and of conflict processes more
generally. To some extent, these results vindicate the claims of Diehl and Goertz (2000)
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and show that many of their expectations about the effects of rivalry linkages were
correct. They also demonstrate that these relationships hold for all forms of rivalry
linkage, not just shared dispute linkages. However, these results suggest that scholars
need to pay greater attention to the ways in which the number of active rivalry linkages
changes over time and incorporate these dynamics into their theoretical arguments.
Rather than being static features of the external environment which distinguish some
rivalries from others, linkage formation can be better thought as a byproduct of the
process by which all rivals compete with one another. As illustrated in this chapter, the
extent to which this security competition results in the formation of rivalry linkages is
likely to have important implications for the frequency and severity of the conflicts that
rivals experience.
Future research could build on these findings in several ways. One possibility
would be to examine how rivalry linkages affect other aspects of dispute behavior, such
as the duration of disputes. Following the arguments developed here, it seems plausible
that linkages should make MIDs more protracted and difficult to result to resolve since
linkages reduce the issue-space available for negotiated settlements. Likewise, it may
also be worthwhile to examine how the effects of rivalry linkages vary across different
phases of the rivalry life-cycle. If conflict between rivals does tend to follow an
escalatory pattern as several recent studies suggest, then one might expect that linkage
formation would be especially dangerous when it links together older, more intense
rivalries. Conversely, if the punctuated equilibrium models are correct, linkage would be
most important during the early stages of rivalry when conditions are still uncertain and
patterns of behavior have not yet been locked into place. It is also possible that the
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formation of linkages might influence the process by which rivalries evolve, with
densely-linked rivalries perhaps escalating more quickly than more isolated rivalries.
Further exploration of these extra-dyadic aspects of rivalry is likely to contribute
significantly to our understanding of the processes that drive rivalry development. While
rivalry research has made a significant advance in identifying and isolating the small
number of dyads which account for most of the world's militarized conflict, we are only
just now beginning to learn what it is that these dyads have in common and what ties
them together. In demonstrating and the explaining the relationship between rivalry
linkages and conflict, this chapter makes small but meaningful contribution to this task.
With further work, scholars may gain insights necessary to begin to map these linkages,
so that future Sarejevos can be identified and addressed before new conflicts emerge and
spread.

CHAPTER V
DE-LINKING INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES
Introduction
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In 1989, following a series of meetings off the coast of Malta, President George
H.W. Bush and Communist Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made a public declaration
announcing that the Cold War was over. In doing so, they brought a symbolic end to
nearly fifty years of intense security competition between the United States and Soviet
Union. Over the previous decades, both states had established far flung networks of
alliances and military bases, supported proxy wars in places like Nicaragua and Angola,
and intervened directly in conflicts to support client regimes in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
With the Malta declaration, they seemed poised to make a dramatic shift in policy,
moving away from a strategy predicated on global competition and rivalry towards one
that emphasized cooperation as means of the primary means of dealing with disputes.
The termination of the US-Soviet rivalry had profound consequences for many
other longstanding conflicts in the international system. Around the world, many
American and Soviet clients experienced dramatic decreases in the levels of support that
they received from their superpower patrons. Some, like the Barre regime in Somalia or
the communist government in Afghanistan, quickly collapsed, as this loss of support left
them unable to fend off domestic challengers. Others, like the Castro regime in Cuba, we
were able to hold on to power, but were forced to severely limit their foreign policy
endeavors. As a result, many of these client states were left unable or unwilling to
continue participating in rivalries that they had maintained during the Cold War. Of the
26 enduring rivalries in which at least one participant had an alliance with the US or
Soviet Union in 1989, 12 had come to an end by 1995.
The wave of rivalry terminations that followed the end of the Cold War provides a
dramatic example of the potential effects of rivalry de-linking. If rivalry linkages serve to
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facilitate security competition and exacerbate rivalry conflict, as the previous two
chapters suggest, then it seems plausible that the termination of these linkages may help
to shorten rivalry. As in the case of the Cold War, the de-linking of great power rivalries
from those of their minor power clients can interrupt the flow of aid and support to these
conflicts, and remove a potential point of confrontation between great powers. In
addition, de-linking may make also it easier to resolve regional security issues or prevent
the spread of conflicts across rivalries. Consequently, the study of de-linking points to
one of the most important policy implications of research on rivalry linkages, as it
suggests that by finding ways to disconnect rivalries, policymakers may be able to bring
some of them to an end.
In this chapter, I examine the effects of de-linking on the duration of international
rivalries. In doing so, I turn my attention to a new dependent variable, rivalry termination,
which has yet to be examined by linkage research. In the next section, I begin by briefly
reviewing the expectations of past research in regards to the likely effects of rivalry delinking. Most of this research suggests that de-linking should tend to lengthen rivalry
because it frees up foreign policy resources which states can redirect towards competition
with their primary enemies. I then present my own set of arguments drawn from the
theoretical claims about the causes and consequences of rivalry linkages that were
developed in the previous two chapters. These arguments suggest that de-linking should
shorten rivalry because it removes avenue for the diffusion of militarized disputes across
rivalries and facilitates the diplomatic resolution of disputes. In addition, these arguments
are also consistent with those of Diehl and Goertz (2000), who assert that de-linking
should tend to shorten rivalry because it provides an exogenous shock which should serve
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to disrupt the stability of rivalry relationships. In the third section of this paper, I discuss
the data and methods that I use to assess the impact of de-linking on rivalry duration,
while the fourth section presents the results of my analyses. In the fifth section, I
conclude with a short discussion of the implications of these findings for rivalry research
and for policymakers seeking ways to help bring rivalries to an end.

The Effects of De-Linking on Rivalry Duration
In regards to the effects of de-linking, most studies in the rivalry literature
emphasize some variation of what Valeriano (2003, 163) describes as the “rivalry
weariness” argument. According to this view, states are believed to possess a finite
amount of foreign policy resources, some of which must be distributed across all of the
conflicts in which the state is involved. Thus, these studies typically assume that the
resources of states which are involved in multiple rivalries, or whose rivalries entail
connections to many other ongoing conflicts, will be spread more thinly than those who
can focus their attention on a smaller number of issues or enemies (Colaresi 2007).
From this perspective, de-linking essentially reduces the number of issues or
enemies with which a state must be concerned. This is believed to help free up resources
which states can then redirect towards security competition with their primary rivals.
Consequently, de-linkage may make it easier for states to sustain their remaining
rivalries, and thus increase rivalry duration. In this regard, states may even have an
incentive to try to terminate rivalries or rivalry linkages in order to free up military or
political resources for use against other enemies. For example, during the late 1800s, the
British Empire sought to peacefully resolve outstanding colonial rivalries with minor
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powers like China and the United States in order to better focus its attention on what was
believed to be a much more serious major-power rivalry with Germany (Friedburg 1988).
Had the British been unable to terminate these rivalries, it seems plausible that they might
have found it more difficult to compete with Germany, and perhaps might have even been
forced to drop out of the rivalry before the onset of World War I.
In addition, some studies working within the rivalry weariness perspective also
argue that rivalry termination should become more likely as the number of linkages
increases. This argument is based on the assumption that all states possess some sort of
limit on the number of conflicts that they can be involved in at any given time. When
states acquire new rivalries or when their rivalries become linked to other conflicts, this
places additional demands on states' resources. As these demands accumulate they can
force states to make tough decisions about their security priorities, perhaps even leading
states to make concessions in order to terminate rivalries that they consider to be an
unnecessary drain on their resources. Bennett (1996, 1998) casts this argument in terms
of the security benefits of rivalry termination, which he suggests are greater for states that
are involved in other ongoing rivalries and which face a greater number of external
threats. He argues that rivalries are more likely to terminate when their participants are
under greater levels of external threat and would therefore benefit more by ending their
competition and shifting their resources elsewhere.
Thompson (1995, 201) makes a similar claim as part of his efforts to encourage to
scholars to identify rivalries primarily in terms of decision makers’ perceptions rather
than the occurrence of militarized disputes. He asserts that policymakers that are involved
in ongoing conflicts with multiple enemies cannot take them all equally seriously.
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Instead, they prioritize and rank their opponents, and devote greater attention to those that
they consider the most important. Consequently, as states accumulate larger numbers of
rivals, the less important rivalries are likely to deescalate or even lay dormant because
policymakers have focused their attention elsewhere. For Thompson, this means that
most approaches to identifying rivalry probably overestimate the number of conflicts that
are active at any one time. Instead, he suggests researchers would be better off focusing
only on those conflicts that policymakers consider to be their principal rivalries.
In sum, the rivalry weariness argument suggests that de-linking may increase
rivalry duration because it frees up resources and reduces the costs of rivalry
maintenance. Likewise, it also suggests that rivalries which accumulate more linkages
should be at greater risk of termination because the states involved face greater demands
on their resources.
However, there are some reasons to be skeptical of the claim that de-linking
should tend to lengthen rivalry. For one thing, this argument has never been tested
empirically, and the question of how rivalries are affected by changes in relationships
with third party conflicts remains an open one. Furthermore, while many studies suggest
that states can eventually become overwhelmed as they accumulate rivalries and become
involved in greater numbers of conflict, few specify precisely what this state of rivalry
weariness looks like, and there are no measures in place for assessing how many conflicts
states are capable of managing at any one time. Thus, while there are few examples of
states that seem to have grown weary of rivalry, such as Britain in the late nineteenth
century or the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century, it is unclear just how pervasive
the phenomenon of rivalry weariness is, or the extent to which these concerns influence
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decision-makers. Indeed, one of the primary lessons of rivalry research is that these
relationships tend to take on a life of their own, and that policymakers often pursue
competition with rivals even when the costs of that competition appear to be
unsustainable19.
In addition, there are also some studies which suggest that de-linking should
increase the risk of rivalry termination. Goertz and Diehl (1995), for instance, argue that
de-linking is a form of external political shock. External shocks are typically
conceptualized as highly visible events which have an immediate impact on states that
cannot be easily ignored by policymakers (Hermann 1990, 12). When external shocks
occur, they force states to reconsider existing policies and can serve as the impetus for the
making a major changes. For example, the onset of shocks like outbreak of the World
War I, the collapse of the Soviet Union, or President Nixon’s visit to China, all brought
about significant foreign policy adjustments in the states that they affected. Along these
lines, rivalry de-linking is a shock which disconnects a rivalry from a third-party conflict.
De-linking can result in the severing patron-client relationships, alter the balance of
capabilities between rivals, or simply disrupt existing patterns of international
interactions. Diehl and Goertz (1995) suggest these changes may potentially lead to either
the de-escalation of the rivalry or to an increase in conflict, but in either case, de-linking
is believed to increase volatility of rivals’ relations and make it more likely that the
rivalry will terminate.
At the domestic level, de-linking, like other external shocks, is also believed to
19

For example, Colaresi (2005) argues that high, or even seemingly unbearable, rivalry maintenance costs
are not a sufficient cause for rivalry deescalation. Instead, he suggests that rivalry deescalation is likely
only when high maintenance costs are combined with domestic political changes which create opportunities
for dovish political elites to wrest control over foreign policy away from hardliners.
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open up windows of opportunity for policy-makers to make major changes in foreign
policy. Here, Goertz and Diehl draw on work of policy-making scholars, such as Kingdon
(1984) and Tucker (1982), who have argued that major policy changes are only possible
during brief periods when the interests of major actors align in favor of change. Diehl and
Goertz (2001) argue that external shocks help to facilitate changes in the rivalry
relationship because they create uncertainty about the future and can disrupt the political
coalitions which maintain the status quo. Consequently, domestic actors who seek to
make major changes in foreign policy are expected to find it easier to do so in the
aftermath of external political shocks. These arguments are also supported by Colaresi
(2005, 23), who asserts that changes in third party relations frequently alter policymakers'
expectations about the future costs of rivalry maintenance. He argues that when
policymakers come to believe that the costs of rivalry will increase in the future, they are
much more likely to seek ways of terminating the rivalry. Thus, de-linking may increase
the risk of rivalry termination because it can remove some of the barriers which prevent
domestic actors from making major shifts in their states’ foreign policies.
The arguments developed in the previous two chapters of this dissertation also
suggest that de-linking should tend to shorten rivalry. Chapter 4 asserts that rivalry
linkages serve to facilitate security competition between rival states by connecting them
with allies and patrons who can provide them with competitive advantages, and perhaps
even fight alongside them in militarized disputes. Consequently, it suggests that the
disconnecting of rivalry linkages should generally tend to increase the costs of rivalry
maintenance and make large-scale conflicts more difficult to sustain. If these increases in
the costs of rivalry maintenance are great enough, then states should have an incentive to
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pursue rivalry termination.
In a similar vein, Chapter 5 argues that, once in place, linkages contribute to the
spread of militarized disputes across rivalries and increase the risk that third parties will
become involved in rivals’ interactions. Linked rivalries are therefore expected to
experience more conflict because they are prone to catch disputes which begin in other
dyads. These disputes are also believed to be more likely to escalate because the
involvement of third parties tends to make it easier to use force while also making it more
difficult for states to achieve a negotiated resolution to the conflict20. The empirical
analyses conducted in Chapter 5 lend support to these claims, finding that the number of
active rivalry linkages is significantly related to the risk of dispute onset, expansion and
escalation. Given these findings, one would expect that de-linking should tend to reduce
rivalry conflict and facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes. Over time, these changes
should result in an increased likelihood of rivalry termination, as rivals find it easier to
cooperate and the use of force becomes less common.
As a result, there are strong reasons to suspect that de-linking should tend to
shorten rivalry. De-linking creates an external shock that disrupts extant patterns of
international interactions and can create opportunities for domestic actors to make major
changes to the rivalry relationship. Thus, one would expect that risk of rivalry termination
would be greater in the period shortly after de-linking than at other times. Furthermore,
if, as chapters 4 and 5 suggest, rivalry linkages serve to facilitate security competition and
make negotiated settlements more difficult to achieve, then one would also expect that
20

Here, my arguments draw on number of studies (such as Bueno de Mesquita 1983 or Gochman and Maoz
1984) linking the involvement of third parties to conflict escalation. For a more complete review of this
literature, see Chapter 4.
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rivalry termination should be less likely when there are more linkages in place. Or in
other words, one would expect that rivalries which accumulate larger numbers of linkages
should tend to last longer than rivalries which remain relatively isolated. I investigate
these claims by testing the following two hypotheses:

H1: De-linking increases the risk of rivalry termination.
H2: As the number of rivalry linkages increases, the risk of rivalry termination will
decrease.

Data and Methods
In order to test the four hypotheses presented above, I employ a dataset containing
information about all 63 dyads identified by Diehl and Goertz (2000) as “enduring
rivalries” for the period 1816-2000. For each rivalry, I include an observation for each
year that the dyad remained in the rivalry. So, for example, France and Germany are
considered by Goertz and Diehl to have been rivals between 1830 and 1940. I include an
observation for each of those 110 years. Doing this for all enduring rivals results in a
sample of approximately 3,761 observations, with the rivalry-dyad year serving as the
unit of analysis.
I employ Cox proportional hazard models in order to investigate the relationship
between de-linking and rivalry termination. This approach offers advantages over other
methods, such as the use of logit, probit or grouped duration models, because it allows
corrections for censoring, heterogeneity21 and the presence of multiple failures 22(Beck

21

In order to account for heterogeneity across panels, I estimate all models with robust standard errors
clustered on the dyad.
22
There are some instances of multiple failures in the sample, in which a single dyad experiences more
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Katz and Tucker 1998). It is also more flexible than other types of hazard models, such as
Weibull models, because it is not specify a baseline hazard function before estimating the
coefficients. Consequently, it does not make any a priori assumptions about the nature or
shape of the hazard function. This is desirable because existing theory is not detailed
enough to justify the specification of a particular hazard function in advance.
The dependent variable in Cox proportional hazard models is the hazard rate, or
the risk of event failure at a given point in time. In all of the models estimated in this
chapter, event failure is rivalry termination. Following the procedures developed by Diehl
and Goertz (2000), rivalries are considered to have terminated during the same year as
their last militarized dispute, provided that that dispute was not followed by another
dispute during the next 10 years.
Rivalries that are still ongoing in the year 2000 are coded as continuing until the year of
observation, but are not considered to have experienced event failure.
I measure the effects of rivalry linkages on the risk of rivalry termination using
several different variables. As in previous chapters, rivalry linkages sums the number of
four types of linkages based on the presence of contiguity, alliances, common enemies
and shared disputes between rivalry dyads. I also include five dummy variables which
capture the effects of particular de-linkage episodes. Rivalry de-linkage is coded as 1 for
all dyad years in which at least one rivalry linkage is terminated. So for example, if two
rivalries were linked by an alliance, then de-linking would occur during the year that the
alliance expired. In many cases, de-linking occurs because one of the two rivalries has

than one rivalry and more than one instance of rivalry termination. For example, the Anglo-Russian dyad
experiences a rivalry between 1876 and 1923, and again between 1940 and 1999.
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been terminated. In these cases, all of the linkages which connected the two rivalries
would be considered to have been de-linked during the year of year of termination. So,
for instance, if two rivalries were linked by an alliance and a common border, and one of
these rivalries was terminated, the other would have been considered to have experienced
a de-linkage during that year.
In each of the models I also control for several factors identified by previous
studies as likely predictors of rivalry duration. First, I control for five dyadic variables
associated with rivalry characteristics. Minimum democracy records the composite
democracy scores (taken from the Polity IV data) for the lower-scoring state in the dyad.
It is created by subtracting the autocracy score values form the democracy score values
and ranges from -10 to 10, with higher scores indicating higher levels of democracy.
Minimum development is created in a similar fashion, by taking the level of economic
development of the less developed state in the dyad. Since reliable gross domestic
product data are not available for many countries for the period before 1950, economic
development is measured as per capita energy consumption using Correlates of War
(COW) project’s data on national material capabilities. Based on the findings of Prins and
Daxecker (2007), it is expected that rivalries will be more likely to terminate as dyads
become more democratic and more economically developed. War is simply variable that
records whether or a not the two states in the rivalry dyad were at with one another in a
given year, according to the (COW) data set. Although there is some disagreement about
whether wars should shorten or lengthen rivalry, most studies follow Goertz and Diehl
(1995) in treating wars as a dyadic shock which should increase the risk of rivalry
termination. I also control for joint alliance membership, with the expectation that rivals
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which form alliances with one another are likely to experience a higher level of
cooperation (at least while the alliance is in place) and should therefore be more likely to
terminate their rivalries. Joint alliance is a dummy variable which is coded as 1 for years
in which the two states in the rivalry dyad have an active defense pact with one another.
Finally, many studies suggest that rivalries should be more likely to terminate when the
distribution of power between adversaries becomes imbalanced, because stronger states
will be more likely to succeed in their efforts to dominate weaker rivals. I therefore
control for changes in the balance of power by first taking the COW Composite Index of
National Capabilities (CINC) score of the weaker state and dividing it by the score of the
stronger state (Stinnett and Diehl 2001). This produces a ratio that ranges from 0
(preponderance) to 1 (parity). To capture changes from one year to the next, I take the
difference between this ratio in the current year and this ratio in the previous year.
Rivalries are anticipated to be more likely to end when adversaries become more unequal
in power.
Second, using procedures described by Stinnett and Diehl (2001), I also create
three dummy variables which capture the effects of three different kinds of systemic
shocks—world wars, shifts in the distribution of power, and dramatic territorial
changes—that could increase the risk of rivalry termination. The first variable, world
war, captures the effects of an ongoing world war. It is coded as 1 for all dyads during
the years of World War I and World War II (1914-1918 and 1939-1945) and 0 otherwise.
Both world wars were major international conflicts which disrupted international
relationships and contributed to the termination of a number of rivalries (such as the
Anglo-German and Franco-Turkish rivalries). The second variable, power shift, is a
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dummy variable that indicates when there has “a pronounced and sustained shift in the
distribution of military capabilities” according to Stinnett and Diehl (2001, 730). This
variable is coded by Stinnett and Diehl as affecting all dyads for the years 1890-1901 and
1989-1992. It is expected that rivalries will be more likely to terminate during periods
when the distribution of power is shifting, because these changes alter the strategic
environment in which rivalries operate, and can disrupt patterns of alliances or change
states’ perceptions of who they consider to be threats. Finally, the variable territory shock
captures major changes in the distribution of territory. These changes often coincide with
the end of rivalries because they settle territorial disputes or create buffer states which
stand in between rivals that were once contiguous. According to Stinnett and Diehl
(2001, 730), territory shocks are considered to take place whenever “eight or more major
territorial changes occur, totaling at least five million square kilometers”. They code
territory shocks as affecting all dyads for the years 1884-1894 and 1956-1962.

Empirical Results
Table 5.1 presents the results of two Cox proportional hazard models in which
rivalry termination represents event failure. The results from Model 1 indicate, first of all,
that rivalry de-linkage has a significant impact on rivalry duration. On average, rivalry
termination is about three times more likely in years in which rivalry-delinking occurs.
This effect is quite substantial and is larger than that of any other variable in the model.
Model 2 assesses the effects of the number of active rivalry linkages on rivalry duration.
Here, the results indicate that the number of linkages also has a significant effect on
rivalry termination, with each additional linkage reducing the risk of termination by about
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5%. Thus, rivalries are less likely to end when they accumulate larger numbers of rivalry
linkages. Furthermore, this effect is expressed for as long the linkages remain in place, so
that if a rivalry forms a link to another conflict, it faces 5% greater chance of survival
each year until the linkage is removed. Given that the average rivalry has 10 such
connections in place at any one time, and that many connections last throughout the life
of the rivalry, this effect is potentially quite substantial.

Table 5.1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model Estimates of the Effects of Rivalry
Linkages on the Risk of Rivalry Termination
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Rivalry Linkages

0.963**

__
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Rivalry De-linkage
Minimum Democracy
Minimum Development
War
Change in Relative Power
World War Shock
Territory Shock
Power Shock

(0.015)
__
1.055**
(0.027)
1.029
(0.045)
1.720
(0.721)
0.037***
(0.057)
0.265*
(0.201)
0.681
(0.535)
0.531
(0.227)

3.398***
(0.891)
1.060**
(0.026)
1.003
(0.057)
1.314
(0.721)
0.037***
(0.057)
0.276
(0.235)
0.681
(0.535)
0.606
(0.267)

3,536
3,536
N
2
23.63
43.33
Wald χ
<0.01
<0.0001
Wald p-value
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Results reported are hazard ratios, robust standard errors
in parentheses.

Figures 1 and 2 graph the survival functions for rivalries produced by Models 1
and 2, respectively, and both figures illustrate the dramatic effects that rivalry linkages
have on the risk of rivalry termination over time. In Figure 5.1, one can see that rivalries
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which experienced de-linking
linking had a much lower rate of survival than rivalries which did
not experience de-linking.
linking. While all rivalries in the sample had a 100% chance of
survival during their first 20 years in existence23, only about 20% of the rivalries which
experienced delinking were still in place after 50 years, and virtually none lasted longer
than 60 years. In contrast, more than 60% of the rivalries which did not experience dede
linking were still in place after 50 years and many lasted 100 years or more. Thus, dede
linking appears to have a substantial impact on rivalry duration, as reduced the number of
rivalries which survive to 50 years of age by nea
nearly two-thirds.

Figure 5.1: Plot of the survival function of rivalry, varying rivalry de
de-linkage
linkage

23

This is a result of the way in which enduring rivalrie
rivalriess are identified by Diehl and Goertz (2000) which
requires a minimum duration of 20 years before a rivalry is considered to be “enduring”.
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Figure 5.2 plots the survival functions for three groups of rivalries with varying
numbers of rivalry linkages. The first group of rivalries, whose survival function is
illustrated by the blue line, accumulated a low number of rivalry linkages (five linkages).
This group experienced a relatively low probability of survival, with most of them
coming to an end before they reached 50 years of age. The second group, which is
illustrated by the red line, accumulated 10 linkages, which is close to mean for the
sample. This group experienced a slightly higher probability of survival with most
rivalries lasting a little longer than 50 years. Finally, the green line illustrates the third
group, which accumulated 30 linkages, a number which place it at around the 95th
percentile and just 10 linkages short of the maximum in the sample. This group had a
very high probability of survival, with a majority of rivalries lasting at least 75 years and
many lasting a hundred years or more. Consequently, this figure suggests that, consistent
with hypothesis H2, rivalry duration is influenced by the number of linkages which
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rivalries accumulate in their early years.

Figure 4.2: Plot of the survival function of rivalry, varying the number of rivalry
linkages
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As for the control variables, Models 1 and 2 produced fairly similar results. In
both models, rivalries were greater risk of termination in dyads that were more
democratic and where the distribution of power became more unequal. This is consistent
with previous studies which suggest that dyadic levels of democracy and the distribution
of power are among the most important predictors of rivalry duration. Rivalries were also
less likely to terminate in the aftermath of a world war in Model 1. This is somewhat
unexpected, as Goertz and Diehl (1995) argue that systemic shocks disrupt rivalry
relationships and generally increase the risk of termination. However, they also note that
the precise impact of any given shock is to some extent ambiguous, with shocks serving
to shorten some rivalries while lengthening others. In the case of world war shocks, the
positive effect on rivalry duration may reflect the fact that while World Wars I and II may
have contributed to the termination of some rivalries, they also coincided with the onset24
of many of the most enduring rivalries in the international system, such as the US-Soviet
rivalry (1946-1990), the Indo-Pakistani rivalry (1945-Present) and the rivalry between
North and South Korea (1948-Present).
In sum, the results of the analyses conducted in this chapter appear to confirm
both hypotheses H1 and H2. De-linkage seems to dramatically increase the risk of rivalry
termination while the accumulation of rivalry linkages appears to lengthen rivalry.
Consequently, these results lend support to the theory of the causes and consequences of
24

One of the problems with the external shock variables identified by Goertz and Diehl (1995) is that they
are expected to both terminate old rivalries and create new ones. Thus, if the number of new rivalries is
greater than the number of rivalries that were terminated, it is possible that shocks may appear to lengthen
rivalry.
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rivalry linkage developed in Chapters 4 and 5 and cast doubt on the claims of proponents
of the rivalry weariness argument. Yet it is perhaps too hasty to consider the rivalry
weariness argument as having been refuted altogether, for it remains quite plausible that
states do grow weary of participation in multiple rivalries, and that the accumulation of
rivalry linkages does place considerable strain on states' foreign policy resources.
However, the lesson of these analyses appears to be that even under conditions of great
weariness, states rarely succeed in terminating their rivalries, however much they may
want to. Instead, it seems as though rivalry linkages tie different conflicts together in
ways which make it more difficult to resolve them individually. Consequently, the rivalry
linkages which states may have formed originally as a means for gaining the upper hand
over their adversaries eventually come to stand in the way of peace, even after the costs
of security competition have increased to undesirable levels.

Conclusion
The analyses conducted in this chapter reveal evidence of a strong relationship
between rivalry linkages and rivalry duration. Rivalries which accumulated greater
numbers of linkages tended to last longer, and the severing of these linkages increased the
risk of rivalry termination. These findings provide support for hypotheses H1 and H2 and
are consistent with the theory of the causes and consequence of rivalry linkage developed
in Chapters 4 and 5. Thus, it appears that while states may originally form rivalry
linkages in attempt to gain competitive advantages over their adversaries, these
connections also serve to make the rivalry relationship more enduring and difficult to
terminate.
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As a result, this chapter makes a significant empirical contribution to rivalry
research. It offers an additional source of support for this dissertation’s theoretical
arguments about the effects of rivalry linkage, and confirms the expectations of previous
work, which had speculated that de-linking might shorten rivalry, but had not tested these
this claims. In addition, the findings generated here also cast doubt on the claim that
states tend to be more likely to terminate rivalries as they accumulate greater numbers of
rivalry linkages.
Future research could build on this chapter by further investigating the process by
which rivals respond to linkage and de-linkage. In particular, it would interesting to
explore the ways in which de-linking, as an external shock, may interact with domestic
conditions. For example, one might expect that de-linking would be more likely to result
in rivalry termination when it also coincided with changes in domestic political
leadership or institutions. Since rivalry relationships often deeply entrenched both
internationally and domestically, domestically political change of some sort may also be
necessary in order for successful rivalry termination to occur. Likewise, one might
wonder whether there are certain domestic political environments in which it is easier for
opponents to take advantage of the windows of opportunity provided by external shocks.
Regimes vary greatly in regards to the opportunities they provide for the domestic
opposition to criticize the leadership’s foreign policy choices, and in regards to the
information asymmetries that exist between political elites and the mass public (Colaresi
2005). These factors are likely to have an important effect on the extent to which changes
in international relationships are translated into changes in foreign policy.
The relationship that has been observed between linkages and rivalry termination
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also suggests several fairly obvious, but important, policy implications. First, these
findings reiterate the importance of preventing emerging rivalries from becoming linked
to other conflicts. While states in the early stages of rivalry are likely to find to find it
attractive to pursue support from third parties in their contests with their rivals, these
efforts appear likely to have unforeseen consequences which may complicate conflict
resolution efforts in later years. Second, this chapter also suggests that policymakers
seeking to deescalate rivalries would do well to focus some of their attention on rivals’
relations with third parties, since de-linking can substantially shorten rivalry.
Unfortunately, the other implication of this finding that bilateral mediation may not be
very successful as long third parties’ conflicts persist, and that in many cases
policymakers may have to address larger regional security issues for before much
progress can be made. However, if policymakers do succeed in bringing particular dyadic
rivalries to an end, this chapter points to the possibility that this may help to shorten other
rivalries as well. Indeed, the termination of a single densely linked rivalry, such as the
cold war rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union, may produce ripple effects
which could spread through much of the international system and be felt for years to
come.

156

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Introduction
“Mr. President, we and you ought not now pull on the ends of the rope in which
you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that
knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight
that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be
necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to
you, because you yourself understand perfectly what terrible forces our countries
dispose”—Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26,
1962 (Chang, Laurence, Kornbluh and McNamara 1998, 365).

This passage is an excerpt from a telegram sent from Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev to President John F. Kennedy on the eleventh day of the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Sometimes described as the “soft” telegram, it showed clear signs of the
psychological toll that the crisis had taken on the Soviet leader. It arrived in the middle of
the night, appeared to have been personally dictated by Khrushchev without consultation
with other Soviet leaders, and in Robert Kennedy's words, was “very long and emotional”
(Chang, Laurence, Kornbluh and McNamara 1998, 374). One of the prevailing themes of
the telegram and of other communiques between Khrushchev and Kennedy was that
while both leaders greatly wished to avoid war, they were each constrained by the
consequences of the others’ actions. In Khrushchev’s view, the United States’ decision to
support an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and its apparent willingness to do so
again, left him with no choice but to provide Cuba with a nuclear deterrent. Conversely,
Kennedy saw the deployment of missiles to Cuba as an event which dangerously
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destabilized the nuclear status quo, and which left him with no choice but to try and find
a way to remove them, by any means necessary. While each leader had initially made the
policy decisions that led up to the crisis for their own reasons, their actions ultimately
served to constrain their adversaries, and acted like knots which tied both leaders to a
course of events which they soon realized could lead to war. Their challenge, then, was to
find a way to loosen these knots and change course before they arrived at disaster.
Fortunately, Kennedy and Khrushchev were eventually able to reach an
agreement, and therefore avert what would likely have been the most costly military
conflict in human history. Yet the fact that they were only able to so after another two
days of intense negotiations, and after thirteen days of crisis altogether, speaks to just
how difficult it was to untie these knots of war. Throughout the crisis, both leaders found
themselves confronted with considerable pressure to escalate hostilities. It is now wellknown, thanks to the work of Graham Allison (1978), that many of these pressures were
internal in nature, arising from the organizational processes and standard operating
procedures associated with foreign policymaking. Yet it also worth pointing out that there
were considerable external pressures as well. For Kennedy, the Cuban Missile Crisis was
not merely about Cuba. It was also believed to have implications for the credibility of US
deterrent threats and defensive promises in general, and for domestic stability of many
US allies in Latin America who faced potential communist insurrections. Likewise, for
the Soviets, the defense of the Castro regime in Cuba was believed to be crucial to their
efforts to support other communist governments in the third world (Welch and Munton
2012). Thus, to some extent, the origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis can be said to lie in
the fact that US-Soviet rivalry had become connected to other conflicts and relationships
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involving third parties. While these connections were initially formed for a variety of
reasons, many ultimately came to have unintended consequences, raising the costs and
risks of US-Soviet competition and limiting the perceived freedom of action for both
sides.
This dissertation sought to investigate the causes and consequences of these kinds
of linkages between rivalries and third party conflicts. It has argued that while states often
form these connections as part of efforts to gain the upper the hand over their adversaries,
these linkages produce long term consequences that ultimately increase the duration of
the rivalry and increase the risk of war. Tragically, the empirical evidence suggests that
these kinds of linkages between dyadic conflicts are quite common and that they have
continued to form in the post-Cold War era. Thus, today, many states continue to be
bound by these knots of war.
In the next section of this concluding chapter, I begin briefly reviewing the
findings and contributions of this study. I then discuss in greater the greater detail the
implications of this work: First for researchers seeking to gain new insights into the
causes of international conflict, and then for policymakers who may be able to use this
knowledge to help mitigate or even prevent rivalry conflict. It is hoped that this
dissertation will provide some insights that are useful for both communities in their
efforts to understand the sources of international violence.

What Have We Learned About Rivalry Linkage?
This dissertation seeks to fill an important gap in rivalry research. While students
of rivalry had often observed that events in many rivalries appeared to be connected to
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other conflicts involving third parties, these extra-dyadic relationships had yet to receive
much attention from the rivalry literature. There was no theory that explained how or why
these linkages formed, and only a handful of studies had examined the effects of rivalry
linkage, with this work generally producing mixed empirical findings. Thus, when this
dissertation was begun, scholars knew very little about rivalry linkage.
The goal of this dissertation is to make progress towards addressing this gap by
developing and testing a theory of the causes and consequences of rivalry linkage. Each
of the three primary chapters presents a part of this theory and tests some of its
implications. When considered together, these chapters provide a coherent story about the
ways in which rival states become entangled in others’ conflicts, and the consequences
that this involvement has for the rivalry relationship. In addition, each chapter generates
new findings that shed light on important aspects of rivalry behavior. In the pages below,
I consider the contribution of each of these chapters in turn.
First, in Chapter 3, I begin by arguing that many rivalry linkages form as a
byproduct of the coercive foreign policy practices that rivals often employ in their
dealings with one another. Security competition between rivals is often guided by the
logic of realpolitik, which suggests that states can gain advantages over their adversaries
by forming alliances with others or by encouraging third parties to fight alongside them
in militarized disputes. When rival states employ these tactics successfully, they form
linkages between their rivalries and other dyads. This argument therefore suggests that
the formation of linkages is likely to be integral to the processes by which most rivalries
are developed and maintained. Consequently, it helps to explain why nearly all rivalries
form linkages at some point in their duration and why most rivalries form large number
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numbers of linkages; findings which had been considered anomalous by Diehl and Goertz
(2000). In addition, this argument helps to fill an important gap in the literature, which
had yet to provide any explanation for why linkages formed, and had instead tended to
treat linkages as a feature of the external environment.
In regards to its empirical findings, Chapter 3 helps to reveal some of the ways in
which states' involvement in rivalries can affect their relations with third parties. This is a
consequence of rivalry about which very little is known, and one which poses important
implications for the security of other states outside of the rivalry dyad. The analyses
conducted in Chapter 3 find that states involved in rivalry are more likely than other
states to form alliances and experience complex militarized disputes. These findings
contribute to the recent efforts by scholars such Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson (2007)
and Valeriano (2008), who have sought to integrate steps-to-war theory into rivalry
research and elucidate the connections between rivalry involvement and other forms of
conflict behavior. In addition, these findings also contribute to extant but separate
research literatures on the determinants of alliance formation and dispute expansion, and
suggest that work in these areas could benefit from a greater consideration of the
consequences of rivalry involvement.
In Chapter 4, I develop a theory of the consequences of rivalry linkage. It argues
that linkages serve to facilitate the diffusion of conflict across rivalries and promote the
escalation of militarized disputes. While similar claims have been made by previous
studies, they did not fully explain the mechanisms connecting the formation of rivalry
linkages to states' behavior in militarized disputes and relied on some untested
assumptions about the relationship between linkages and dispute expansion. Furthermore,
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the results of previous attempts to test of these arguments had been mixed. This chapter
provides a more fully developed theory that explains why linkages promote the expansion
of militarized disputes, and why the involvement of third parties increases the likelihood
of dispute onset and escalation.
The empirical analyses in Chapter 4 provide substantial support for these
theoretical arguments, finding that greater numbers of linkages were associated with
dispute onset, expansion and escalation to war. Consequently, these findings make a
significant contribution to rivalry research. They vindicate the theoretical claims of
previous studies which argued that linkages resulted in higher levels of rivalry conflict,
but also lend support to several new arguments about the consequences of third party
involvement for rivals’ conflict behavior. Thus, these results suggest that linkages are an
important influence on the risk of conflict between rivals. Furthermore, since most
international conflict occurs within the context of rivalry, this suggests that rivalry
linkages deserve a place within research on international conflict more broadly.
Methodologically, the analyses in this chapter also improve on the techniques that
have been employed in previous studies of rivalry linkage. Unlike past research, this
chapter uses a measure of rivalry linkages which takes all forms of linkage into account
and which accommodates changes in the number of linkages over time. The chapter also
addresses the problem of selection bias, which could arise because linkages affect both
the onset and escalation of disputes. Future studies investigating rivalry linkages could
follow the approach employed by this chapter to uncover new findings about the role that
linkages play in rivals’ conflict processes.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I examine the effects of rivalry linkages on rivalry duration.
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Here, the literature had been divided between studies that asserted the accumulation of
rivalry linkages tended to lengthen rivalry and others which suggested that it might have
the opposite effect. The analyses in this chapter provide the first direct test of both
arguments by using hazard models to assess the impact of changes in the number of
rivalry linkages on the risk of rivalry termination. The results of this analysis indicate that
rivalries which acquire greater numbers of linkages tend to last longer and that the delinking of international rivalries substantially increases the risk of rivalry termination.
These results are therefore supportive of the first view and of the theory of the causes and
consequences of rivalry linkage developed in the previous two chapters. Consequently,
they suggest that a greater consideration of rivalry linkages can contribute to scholarly
understanding of the determinants of rivalry duration, one of the least developed areas of
rivalry research.

Future Research
Future research could build on contributions of this dissertation in two general
ways. First, this dissertation suggests that many studies of interstate conflict processes
could potentially benefit from the incorporation of variables that measure rivalry
linkages. Since rivalry linkages have been shown here to have an effect on many aspects
of rivalry behavior, it seems likely that they can contribute to the explanatory power of
many existing empirical models by serving as control variables. For example, Goertz
Jones and Diehl (2005) have developed an influential model of rivalry maintenance
which links the occurrence of new disputes between rivals to the failure of these states to
achieve a decisive resolution to their conflicts in previous confrontations. In this regard,
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they find that disputes are more likely to recur when they end in stalemates and entail the
use of higher levels of force. Yet, the overall explanatory power of their model is
relatively low and most of their variables become insignificant in the enduring rivalry
phase of the rivalry relationship. This may be because Goertz, Jones and Diehl do not
include any variables in their model that are related to factors or conditions that lie
outside of the rivalry dyad. Given the findings in the Chapters 4 and 5, one would expect
that these kinds of variables would play an important role in the maintenance of rivalry.
In particular, these chapters seem to suggest that militarized disputes would be more
likely to continue to recur in rivalry dyads with larger numbers of active rivalry linkages,
since linkages may introduce new conflicts into the rivalry or exacerbate disagreements
between rivals. Thus, it seems likely that the explanatory power of this model could be
enhanced by incorporating some sort of measure of rivalry linkage. In a similar fashion,
many other models of rivalry behavior could likely be improved by incorporating some
measure of rivals’ extra-dyadic relationships.
In addition, measures of rivalry linkage may also help to improve the explanatory
power of existing models of rivalry by serving as interaction terms which magnify or
dampen the effects associated with other variables. For example, because measures of
rivalry linkage provide an indication of the nature of a rivalry’s connection to the broader
rivalry environment, they may help to explain variation in regards to how different
rivalries are affected by systemic conditions and events, such as the “systemic shocks”
identified by Diehl and Goertz (2000). Systemic shocks are events such as world wars or
dramatic changes in the distribution of territory or power, which disrupt the stability of
rivalry relationships. Consequently, they are believed to be a “modest necessary
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condition” for the onset and termination of rivalry and are an important part of
punctuated equilibrium models of rivalry development (Goertz and Diehl 1995, 30). Yet,
in many empirical analyses (including those conducted here), variables related to
systemic shocks have generally failed to exhibit statistically significant effects on the
probability rivalry onset (Stinnett and Diehl 2001) or termination (Bennett 1996). These
null findings have been puzzling because, in terms of descriptive statistics, most rivalries
do begin and end shortly after some sort of external shock. The failure of empirical
studies to uncover statistically significant relationships linking shocks to changes in
rivalry relationships have led some scholars, such as Colaresi (2005), to argue that the
punctuated equilibrium model is underspecified, and that some additional variables need
to be incorporated into the model in order to explain when and where the effects of
shocks will be most likely to be observed.
This dissertation suggests that a measure of rivalry linkage might be one such
variable. Given the findings of Chapter 5, one might expect that systemic shocks would
be more likely to result in rivalry termination when they coincide with the severing of
rivalry linkages. While systemic shocks may have some effect on rivalries throughout the
international system these effects should be larger when they disrupt the external
environment that is relevant for a particular rivalry. Thus, it seems plausible that World
War I, for instance, was a systemic shock that had a larger impact on European rivalries
than on rivalries in say, Central America. Thus, by interacting variables related to
systemic shocks with measures of rivalry linkage, researchers may be able to see more
clearly how these events disrupt rivalry relationships.
A second direction for future research would be to examine some of the new
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research questions which are raised by this dissertation. For example, in Chapter 3, I
argue that states involved in rivalries were especially likely to form external alliances and
to encourage third parties to join their disputes because these behaviors were portrayed
by realist foreign policy thinking as providing a source of competitive advantages for
states involved in security competition. Yet this argument does not explain how states go
about deciding which third parties to pursue alliances with or to invite into their disputes.
Future research could build on this chapter by further investigating the motivations for
alliance formation and dispute expansion within the context of rivalry. For example, one
might investigate whether states are more likely to seek out support from third parties
with whom they which share similar values or ideology, or one might explore the extent
to which states take extant rivalry linkages into account when selecting potential alliance
partners.
One could also take this line of inquiry a step further, and examine whether there
are broader patterns in the ways in which linkages connect different groups of rivalries.
For instance, during the Cold War, many rivalry linkages connected the US-Soviet
conflict with the rivalries of minor power clients. In many cases, regimes tended to ally
with or fight alongside the great power with whom they were the most similar
ideologically. Furthermore, when one state in a rivalry established an alliance or patronclient relationship with the US or Soviet Union, their rivals often found it much easier to
acquire support from the other side of the US-Soviet conflict. One might wonder whether
there are also patterns in the structure of rivalry linkages today, and if so, what effects
these patterns have on rivalry dynamics. For instance, is conflict between minor power
rivals more likely when they are allied with opposite sides of a great power rivalry? Or do
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great powers restrain their clients in order to prevent them from increasing the costs and
risk associated with their own competition? In addition, it might be worthwhile to
investigate whether certain types of distributions of rivalry linkages are associated with
higher levels of conflict across the international system. In this regard, one might ask
whether wars and militarized disputes were more likely to spread across rivalries prior to
World War II, when patterns of rivalry linkages tended to be complex with many different
overlapping systems of alliances and multiparty conflicts, or in the period during the Cold
War, when rivalries tended to have higher numbers of linkages but with clearer patterns
of alignment.
Research along into these kinds of broader relationships involving multiple states
would likely require the development of new sources of data and methodological tools.
Here, some interesting progress has been made by scholars such as Maoz (2011), who
have begun to employ social network analysis to examine the ways in which international
interactions are affected by the formation of complex relationships between multiple
states. In a similar fashion, the utilization of social network analysis could open new
opportunities for rivalry researchers by permitting them to better examine how rivalries
are affected by extra-dyadic relationships. While this dissertation has shed light on the
effects of extra-dyadic relationships between rivals, it is merely a first step in this
direction. Researchers using social network analysis could build on this dissertation by
examining whether rivalry linkages exhibit effects at greater degrees of separation or
whether rivalry dynamics are influenced by rivalries’ changing positions within the
broader network of rivalry linkages. In this regard, one could investigate whether rivalries
located near the core of rivalry networks behave differently from rivalries located at the
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periphery. Thus, by expanding their focus beyond the rivalry dyad, researchers can
potentially open up many promising new agendas for rivalry research.
New research questions are also raised by Chapter 4, which argues that rivalry
linkages tend to encourage the spread of conflicts across rivalries and the escalation of
disputes to war. Yet while these results of the analyses in this chapter provide support for
these claims, they did not directly examine the mechanisms by which linkages contribute
to the onset, expansion or escalation of disputes. Future research could build on this
chapter by using case studies to examine in greater detail the role of linkages in the
dispute escalation process. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate the ways in
which rivalry linkages affect how leaders behave during disputes or interpret external
threats. For example, to what extent are leaders aware of linkages during confrontations
with their rivals, and how do they go about trying to predict how third parties will
respond to different conflict trajectories? Furthermore, how do these decision-making
processes change as the number of rivalry linkages increases? By comparing the dispute
escalation process in rivalries with varying numbers of linkages, and perhaps with
disputes that occur between non-rivals, scholars could gain valuable insights into how
these third-party relationships influence foreign policy decision-making.
Another opportunity for further inquiry suggested by Chapter 4 concerns the
process by which rivalries “catch” others’ disputes. This dissertation has generally
followed the conflict diffusion literature in treating the diffusion process probabilistically.
Linkages increase the risk that disputes may spread across dyads, but the question of
what actually causes the diffusion in any particular case is left open. Future research
could benefit from examining more closely the factors which influence states' decisions
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about whether or not join a dispute in a linked dyad. A greater understanding of the
motivations behind dispute-joining could potentially tell us much about the dangers
associated with linkage and perhaps help to identify “hot spots” where diffusion is
especially likely. In addition, we might also be able to learn whether there are particular
factors that mitigate dispute expansion. This knowledge, in turn, could help lead to policy
recommendations about how to manage enduring multiparty conflicts.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I observe that rivalries which accumulated larger numbers of
linkages tended to last longer, while de-linking substantially increased the risk of rivalry
termination. These findings help to highlight the effects that the accumulation of rivalry
linkages have on rivalry duration, but they also raise a number of additional questions
which could be explored further. For example, drawing on the discussion of social
network analysis above, one might wonder whether de-linking has a greater impact on
rivalries that are on the periphery of rivalry networks, or whether delinking may have
affects that are expressed over several degrees of separation. Another possibility for
further inquiry concerns the mechanisms by which de-linking terminates rivalry. Most
studies have tended to emphasize the termination of patronage resources like foreign aid
or alliances, and this dissertation has also suggested that de-linking can encourage rivalry
de-escalation because it removes an avenue for the expansion of militarized disputes.
Along these lines, it would interesting to examine the effects of changes in military aid
distribution on the duration of rivalry or to explore how dispute joining and escalation
processes may change after linkages are severed.
Ultimately, this dissertation points to a number of ways by which greater
consideration of rivalry linkages could contribute to the rivalry research program.
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Whether this means simply integrating linkage variables into existing models or opening
entirely new lines of inquiry, these new research possibilities are united by the fact that
they all entail pushing the rivalry research beyond its focus on the rivalry dyad and
towards the consideration of how rivalries fit into broader structures of international
relationships. While this dissertation has taken only a small step in this direction, and has
largely proceeded using the dyadic research designs that are already common in the
literature, the apparent significance of external linkages for so many of aspects of rivals'
behavior points to the considerable promise associated with this approach. In the future,
scholars may come to think of rivalries more as an interconnected network of
international relationships than as a set of dangerous dyads. From this perspective, the
dyadic conflict processes associated with rivalry are still important, but they are only part
of a larger story.

Policy Implications
This dissertation's findings raise a number of potential implications for
policymakers. Most of these are useful for mediators seeking to mitigate conflicts
between rivals, but there are also others which are relevant for policymakers working in
the realm of national security. In regards to conflict mediation, the most obvious
implication of this study is that mediators may need to address third party conflicts before
rivalries can be successfully brought to an end. This may mean that diplomatic
interventions need to be multilateral in nature, or that mediators may need to begin by
focusing on resolving ancillary disputes involving third parties before moving on to
address the key issues underlying the rivalry. This does suggest that rivalry linkages are
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likely to make conflict management efforts more difficult in most cases, but it may be
possible to use an understanding of rivalry linkages to identify the most important third
party relationships for a given rivalry, and thus help meditators decide where to focus
their efforts. Furthermore, continued research into rivalry linkages may help to reveal
connections between conflicts that are not immediately obvious, and therefore help to
elucidate some of the third party relationships that could hinder future negotiations or
increase the risk that militarized conflicts might spread.
Another implication of this study is that conflict mediation between rivals, when
successful, may produce ripple effects which spread outward through linkages to
influence other conflicts. If mediators succeed in their efforts to terminate an ongoing
rivalry, then this would effectively de-link that rivalry from all of the other rivalries with
which it is connected, something which Chapter 5 suggests would increase the risk that
these other rivalries might terminate as well. In addition, rivalry termination would also
remove a node from the broader rivalry network and perhaps hinder the spread of
conflicts across different rivalry dyads. Thus, research into rivalry linkages suggests that
rivalry termination is a worthwhile endeavor and that enduring rivalries, even those that
seem to have gone “cold”, should continue to be an important concern for policymakers
for as long they are in place. In this regard, future research into rivalry linkages might
allow policymakers to identify and target particular rivalries that appear to be important
for sustaining the broader rivalry system, and therefore facilitate efforts to reduce the
occurrence of international conflict across the entire international system.
Finally, this dissertation also suggests that one of the most important things that
mediators can do is to try to prevent states from forming rivalry linkages in the first
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place. Once established, most linkages tend to last until near the end of the rivalry and
they often contribute to the formation of complex multilateral conflict relationships that
can be very difficult to unravel. Consequently, the best option for policymakers is likely
to be to try to prevent these linkages from forming while rivalries are still young. For
example, in dyads that appear to be in the early stages of rivalry, mediators could work to
resolve outstanding disputes between those states and third parties, or try to discourage
them from forming alliances with other states that are already involved in rivalries of
their own. Of course, these efforts are likely to be very difficult, but they do offer hope
that emerging clusters of linked rivalries can be identified, and perhaps disconnected,
before conflicts begin to spread between them.
For policymakers working in the area of national security, this dissertation also
suggests several recommendations. First of all, the possibility that conflicts may diffuse
across rivalry linkages suggests that states involved in rivalries need to be aware that
potential conflicts may arise not just from disputes with their own rivals but also from
disputes that begin in rivalries between third parties with whom they are linked. Thus,
policymakers should be aware of what rivalries they are connected to and of the
possibility that actions that they take in regards to their own rivalries may have
consequences for others. Given the difficulty of managing multiparty disputes and the
danger that they may escalate to war, states may need to consider disconnecting
themselves from particularly dangerous rivalries by terminating alliances or patron-client
relationships.
In a similar vein, this dissertation also suggests that policymakers need to think
more carefully about engaging in foreign policy behaviors that tend to promote the
172

formation of rivalry linkages. While there are many potential reasons (as described in
Chapter 3) why activities such as the pursuit of alliances or deliberate expansion of
militarized disputes may seem attractive to rivals in the short term, this dissertation
suggests these actions often end up increasing the costs and duration of the rivalry. Thus,
states may be better off in the long run if they forgo some of the advantages that might
follow from third party involvement and try to keep rivalry conflicts within the dyad.
In sum, this dissertation suggests that international rivalries are about more than
just a history of conflict and grievances between a pair of adversaries. They often entail
the involvement of third parties who influence the course of rivalry development and who
sometimes participate in it by joining in rivals’ militarized disputes. While this
dissertation has found that these third party relationships generally tend to exacerbate
rivalries, its findings also point to the possibility that third parties may also be able to use
their influence to deescalate them as well. By discouraging third party involvement, or by
encouraging third parties to intervene in rivalry conflicts as mediators rather than disputejoiners, policymakers may be able to help manage these conflicts, and ultimately, loosen
some of the knots of war.
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